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Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Smith
Citations: 177 A.3d 640; 457 Md. 159Docket: 26ag/16
Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland; January 19, 2018; Maryland; State Supreme Court
Original Court Document: View Document
In the matter of Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Edward Smith Jr., the Court concluded that Edward Smith Jr. exhibited severe professional misconduct, which warranted disbarment. Key findings included Smith's incompetence, lack of diligence, and failure to communicate with clients. He also mismanaged client funds by not keeping them in a trust account before they were earned, commingled funds, and made misrepresentations to both Bar Counsel and clients. His actions violated multiple Maryland Attorney’s Rules of Professional Conduct, including rules concerning competence, diligence, communication, safekeeping property, and record-keeping. The Attorney Grievance Commission filed two petitions against him in 2016, which were consolidated for a hearing. Judge Yvette M. Bryant presided over a four-day evidentiary hearing in 2017, after which she determined, by clear and convincing evidence, that Smith’s conduct constituted violations of various professional conduct rules. The Court affirmed these findings and supported the conclusion that disbarment was the appropriate sanction. Smith, admitted to practice in Maryland since 1975, had previously managed a law practice in Baltimore and employed a former client, Calvin Robinson-Bey, to assist with drafting petitions after Robinson-Bey's post-conviction release. Respondent represented Mr. DaJuan Marshall in drafting a post-conviction petition following Marshall's life sentence plus 20 years for a conviction upheld by the Court of Appeals in 2013. Disputes arose regarding the start date of Respondent's representation, which began with consultations by Marshall’s parents in Spring 2014. Respondent agreed to review trial transcripts and charge a flat fee of $7,500, but there is no documentation confirming when he definitively agreed to represent Marshall. Communication between Respondent and Marshall was inadequate; aside from one letter in May 2014, Respondent initiated no further written communications and never met Marshall in person. During the attorney-client relationship, which ended in December 2014, Marshall and his parents primarily communicated with Mr. Robinson-Bey, who was not formally recognized as an attorney. Respondent did not provide adequate counsel regarding the post-conviction petition's content or the urgency of preserving federal rights. Ultimately, Respondent failed to file the petition on time, leading to Marshall losing his chance for federal habeas corpus relief, a situation Respondent attributed to Marshall's reliance on advice from other inmates rather than taking responsibility for his own shortcomings. Respondent's records lack documentation of his communications with Marshall, and he expressed no remorse for the outcome, blaming Marshall instead. The court determined that the Respondent's lack of communication and direct involvement in Mr. Marshall's post-conviction case contributed to his inability to recall pertinent facts and respond to specific questions regarding his representation. Although the Respondent's limited engagement led to Mr. Marshall's dissatisfaction, it did not result in the failure to preserve his federal habeas corpus rights. After receiving the transcript, the Respondent assigned Mr. Robinson-Bey to draft the post-conviction petition without personally preparing or reviewing it. The court established that the Respondent did not supervise Mr. Robinson-Bey’s work and failed to read the petition before presenting it to Marshall in December 2014. To preserve his federal habeas corpus rights, Mr. Marshall needed to initiate post-conviction proceedings within one year of the denial of his petition for writ of certiorari on December 23, 2013. The court noted that while Respondent's actions did not directly cause Marshall to decide against filing the petition, he effectively delegated the entire responsibility to Mr. Robinson-Bey, which eroded Marshall's faith in the Respondent. The court found no delays in the Respondent's services, as the retainer was only paid at the end of November 2014, shortly before the petition's deadline. However, the Respondent's failure to review the petition and engage meaningfully with Marshall until the last minute left him with an uncomfortable choice about filing the petition. Regarding fee arrangements, the hearing judge found the Respondent lacked proper documentation for the funds entrusted for Marshall's case. He quoted a flat fee of $7,500, received a $5,000 check on November 26, 2014, and began work before the retainer was fully paid. The Respondent deposited the check into his trust account on December 1, 2014, but withdrew funds equivalent to the retainer shortly thereafter. He did not maintain adequate records of these transactions or demonstrate how the funds were managed, failing to provide any client ledger or documentation related to the funds received from Ms. Monroe. The hearing judge determined that Respondent misrepresented the status of funds in trust after Mr. Marshall terminated his services on December 22, 2014. Following this termination, Ms. Monroe, on behalf of Marshall, requested a refund of the retainer. Respondent failed to respond to her March 13, 2017 letter and misled Bar Counsel regarding the funds, falsely claiming they remained in his account. He indicated that the final bill would exceed $5,000 and mentioned a deceptive $1,000 "escrow" for potential disputes, despite having already withdrawn the funds. Analysis revealed that only $1,700 of Ms. Monroe’s funds were retained at the time of his June 3, 2015 correspondence, contradicting his claim of having $4,000 in escrow. The judge found that Respondent made various misrepresentations about the work done on Marshall's case. Although Bar Counsel was investigating, Respondent delayed his response to a request for information, eventually claiming he had drafted two versions of a post-conviction petition, which was later shown to be untrue. The only modification made to the initial draft was a correction of Marshall's address. Respondent's assertion that Mr. Robinson-Bey spent 205 hours on the case was also found to be false, as contemporaneous records did not support this claim. An invoice provided to Ms. Monroe after the complaint indicated that Respondent was owed $6,855, but the court deemed this billing statement and the timekeeping records submitted by Robinson-Bey to be incredible. Testimony from Robinson-Bey contradicted Respondent regarding his involvement in the case, further undermining Respondent's credibility. Mr. Robinson-Bey’s testimony regarding the Respondent's involvement in preparing the petition was deemed not credible by the court. Bar Counsel's initial letter on August 18, 2015, requesting additional information went unanswered within the stipulated time frame, and the Respondent's subsequent responses failed to address the specific inquiries. Despite claiming to have reviewed drafts from Robinson-Bey, the Respondent's testimony during the trial contradicted this claim. Further correspondence from Bar Counsel did not elicit substantive answers. The court found that the Respondent mismanaged his trust account, particularly in relation to Ms. Monroe's funds, which he falsely claimed were held in trust. Evidence showed the trust account went into overdraft status on June 22, 2015, indicating that Ms. Monroe's funds were not being properly maintained. The Respondent misrepresented his handling of these funds in various communications. A subpoena for the trust account records revealed significant issues: the account was used for non-client-related expenses, personal funds were commingled, and the account had a negative balance due to inappropriate withdrawals. While the court refrained from labeling the Respondent's actions as outright misappropriation of funds, it noted a pattern of borrowing from one client’s funds to satisfy another's. Specific transactions highlighted included a check written to himself that created a negative balance and deposits that could not be linked to client matters. Despite multiple inquiries from Bar Counsel regarding the trust account, the Respondent failed to provide any relevant information or refund Ms. Monroe's funds. Additionally, the Respondent was involved in the representation of Ms. Mashea Simmons, for whom he quoted a flat fee of $7,500 for post-conviction relief after meeting with her mother, Lillian Ray, in April 2015. Ray signed an updated retainer agreement, dated March but sent on April 17, 2015, and paid the full fee on April 23, 2015. The Respondent did not deposit these funds into a trust account, instead placing them in his operating account. At the time of Ray's consultation, Ms. Simmons was in the appellate process; the Court of Appeals granted her Petition for Writ of Certiorari on April 17, 2015. Following this, Simmons' public defender notified her of the court’s decision on April 23, 2015, and she communicated this to the Respondent. On April 27, 2015, the Respondent met Simmons to discuss filing a petition. By May 18, 2015, he claimed to have completed the post-conviction petition but decided to wait for the ruling on the writ before filing. He reiterated completion of the petition in letters to both Simmons and her public defender in June and August 2015, despite acknowledging at trial that the petition was not completed at those times. While the Respondent engaged in some case-related activities, including meetings and correspondence, the post-conviction pleading was deemed of no value due to Simmons’ conviction being vacated. The court found the Respondent's preparation of the petition was a pretext to justify retaining Ray's legal fees, as he misrepresented the status of the petition to both Simmons and her public defender. Additionally, the court rejected the Respondent's claim that Simmons urged him to file the petition and highlighted that he had no authorization to represent Simmons in her parole hearing or new trial, services not included in the retainer agreement. Respondent's claims regarding the value of communications with Simmons and the Parole Commission regarding the parole hearing are undermined by the court's findings. The hearing judge identified multiple misrepresentations made by Respondent to Ms. Simmons, Ms. Ray, and Bar Counsel after Simmons ended her representation. Prior to August 20, 2015, Ms. Ray requested a refund of her fees, to which Respondent responded via text that he would prepare a bill and refund unearned fees. However, evidence indicates he did not deposit Ray's funds into his trust account, meaning no funds were available for disbursement. Respondent's correspondence with Simmons on August 25, 2015, revealed his intention to retain the fees despite claiming otherwise to Ray. The dispute over fees between Ray and Respondent escalated to litigation, suggesting Respondent intended to keep the fees without having earned them. Following Simmons' request for termination of representation in December 2015, Respondent failed to withdraw his appearance and misled Simmons about his obligations. His prepared invoice claimed fees totaling $14,350, which the court deemed incredible, especially since he initially quoted a flat fee of $7,500 for the case. Furthermore, Respondent's response to Bar Counsel in February 2016 included a billing rate of $450 per hour, which contradicted the retainer agreement. The hearing judge found his fee statements lacking credibility, and the court noted that to accept his account as valid would require believing he billed at the same rate as another attorney without any distinction in his records. The hearing judge determined that Respondent was evasive during Bar Counsel’s investigation into the Simmons matter, failing to provide requested financial information and documentation regarding service dates despite multiple requests. Respondent did not reimburse any fees received for representing Simmons in the post-conviction matter. Bar Counsel alleged that Respondent violated the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct in his representation of Kintrell McEachern, who sought assistance with federal and state court matters after receiving a lengthy federal sentence. McEachern, through his wife, hired Respondent for coram nobis relief, paying a flat fee of $2,500 without a formal retainer agreement. Respondent did not deposit this fee into his trust account or obtain consent to bypass this requirement. After entering his appearance in the case, Respondent failed to take necessary actions regarding McEachern’s pending habeas corpus matter and did not effectively address a related traffic matter. Although there were clerical errors in the case filings, these did not appear to impact the court's consideration of the coram nobis requests. Issues arose when the judge delayed issuing a ruling, leading Respondent to attempt various communications with the court to expedite the process. However, he did not pursue mandamus relief or disciplinary actions against the judge, despite McEachern's concerns. Respondent's failure to take necessary actions led to a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship with McEachern, resulting in McEachern terminating Respondent's services. Tensions escalated in Spring 2015 when Respondent refused to adopt the strategies McEachern preferred for their case. Subsequent communications primarily occurred in writing, as Respondent felt harassed and was concerned about liability for McEachern's actions against the hearing judge. Discontent was also fueled by Respondent's failure to provide sealed federal documents to McEachern’s wife despite earlier indications that he would do so after accessing them through PACER. The court noted that Respondent was not entirely obstructive, as Mrs. McEachern continued to visit his office and communicated frequently, albeit with increasing tension. It was determined that Respondent should have ensured McEachern was aware of the appeal deadline for the hearing judge’s denial of coram nobis relief and provided a copy of the ruling. Furthermore, Respondent was criticized for not formally withdrawing from the ongoing state and federal matters and instead relying on McEachern to file such a motion. However, the court found that McEachern understood the implications of the hearing judge’s ruling on the federal case and that Respondent was justified in withholding sealed documents. The court also noted deficiencies in Respondent's handling of McEachern's funds, as he did not place them in escrow or keep an accounting of his time, although McEachern did not dispute the fees for coram nobis representation. The timeline of Respondent's retention for a traffic matter in state court remained unclear, despite a cash payment of $2,500 being made. Respondent claims to have charged $1,500 for legal services, yet failed to provide a retainer agreement or deposit funds into a trust account, lacking consent to bypass this requirement. McEachern paid $2,500 in cash for representation in federal court, while Respondent asserts he only charged $1,500 for this federal matter as well, again without a retainer agreement or escrow arrangement. The court finds Mrs. McEachern's account of the fees more credible than Respondent's, noting that his written time accounting lacks contemporaneous records and appears reconstructed. Although Respondent opened communication with the Assistant United States Attorney regarding the federal case, his actions were limited without a state court ruling. The court determined that Respondent misled Mrs. McEachern about the existence of legal funds in trust in communications dated June 2 and August 28, 2015, and failed to provide an accounting or refund. There is uncertainty regarding the existence and contents of his file beyond court documents, but the court believes Respondent did forward some files to McEachern. Respondent's cooperation with Bar Counsel was insufficient; he did not adequately respond to requests for information nor provide a retainer agreement until much later. He acknowledged that the fees were not placed in his trust account and has not returned any funds to McEachern. Bar Counsel did not call McEachern to testify. The court did not assess the credibility of McEachern as it only considered the written complaint for context. Mrs. McEachern was perceived as aggressive, which may have contributed to an escalated atmosphere in Respondent’s office. Her demeanor suggested she exerted control over Respondent, influencing his preference for written communication. Judge Bryant concluded that Respondent was generally competent in handling post-conviction matters, possessing the necessary legal knowledge and skills. However, in the Marshall case, Respondent's involvement was minimal, limited to writing and discussing the case with Mr. Robinson-Bey, and he did not prepare or review the petition before submission. This lack of thoroughness exhibited a failure to competently represent Marshall, violating Rule 19-301.1. The court did not assert that Marshall's post-conviction petition was meritless, as no evidence indicated other issues should have been raised. Bar Counsel failed to show that Respondent violated Rule 19-301.1 in his representation of Simmons and McEachern regarding substantive work. However, Respondent did violate the rule by mishandling Ms. Monroe’s funds after depositing them in his trust account, as he failed to place Simmons’ and McEachern’s funds into the trust account. Respondent's representation of Marshall was marked by inadequate communication and diligence, resulting in violations of legal conduct rules. Respondent had minimal interaction with Marshall regarding the petition’s contents and failed to verify that the petition addressed relevant legal issues before post-conviction proceedings. Upon discovering Marshall's dissatisfaction with the draft, Respondent merely suggested he file the petition and amend it later, undermining client confidence. Although Respondent initially demonstrated diligence by reviewing Marshall’s transcript and preparing the petition ahead of payment, he failed to maintain sufficient communication regarding the petition's issues. He neglected to engage with Marshall meaningfully, disregarding the obligation to consider the client’s perspective and ensure timely filing to protect federal rights. Respondent's reliance on a third party for communication led to a lack of explanation regarding the legal theories and the necessity for timely action. Ultimately, Respondent did not adequately represent Marshall from May to December 2014, violating Md. Rule 19-301.2(a), 19-301.3, and 19-301.4(a)(2), (3), and (b). No violations were found regarding clients Simmons and McEachern. Respondent failed to notify McEachern of the deadline for filing an appeal in the coram nobis case, violating Md. Rule 19-301.4(b). Regarding post-conviction services for Marshall, the court found the initial fee of $7,500 reasonable given Respondent's experience, but it became unreasonable as he delegated work to a non-lawyer without ensuring quality or compliance with legal standards. Respondent received payment on November 26, 2014, but personally spent minimal time on the case, rendering the $5,000 charge for the non-lawyer's services unjustified and in violation of Md. Rule 19-301.5(a). In the Simmons matter, the fees became unreasonable after retention, as Respondent only engaged in minimal activities and sought to justify the absence of funds in his trust account after being asked to return money to Ray. Conversely, the fees in the McEachern case were not inherently unreasonable due to the complexity of the state cases involved and Respondent's efforts, including post-argument actions and communications with the McEacherns. In the federal matter, while fees were initially reasonable, they became unreasonable as Respondent did little substantive work, primarily communicating with the court and the U.S. Attorney without advancing the case significantly. The same assessment applied to the traffic matter. Respondent did not perform sufficient work to justify a $2,500 fee and violated Rule 19-301.5(a) in handling McEachern’s cases. In the Marshall case, Respondent received $5,000 on November 26, 2014, placed it in his trust account, but failed to maintain any records of its use or demonstrate that the funds were earned, violating Md. Rule 19-301.15(c). Although the post-conviction petition had been drafted before he received the funds, he did not verify its legal sufficiency, as most work was done by a non-lawyer assistant. Consequently, Respondent could not claim to have earned the $5,000 since no filing or hearing was scheduled. In the Simmons matter, Respondent failed to deposit a $7,500 payment into his trust account, violated Rule 19-301.15(c), and retained unearned funds without returning them when requested. He did not deposit funds from McEachern into his trust account, violating Rule 19-301.15(c) again, and failed to keep a portion of client funds in trust when disputes arose. Furthermore, he neglected his obligation to provide an accounting of client funds, violating Rule 19-301.15(d). The evidence indicates that Respondent mismanaged his trust account by using it for personal expenses and allowed it to fall out of balance, violating Rule 19-301.15. Lastly, he improperly withdrew from representing clients in the McEachern and Simmons matters, violating Rule 19-301.16. Respondent violated Rule 19-301.16(d) by failing to withdraw his appearance and shifting the burden to Simmons to secure new counsel. He also neglected to protect McEachern’s right to appeal the denial of coram nobis relief. However, the court found no violation related to failing to turn over papers to the McEacherns, as it could not determine the impact on Respondent's federal obligations. Furthermore, Respondent violated Rule 19-301.16(d) by not safeguarding each client’s financial interests amid a fee dispute. Under Rule 19-305.3, the court found Respondent failed to properly supervise Mr. Robinson-Bey, allowing him to draft a petition without oversight, thereby abdicating his responsibility for competent legal service. This constituted violations of Rules 19-305.3(a) and (b). However, the court did not find evidence that Robinson-Bey provided legal advice, nor did it find violations in the McEachern matter. Regarding Rule 19-308.1, Respondent violated Rule 19-308.1(a) by knowingly providing false information to Bar Counsel, including misleading statements about his trust account and the work performed for clients. He also failed to respond adequately to inquiries about client funds, constituting a violation of Rule 19-308.1(b). Lastly, the court found clear and convincing evidence of violations of Rules 19-308.4(a), (c), and (d) regarding misconduct for each client, but determined there was no violation of Rule 19-308.4(b) related to McEachern and Marshall, as Respondent had performed some work for them, despite concerns about its nature and timing. Respondent exhibited misconduct characterized by negligence and inadequate delegation of responsibilities, resulting in poor record-keeping and a failure to properly manage financial matters. He violated Rule 19-308.4(b) by intentionally misrepresenting the preparation date of a post-conviction petition to justify retaining legal fees. This act, along with multiple violations of professional conduct rules, constituted dishonesty, including claims of work not performed and misleading Bar Counsel about client funds. Additionally, Respondent breached Rule 19-308.4(c) by generating false billing statements for clients on a flat fee basis and misrepresenting his trust account status. His actions were deemed prejudicial to the administration of justice, resulting in significant detriment to clients, including the loss of timely appeals and habeas corpus relief opportunities. Respondent also failed to deposit client funds into his trust account, violating Rule 19-404, which mandates that all funds not yet earned be placed in trust. Furthermore, he did not maintain necessary records for trust account transactions as required by Rule 19-407, failing to provide adequate documentation when requested by Bar Counsel. Overall, the evidence shows clear violations of multiple rules governing professional conduct and trust account management. Respondent violated Rule 19-408 by disbursing client funds to himself, his church, and for other unrelated expenses, as evidenced during the representation of clients McEachern and Marshall. He also improperly deposited unidentified funds into his trust account, which were not linked to any specific client matters. Additionally, under Rule 19-410, Respondent's trust account was found to be out of balance concerning five clients, indicating a broader issue with the account’s management. In the Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Hamilton case, the Court of Appeals maintains original jurisdiction over attorney discipline and typically accepts fact findings from hearing judges unless clearly erroneous. Legal conclusions, however, are reviewed without deference. Respondent raised timely exceptions and objections to the hearing judge's conclusions and some factual findings, particularly regarding the admission of DaJuan Marshall's deposition. He argued that Marshall, despite being incarcerated, was not unavailable for the hearing. Bar Counsel asserted that Respondent had received adequate notice of the deposition. The hearing judge clarified that while a deposition of a prisoner requires court approval, Bar Counsel did not seek such approval, and Respondent contested the deposition's admissibility based on related Maryland Rules regarding depositions and their use in legal proceedings. A deposition may be used by any party against another if the court finds certain conditions apply, including the witness being deceased, out of state, unable to testify due to incapacity or imprisonment, or if exceptional circumstances exist that justify the deposition's use. Bar Counsel failed to seek court approval or provide proper notice for the deposition, which led to confusion regarding its purpose as a de bene esse deposition. Despite this procedural oversight, the court determined that exceptional circumstances justified allowing the deposition's use because Mr. Marshall was incarcerated, a condition recognized under Maryland Rule 2-419(A)(3)(c). The hearing judge's discretion in permitting the deposition was upheld, as the parties had an understanding about Mr. Marshall's appearance via videotape. The Respondent's objections to leading questions and the admission of certain text messages and documents were dismissed due to lack of supporting legal arguments. Additionally, the Respondent contested the hearing judge's finding regarding his communication with Mr. Marshall and the associated fees, asserting he had adequately prepared and discussed the case with his paralegal. The hearing judge determined that Respondent had minimal communication with Mr. Marshall over seven months, with only two instances noted. The first communication occurred before Respondent had full access to Mr. Marshall’s records, and was characterized as unproductive speculation regarding potential issues for a post-conviction petition. The subsequent communication happened in mid-December 2014, shortly before the filing deadline, which did not allow sufficient time to address Mr. Marshall’s concerns effectively. Consequently, the judge found Respondent's communication was not meaningful, a conclusion upheld by the review body, referencing prior case law on attorney-client communication standards. Respondent contested findings regarding inadequate supervision of his law clerk, Mr. Robinson-Bey, claiming he supervised the work involving post-conviction cases. However, evidence revealed that Mr. Robinson-Bey's timesheets indicated work continued after Mr. Marshall had terminated Respondent’s services, raising questions about their accuracy. The hearing judge concluded that these inconsistencies suggested Mr. Robinson-Bey’s timesheets were fabricated, and noted his failure to keep accurate records contributed to this issue. The judge upheld the finding of Respondent's inadequate supervision and his delegation of significant work to Mr. Robinson-Bey, who did not prepare or review Mr. Marshall’s petition adequately before submission. All exceptions raised by Respondent were overruled. The hearing judge established that Respondent was not the primary source of information for the client, with Mr. Robinson-Bey serving as the main contact. Respondent provided limited documentation of his involvement, consisting of only two letters and a review of a transcript. Respondent contested the judge's finding that he did not read the Marshall petition, but Mr. Marshall's deposition indicated that Respondent admitted to not reading it, and no contrary evidence was presented by Respondent. This exception was overruled. Respondent also disputed the finding that he failed to adequately advise Mr. Marshall on preserving his right to file a federal habeas corpus petition. Mr. Marshall testified that during a December 20, 2014, call, Respondent suggested he file a "skeleton" petition to toll the limitations period and indicated that the petition could be amended later. Respondent provided a petition for Mr. Marshall to review before the tolling period expired. However, Mr. Marshall chose not to file based on advice from non-attorneys. The record shows that Mr. Marshall was aware of the filing requirements when he informed Respondent not to file. This exception was sustained. Respondent also objected to the finding that he created bills for services to justify the funds received for Mr. Marshall’s representation, particularly in light of a request for a refund of a $5,000 retainer received on March 3, 2015. On June 3, 2015, Respondent responded to Bar Counsel’s investigation by submitting a statement regarding the Marshall account, which included a bill for services totaling $11,855.00. The bill detailed eight hours of work by Respondent at $450 per hour and 110 hours by Mr. Robinson-Bey at $75 per hour. However, Respondent claimed to have completed work on the Marshall case in January 2015, while Mr. Marshall had terminated representation in December 2014. The hearing judge found discrepancies in the reported hours, including Mr. Robinson-Bey’s time, which was deemed fabricated. Additionally, Respondent claimed to have spent two hours reviewing a petition but later admitted he had not read it. These inconsistencies supported the conclusion that Respondent submitted false billing records to justify retaining the $5,000 retainer fee. Respondent's exceptions regarding findings related to Mr. Kintrell McEachern were overruled. The hearing judge acknowledged that Respondent had performed some substantive work on Mr. McEachern’s federal case, despite limitations due to pending state court rulings. Respondent also contested the finding of failing to withdraw his appearance in Mr. McEachern's federal case. The last communication on June 3, 2015, indicated a request for revisions to a writ of mandamus, after which Mr. McEachern filed a pro se motion to stay the case and notified Respondent of a complaint filed with the Attorney Grievance Commission. Subsequently, Mr. McEachern petitioned for the withdrawal of Respondent’s appearance on August 21, 2015. Respondent did not provide evidence of any work or attempts to withdraw his appearance after June 16, 2015, leading to the conclusion that he had no obligation to continue representation. Additionally, Respondent created an expectation of providing Mr. McEachern with sealed documents related to his federal criminal case. Respondent created an expectation for the McEacherns regarding the availability of sealed federal documents by suggesting they could obtain them independently, without disclosing their sealed status. This exception is overruled. Regarding Ms. Simmons, the hearing judge found that Respondent only visited her and wrote dishonest letters before being asked to return Ms. Ray’s money. Respondent claims he engaged more deeply by reading the transcript and communicating with Ms. Simmons, but the Petitioner did not provide clear evidence of Respondent's failure to read the transcript, leading to the sustainment of this exception. The specific sealed documents sought by the McEacherns remain unclear due to vague requests. Respondent contests the hearing judge’s conclusion that he violated Rule 19-301.1 concerning his representation of Marshall. The judge noted that Respondent did not verify the petition's sufficiency or discuss critical issues with Marshall, thus failing to competently represent him and neglecting his duty to pursue post-conviction relief timely. Evidence of inadequate thoroughness in representation supports a Rule 19-301.1 violation. Competence requires attorneys to analyze factual and legal issues and prepare adequately based on what is at stake. Respondent did not read a petition drafted by his assistant before sending it to Marshall and suggested filing it without amendments. Despite Marshall's attempts to discuss substantive issues, Respondent did not engage. Additionally, Respondent was found to have mismanaged Ms. Monroe’s funds in his trust account, further indicating a violation of Rule 19-301.1, as maintaining a client trust account properly is a requirement of competent legal practice. Ms. Monroe paid a $5,000 retainer fee for Mr. Marshall’s legal representation, which was deposited into Respondent’s trust account on December 1, 2014. Subsequently, Respondent withdrew funds from the account—$500 on December 4, $300 on December 14, and $2,500 on December 23, totaling $3,300. Following these withdrawals, Mr. Marshall should have had $1,700 remaining in the account. However, by June 2015, the account had a negative balance of $372.90, indicating Respondent's mismanagement of the trust account. Respondent contested the hearing judge's conclusion that he violated Rule 19-301.2(a) concerning the scope of representation. The rule requires that a lawyer must provide honest updates for a client to make informed decisions about their case. Mr. Marshall had requested the inclusion of specific legal issues in his post-conviction petition, but Respondent failed to address these concerns, preventing Mr. Marshall from making informed decisions regarding his representation. Respondent also challenged the finding of a violation of Rule 19-301.3, which mandates that lawyers act with reasonable diligence. The rule was violated when an attorney fails to act to advance a client's case or to manage funds properly. The precedent set in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Shuler highlighted that minimal communication with a client over a lengthy period constituted a violation of this rule. Although Respondent claimed to have engaged in meaningful communication via letters, the evidence did not support his assertion of adequately responding to Mr. Marshall’s requests for information. On May 1, 2014, Respondent informed Mr. Marshall that they were still awaiting the transcript for his case. The communication highlighted concerns regarding ineffective assistance related to CL §9-804 and evidentiary issues stemming from gang testimony about Mr. Marshall's involvement in a robbery. Respondent expressed concern over the introduction of Mr. Marshall's prior trial testimony in the subsequent trial and noted that a modified MPJI 3-232 instruction should have been included. This letter represented the only substantial communication between Respondent and Mr. Marshall prior to the latter's review of the crucial transcript, with the next contact occurring in December 2014, just before the petition's filing deadline. The hearing judge concluded that Respondent failed to engage in meaningful communication necessary for effective representation, leading to Mr. Marshall's dissatisfaction and possible forfeiture of post-conviction rights. Respondent contested the hearing judge's findings regarding violations of Rules 19-301.4(a)(2), 19-301.4(a)(3), and 19-301.4(b), which require attorneys to keep clients informed and respond to their inquiries. The judge emphasized that Respondent relied heavily on a legal assistant for communication and neglected to adequately discuss legal strategies with Mr. Marshall. Additionally, Respondent did not dispute the ruling that he violated Rule 19-301.4(b) in the McEachern case. Regarding Rule 19-301.5 on attorney fees, Respondent disagreed with the judge's conclusion that his fees became unreasonable due to insufficient service. Although he claimed to have reviewed the transcript multiple times and drafted the necessary petitions, the judge found that Respondent's initial reasonable fees turned unreasonable as he delegated work to a non-lawyer without ensuring that the output addressed the issues highlighted in the transcript. Respondent engaged minimally in legal work, spending only a few hours on the matter and providing no valid reason for charging $5,000 for a legal assistant's services. A fee arrangement is deemed unreasonable if the attorney does not perform meaningful work for the client. In the Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Chapman case, it was established that charging fees is improper when most work is performed by non-lawyers and legal services outlined in the retainer agreement are not provided. The hearing judge noted that in the McEachern case, fees were initially reasonable but became unreasonable due to Respondent's limited engagement, which primarily involved communicating with the court and the Assistant U.S. Attorney without advancing the case significantly. For the McEachern traffic matter, Respondent charged $2,500 for merely reviewing a pro se pleading and requesting a hearing. In the Simmons case, Respondent's actions were characterized by minimal effort, including visiting Ms. Simmons and writing dishonest letters, and he only completed a post-conviction petition after being asked for a refund. The judge deemed this petition unnecessary since the case had been remanded, making it redundant. Respondent's exceptions to various Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct were overruled due to a lack of supporting case law or record citations. He acknowledged mishandling trust account funds and committed to rectifying such errors in the future. Sanctions for attorneys are intended to protect the public and deter violations rather than punish the attorney, as reiterated in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Zuckerman. Sanctions imposed for violations of the Maryland Attorneys' Rules of Professional Conduct (MARPC) must align with the severity and intent behind the misconduct. The appropriate sanction is determined by the specific facts and circumstances of each case, taking into account any mitigating factors. In *Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Allenbaugh*, the court identified several aggravating factors that influence sanctioning decisions, including prior disciplinary actions, dishonest motives, patterns of misconduct, multiple violations, obstruction of the disciplinary process, submission of false evidence, refusal to acknowledge wrongdoing, victim vulnerability, extensive legal experience, indifference to restitution, illegal conduct, and likelihood of repeating the misconduct. In this case, the hearing judge evaluated both mitigating and aggravating factors. The respondent did not present any affirmative defenses or evidence of mitigation. The aggravating factors identified included a prior disciplinary action, a selfish motive in misusing client funds, a pattern of mismanaging trust accounts, knowingly submitting false timesheets and statements to Bar Counsel, and a refusal to acknowledge wrongdoing. The judge also noted the clients' varying levels of vulnerability and the respondent’s significant experience in law, which contributed to the severity of the sanctions. Importantly, the judge found that the respondent did not provide false testimony during the proceedings. Respondent's failure to respond to Bar Counsel and recall testimony details is attributed to inadequate documentation and excessive delegation of authority to staff, resulting in a lack of necessary records to answer specific questions. Petitioner seeks Respondent's disbarment, while Respondent proposes a 30-day suspension, during which he would take a class on fund management and implement a client management system. The Court advocates for disbarment, referencing Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Vanderlinde, which emphasized that intentional dishonest conduct by attorneys is a serious breach of character, warranting disbarment as the typical sanction. Dishonesty can manifest in various forms, including misappropriation of funds or misrepresentations, and is particularly condemned when it involves client funds. The Court notes that disbarment is justified in cases of unmitigated misappropriation combined with dishonesty, reinforcing that intentional dishonesty violates Rule 19-308.4(c) without extenuating circumstances. While the general rule favors disbarment for intentional dishonesty, each case is evaluated based on its specific facts and mitigating factors. In cases lacking intentional dishonest conduct, sanctions may include indefinite suspension with the possibility of reinstatement. An attorney was indefinitely suspended for misusing his trust account, allowing it to reach low or negative balances, and disbursing non-client-related funds, violating several professional conduct rules. In a related case, the court imposed a similar sanction on an attorney who made cash disbursements from his trust account and misled Bar Counsel about a client matter. However, mitigating factors such as an otherwise impeccable 28-year record, the impact on a non-client, and the attorney's willingness to admit wrongdoing were considered. The court emphasized that attorneys who intentionally deceive clients or Bar Counsel face severe penalties, particularly in the absence of mitigating circumstances. In another case, an attorney was disbarred for failing to represent clients diligently, communicating poorly, and making intentional misrepresentations, which were aggravated by a lack of mitigating factors. A pattern of deceitful conduct and failure to act on behalf of clients were significant in determining the severity of sanctions, with disbarment being possible even without aggravating factors. An attorney was disbarred for demonstrating a lack of diligence, preparation, and communication with clients, as well as failing to account for and return client funds. The attorney also did not comply with requests from Bar Counsel, made misrepresentations, and charged unreasonable fees. Despite having no prior reprimands, these factors did not mitigate his misconduct. The attorney's actions involved negligent misappropriation and some intentional dishonesty, including personal payments made from a client trust account. Although the hearing judge found the misconduct did not constitute criminality or direct misappropriation, it stemmed from negligence and poor management practices rather than intentional theft. The judge noted that the attorney's hubris and inadequate oversight led to unintentional misappropriation, but also highlighted intentional misrepresentations made to clients and Bar Counsel regarding fees for minimal work performed. The court emphasized the fine line between intentional and negligent misappropriation, indicating that circumstantial evidence suggested the attorney knew or should have known of the fund invasions. The attorney's conduct included fabricating billing statements and falsely claiming client funds were secure, raising concerns about potential future misconduct. Respondent misled Ms. Simmons and her Public Defender by claiming he had drafted her post-conviction petition months prior to actually doing so, reflecting conduct similar to that in the cases of Mitchell and Wallace, where attorneys engaged in deceptive practices regarding their clients' cases. His actions included intentional misrepresentations and negligent misappropriation, compounded by multiple rule violations and aggravated by several factors. Lacking mitigating circumstances, the only suitable sanction is disbarment, in line with established principles aimed at public protection. This disbarment order will take effect 30 days after the opinion is filed, and the Respondent is required to pay all costs as determined by the court clerk, including transcript costs, with a judgment entered in favor of the Attorney Grievance Commission.