Clint Richardson v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

Citation: Not availableDocket: 49A04-1707-CR-1567

Court: Indiana Court of Appeals; January 17, 2018; Indiana; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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On January 18, 2018, the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed Clint Richardson's classification as a habitual offender. Richardson appealed, claiming the trial court erred in instructing the jury during his habitual offender phase. The case arose from an incident on July 28, 2016, when Alina Pawchareune discovered someone had broken into her rented home. After noticing unusual circumstances, including a forced-open attic door, she and a friend confronted the intruder, later identified as Richardson, who was found shirtless and carrying a television. 

When police arrived, Officer Thomas Thompson observed Richardson inside the house but did not enter. Officer Scott Charleswood, arriving separately, spotted Richardson attempting to flee and successfully apprehended him. The officers found a television belonging to Pawchareune's housemate in the yard and discovered Pawchareune’s wallet in Richardson's possession. The memorandum decision clarifies that it is not to be cited as precedent except for establishing res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

Richardson faced charges of burglary (Level 4 felony) and theft (Level 6 felony due to a prior conviction), with the State alleging he was a habitual offender. The trial occurred in three phases: the jury found him guilty of burglary and theft as a Class A misdemeanor in phase one; in phase two, he waived his right to a jury trial regarding his prior theft conviction, which the court affirmed; during phase three, the jury confirmed his habitual offender status. Following the trial, Richardson appealed, claiming the court erred by not instructing the jury that, per Article I, section 19 of the Indiana Constitution, they had the right to determine both law and facts. He acknowledged not raising this issue during the habitual offender phase and requested the court recognize the omission as fundamental error. Generally, a defendant must raise objections to jury instructions to preserve issues for appeal, though fundamental errors—substantial violations of basic legal principles—can be reviewed despite lack of objection. During phase one, the jury was correctly instructed about their rights. However, in the habitual offender phase, the proposed jury instruction from the court, which suggested that jurors could decide against a finding of habitual offender status even if prior convictions were uncontroverted, faced objections from the State. Richardson did not object to this instruction, and the court noted the objection from the State but did not resolve it.

The Court addressed Instruction Number 3 during a recess and determined that it was not a recognized patterned instruction, suspecting it may have been used in previous trials. The Court granted the State’s objection to this instruction, deeming it confusing and not aligned with established guidelines. Following this, both parties were given a chance to raise additional concerns, which Richardson declined. During the habitual offender phase, Richardson reminded the jury of their power to deliberate and find him not guilty. The Court ruled that any potential error regarding Instruction Number 3 was not fundamental, as the jury had previously been informed of its powers under the Indiana Constitution. Additionally, Richardson’s closing argument reinforced the jury's decision-making authority. The evidence against him was deemed thorough and consistent, leading to the conclusion that the jury was adequately informed of the law, and thus any instructional error did not infringe upon Richardson’s due process rights. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed.