Double R Ranch Trust v. Bail

Citation: Not availableDocket: Civil Action No. 2017-0438

Court: District Court, District of Columbia; January 17, 2018; Federal District Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Under the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, Congress has the authority to designate certain rivers for protection to maintain their natural attributes. This case involves the Bureau of Land Management's determination that a segment of the Rogue River in Oregon is suitable for potential congressional designation under the Act. The plaintiffs challenge this decision by suing the Bureau’s Acting Director, arguing the determination is flawed. However, the court finds that the plaintiffs lack standing to contest the suitability determination because it is only a preliminary step in a lengthy process, and they have not demonstrated an injury directly resulting from it. Consequently, the court grants the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Acting Director Michael Nedd has been automatically substituted as a defendant following the previous Acting Director Kristin Bail’s tenure. 

The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, enacted in 1968, aims to protect free-flowing rivers with significant scenic, recreational, and cultural values, ensuring they remain preserved for future generations. Rivers are classified as wild, scenic, or recreational, forming a national system. The Act allows for the designation of rivers through congressional legislation or recommendations from federal agencies after conducting studies on potential candidates. The study process consists of eligibility and suitability phases, where the agency first assesses whether a river meets the criteria for free-flowing status and outstanding values before assigning a classification.

Eligibility of a river for designation involves a suitability analysis addressing three main questions: (1) the need to protect the river’s free-flowing character, water quality, and outstanding values against other significant uses; (2) the effectiveness of designation in safeguarding these attributes, weighed against associated costs and benefits; and (3) the commitment from non-federal entities to manage and protect the river. If deemed suitable, the river proceeds to a recommendation stage, with formal study reports prepared by the responsible federal agency’s staff, subject to a 90-day review by key federal officials and governors of affected states. The findings and comments are then submitted to the President for transmittal to Congress. For agency-initiated studies, recommendations follow an environmental impact statement and a notice-and-comment process, with draft bills reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget before being sent to Congress. Only Congress can ultimately designate rivers through legislative action.

To protect designated rivers, the Act imposes various statutory protections such as prohibiting dam licenses, limiting agency approvals for projects adversely affecting river values, restricting mining within a quarter-mile of protected rivers, and removing relevant federal lands from sale. These protections also extend to congressionally-mandated study rivers during their study period. Conversely, agency-identified study rivers lack protections under the Act, though agencies can utilize existing authorities to maintain the rivers' free-flowing nature and water quality.

The Rogue River in southwestern Oregon, which spans over 200 miles, has segments designated for protection under the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, specifically 84.5 miles since 1968 and an additional 40.3 miles in 1988. This case pertains to the potential designation of a third segment of the Rogue River.

In 1990, the Bureau's Western Oregon divisions identified fifty-one river segments, including a portion of the Rogue River, as eligible for designation. They later determined the suitability of these segments, concluding in August 2016 that six, including a 63.2-mile segment of the Rogue River (the "Proposed Segment"), met the criteria for designation. The Bureau's Oregon State Director is currently reviewing the Medford District's recommendation regarding this segment. Plaintiffs, including Double R Ranch Trust, Oregon Cattleman’s Association, and Oregon Concrete and Aggregate Producers Association, filed suit against the Acting Director of the Bureau of Land Management and the Secretary of the Interior to challenge the suitability determination, claiming it was arbitrary under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) and seeking a declaration that the Proposed Segment was neither eligible nor suitable. The defendants moved to dismiss, asserting the plaintiffs lacked standing, there was no final agency action, and the case was not ripe for review. The Court held a hearing on December 18, 2017, and decided to dismiss the case due to lack of standing. Conservation groups also sought to intervene in support of the Bureau and participated as amici curiae. Legal standards for standing require plaintiffs to demonstrate an injury in fact, causation, and the likelihood of redress from a favorable decision. Each element of standing must be established by the plaintiff, with injury in fact requiring a concrete and particularized invasion of a legally protected interest.

Redressability requires that it be likely, rather than merely speculative, that a favorable decision will redress an injury. At the motion to dismiss stage, plaintiffs must present a plausible claim for standing. The court accepts well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiffs but does not assume the truth of legal conclusions or unsupported inferences. The court may also consider materials outside the complaint, such as sworn declarations.

The government argues that plaintiffs lack standing because their injuries are too speculative and not traceable to the challenged determination. The court concurs, stating that plaintiffs identify two types of injuries: those from congressional designation and those from the Bureau’s protective management regime. However, only injuries related to designation are sufficiently specific for standing, as injuries from the suitability determination are deemed too general. The plaintiffs’ potential injuries hinge on a lengthy and uncertain chain of events, including approvals from various governmental levels and actions by Congress and the President.

Plaintiffs acknowledge the complex causation involved, suggesting that their injuries would be redressed if the segment is not designated. However, the court finds that the attenuated chain of causation, involving independent actions of third parties, indicates that the injuries are not fairly traceable to the challenged action. Additionally, the many links in this chain prevent plaintiffs from establishing that each event is likely to occur, leading to a conclusion that they fail to show an injury-in-fact. Ultimately, the court notes that the identified injuries stem primarily from designation rather than the suitability determination.

Potential prohibitions identified are categorized into four groups: (1) loss of permits from the Army Corps of Engineers for activities such as streambank stabilization and mineral sales, (2) loss of existing and future water rights, (3) loss of grazing permits, and (4) loss of mining permits from the Oregon Department of Geology and Mineral Industries. The roadblocks cited by Plaintiffs stem from statutory protections related to river designation, rather than from the Bureau’s suitability finding. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that section 1278(a) of the Act prevents the Army Corps from authorizing projects that could adversely affect designated rivers. However, this section only applies to rivers that are officially designated as part of the national wild and scenic rivers system, which is not the case for agency-identified study rivers. The technical agency manual referenced by Plaintiffs supports this interpretation, confirming that section 1278 only concerns designated rivers. Additionally, both parties agreed during the hearing that section 1278 does not apply to the current situation, indicating no barrier to obtaining future permits due to the suitability determination. Evidence shows that Plaintiffs have successfully obtained permits in the past under similar protective management for the Proposed Segment, suggesting that any restrictions would only come into effect upon the river's designation. Regarding water rights, Plaintiffs claim that designation will limit their ability to modify existing rights or apply for new ones, citing section 1284(d), which restricts state jurisdiction over river waters if it conflicts with the Act's purposes.

State jurisdiction over designated river waters is not impacted by section 1284(d), and this section does not affect Oregon law regarding study rivers like the Proposed Segment. Oregon regulations on water rights transfers specifically apply to "federal wild and scenic rivers," excluding agency-identified study rivers. Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate how the suitability determination affects Oregon's jurisdiction or their water rights, suggesting that any restrictions on water rights transfers would occur only upon designation.

Plaintiffs claim injuries related to limitations on routine land management practices and potential loss of federal grazing permits, attributing these concerns to section 1278(a). However, this section does not impact federal agencies until the Proposed Segment is designated, and no independent barriers to permit renewals are identified. 

Regarding mining permits, Plaintiffs assert that they will face challenges in obtaining or renewing mining rights, but again, they provide no evidence that these challenges will arise before designation. Section 1284(d) potentially affecting mining rights is uncertain and not applicable to study rivers. 

Overall, Plaintiffs' claims focus on the negative consequences of designation rather than the suitability determination itself, with assertions of economic harm and limitations on agricultural operations contingent upon the Proposed Segment's designation. No specific injuries stemming from the suitability determination alone are presented, although Plaintiffs mention potential federal protective management actions that may arise from the Bureau's authorities under various environmental laws.

The Bureau's manual grants it broad discretionary authority to avoid impacting river values, allowing case-by-case decision-making under the National Environmental Planning Act. Plaintiffs did not present a specific project under the Bureau’s review affected by its protective management, nor did they identify any federal project requiring Bureau authorization that could be impacted by a suitability determination. Instead, they referenced decisions by other agencies, such as the Army Corps of Engineers, and raised concerns regarding section 1278(a), which does not apply to rivers prior to designation. While the Bureau may influence other agencies' decisions, it lacks authority to prevent permits unless a designation occurs. Plaintiffs argued that the suitability determination complicates the regulatory process but failed to detail how or what specific activities would be impacted without designation. Their general claims of injury were deemed insufficient for establishing standing. The Defendant-Intervenors noted a limitation on leasable fluid minerals applies to suitable rivers, which does not affect the activities Plaintiffs cited for standing. The injuries alleged by Plaintiffs stem from potential future designations rather than the current suitability determination, resulting in an unclear causal link between the Bureau's actions and the claimed injuries. The process for potential designation involves several steps, including approvals from various levels of the Bureau and ultimately Congress, before any impact on the Plaintiffs' intended actions can occur.

Plaintiffs have not established standing due to an insufficient causal connection between their alleged injuries and the challenged action. Their claims rely heavily on the actions of third parties, including Congress, the President, and agencies like the Army Corps of Engineers, none of which are involved in the case. Establishing traceability requires plaintiffs to present facts indicating that these third parties will act in a way that causes their injuries, which they have failed to do. Plaintiffs provide no basis to conclude that key officials will support the Bureau's determination regarding the eligibility of the proposed segment for designation, nor do they offer evidence of Congress's likelihood to act on the Bureau’s recommendations. The possibility of Congress passing specific legislation is highly speculative. Additionally, even if such legislation were enacted, it would not create absolute prohibitions on activities; agencies can approve actions that do not impair the Act's purposes. Furthermore, the Oregon regulation on water use permits only requires consideration of the river’s designation, not an outright denial of permits. Plaintiffs do not convincingly argue that their permits would be denied, leaving the final link in the causal chain speculative. They also fail to demonstrate that their injuries are "certainly impending" as required for an injury-in-fact, since they only reference potential future injuries related to permit denials and water rights transfers.

Plaintiffs must demonstrate a "substantial probability" of imminent injury to establish standing, which they fail to do. Their claims regarding potential future injuries—such as limitations on grazing rights, opposition to mining permits, and restrictions on water rights—are characterized as speculative and lacking concrete evidence of current actions or applications. Specifically, Plaintiffs do not indicate any pending permit applications nor do they show imminent plans to seek such permits, which undermines their assertion of injury-in-fact. The court finds that the speculative nature of the Plaintiffs' claims, compounded by multiple uncertain links in the causal chain, prevents them from establishing a direct connection between the government’s actions and their alleged injuries. Consequently, the court concludes that Plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the suitability determination. The ruling clarifies that while this decision does not preclude all challenges to the suitability determination, it emphasizes that any future challenges must be based on specific, concrete injuries. The court grants the government's Motion to Dismiss and denies the prospective Defendant-Intervenors’ Motion to Intervene as moot.