Charleen T. Raddatz and Michael George Raddatz v. United States

Citations: 750 F.2d 791; 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 15572Docket: 84-1542

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; December 28, 1984; Federal Appellate Court

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Charleen T. Raddatz and Michael George Raddatz appeal a district court's summary judgment that their medical malpractice claims against the United States are barred by the two-year statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). The claims stem from an Army physician's unsuccessful insertion of an intrauterine contraceptive device (IUD) and a Navy physician's alleged failure to recognize or treat subsequent infection symptoms, leading to a hysterectomy. The Ninth Circuit found the district court erred by not distinguishing between the claims against the Army and the Navy, reversing the summary judgment.

The case facts indicate that on February 28, 1977, Mrs. Raddatz was referred by Navy physician Dr. O'Donnell to Tripler Army Medical Center for IUD insertion, which was performed by Dr. Arner. She experienced severe pain and was informed of a perforated uterus. Following this, she visited the Army emergency room and returned to Dr. O'Donnell, who dismissed her ongoing symptoms as normal without prescribing antibiotics. After further consultations, Mrs. Raddatz sought help from a civilian physician, Dr. Williams, who diagnosed her with pelvic inflammatory disease (P.I.D.) and performed a hysterectomy due to complications from the earlier negligence.

On February 28, 1979, the Raddatzes filed a negligence complaint against Dr. Arner and Dr. O'Donnell in district court, which was dismissed without prejudice on November 13, 1979. Concurrently, on March 1 and March 5, 1979, they submitted administrative claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) regarding negligence in treating Mrs. Raddatz's medical issues. The Army Claims Service denied their claim on January 18, 1980, but on February 7, 1980, indicated it would reconsider, noting additional claims related to Navy physicians. 

Subsequently, on November 5, 1980, the Army communicated that no basis existed for reconsideration and that the Navy had also found no grounds for action. The Raddatzes were informed they had six months from the letter's mailing to file suit if dissatisfied. The Navy did not issue a separate denial letter. A second complaint was filed in district court on December 9, 1980, but voluntarily dismissed on February 4, 1981, to seek further administrative remedies. 

On June 12, 1981, the Raddatzes initiated the current suit, claiming negligence by Navy personnel for failing to treat pelvic inflammatory disease, seeking damages for pain and suffering and loss of companionship. The United States moved for summary judgment on June 29, 1983, arguing noncompliance with the FTCA's statute of limitations as outlined in 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2401(b). The district court granted the motion on December 8, 1983, concluding that the Raddatzes' claims were barred due to failure to meet the two-year agency filing requirement and the six-month district court filing requirement, determining the cause of action accrued on February 28, 1977, with the Army's letter serving as a final denial of the Navy claim.

The district court granted summary judgment, determining that the Raddatzes' claim was legally barred due to undisputed facts. In reviewing this decision de novo, the appellate court must assess if the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the Raddatzes. 

The court found that the district court erroneously treated the Raddatzes' claims against the Army and Navy as a single claim, stating they accrued on the same date, February 28, 1977, due to a negligent act during an IUD insertion. However, the Raddatzes filed two distinct claims against separate agencies: one against Army Doctor Arner for negligently perforating Mrs. Raddatz's uterus and another against Navy Doctor O'Donnell for failing to provide subsequent medical treatment. The latter claim involved allegations of negligence regarding failure to warn of infection risks and failure to diagnose complications after the initial injury.

The court emphasized that separate negligent acts can lead to distinct claims, even if they result in the same damages. The district court's reliance on precedents from Kubrick and Ashley was found to be misplaced because these cases address the accrual of medical malpractice claims based on the plaintiff's awareness of injury and its cause, not the separation of distinct negligent acts by different parties. Consequently, the Raddatzes' claims should have been evaluated individually, as each involved different acts of negligence and medical professionals.

Kubrick and Ashley established that affirmative acts of negligence can result in clearly identifiable injuries, such as Kubrick’s improper antibiotic treatment leading to partial hearing loss and Ashley’s nerve contact during a blood sample attempt causing immediate pain. The Ashley court noted that no additional negligence was claimed after the blood test. In these scenarios, injuries were apparent, and the statute of limitations began upon discovery of the cause. The Kubrick standard applies to the Army claim regarding the negligent IUD insertion that perforated Mrs. Raddatz's uterus, which she became aware of on February 28, 1977, making her claim against the Army barred under Sec. 2401(b) due to failure to file within two years. Conversely, the Navy claim is based on negligence in diagnosing and treating the resulting infection, not on the act of insertion. In cases of malpractice involving failure to diagnose or treat existing injuries, the claim accrues when a patient becomes aware or should have become aware of the issue. According to the Augustine standard, Mrs. Raddatz's claim against the Navy accrued on March 29, 1977, when her physician informed her of the infection, making her subsequent claim filed on March 1, 1979, timely under Sec. 2401(b). Additionally, Sec. 2401(b) requires actions to be filed in court within six months of receiving a final denial of the claim. The district court deemed the Army's November 5, 1980 letter as a valid denial of the Navy claim, which the Raddatzes contest, arguing that the Navy has not issued a valid final denial, thus claiming their June 12, 1981 filing was timely.

The Army's letter dated November 5, 1980, is deemed legally insufficient as a final denial of the Navy claim due to failure to comply with statutory requirements. Specifically, it was not sent via certified or registered mail as mandated by 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2401(b) and Sec. 2675(a), which raises questions about its validity. Furthermore, the letter was not sent from the agency responsible for the claim, as it lacked correspondence from the Navy denying the claim. While the Army's letter referenced the Navy's lack of basis for the claim, it did not have the authority to deny it, given that there was no designation of a single agency to handle the claim as required by 28 C.F.R. Sec. 14.2(b)(2). The Raddatzes did not receive notification designating the Army as the agency responsible, and thus the Army could not deny the Navy claim.

The United States contends that the Raddatzes did not inform the agencies about their claims against both the Army and Navy, which could affect the finality of one agency's actions on the other’s claims under 28 C.F.R. Sec. 14.2(b)(3). However, the Raddatzes argue this regulation is inapplicable since their claims arose from separate incidents at different facilities, and both agencies had notice of the claims through prior communications and a premature complaint filed in district court.

The district court's ruling that the Raddatzes' claim against the Navy began when an Army physician's negligence occurred is reversed. The determination that a valid final denial occurred on November 5, 1979, and that the Raddatzes failed to file within six months is also reversed. Consequently, the Navy claim is not barred under Sec. 2401(b), leading to the reversal of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.