Com. v. Stark, P.

Citation: Not availableDocket: 219 MDA 2017

Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania; December 17, 2017; Pennsylvania; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Patricia Leigh Stark appeals the dismissal of her third Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) petition by the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas. Stark had previously entered a guilty plea to multiple serious charges, including criminal homicide, on December 22, 2006, receiving a life sentence without parole. Following the plea, she did not file post-sentence motions or a direct appeal.

Stark filed her first pro se PCRA petition on March 22, 2007, later requesting new counsel. After being appointed new counsel, she withdrew her petition voluntarily on August 28, 2007. Stark submitted a second pro se PCRA petition on August 21, 2012, which was denied on February 19, 2013, without an appeal.

On March 23, 2016, Stark filed a third pro se PCRA petition, and new counsel was appointed on May 27, 2016. After an evidentiary hearing on December 1, 2016, the PCRA court dismissed the petition, ruling it was untimely. Stark's court-appointed counsel subsequently filed a petition to withdraw, accompanied by a "no-merit" brief under the standards set by Commonwealth v. Turner and Commonwealth v. Finley. The court granted counsel's request to withdraw and affirmed the PCRA court's dismissal of the petition. The review standard for PCRA relief focuses on whether the PCRA court's findings are supported by the record and free from legal error. Stark filed a pro se brief reiterating issues raised in the counsel's brief, which the court considered alongside the Turner/Finley brief.

PCRA counsel must meet specific procedural requirements to withdraw representation, including a zealous case review and submission of a 'no-merit' letter or brief detailing the review process, the issues raised by the petitioner, and the rationale for their lack of merit, while also requesting withdrawal. Counsel must provide the petitioner with copies of the 'no-merit' letter, the petition to withdraw, and a statement of the petitioner's right to proceed pro se or with new counsel. If these requirements are met, the court must then review the merits of the case. In this instance, PCRA counsel has complied, having detailed the review process, addressed the claims in the pro se PCRA petition, and concluded that the issues lack merit and that the petition was untimely. Furthermore, PCRA counsel confirmed he could not find any meritorious issues related to the timeliness exceptions in the PCRA. Pennsylvania law stipulates that no court has jurisdiction over untimely PCRA petitions, which must be filed within one year of the final judgment. The judgment is considered final after all avenues for direct review have been exhausted or the period for seeking review has expired. There are three limited exceptions to the timeliness requirement, which must be specifically alleged and proven by the petitioner: government interference, unknown facts that could not have been discovered through due diligence, or newly recognized constitutional rights that apply retroactively.

The petitioner bears the burden of proving that a timeliness exception applies to her case, as established in Commonwealth v. Marshall. All exceptions to the time-bar have a separate deadline, which requires a petition to be filed within sixty days of when the claim could first have been presented, as outlined in Commonwealth v. Edmiston and 42 Pa.C.S.A. 9545(b)(2). In this instance, the Appellant was sentenced on December 22, 2006, and did not file post-sentence motions or a direct appeal, causing her judgment to become final on January 22, 2007. Consequently, she had until January 22, 2008, to file a timely PCRA petition, but her petition was filed on March 23, 2016, making it untimely under 42 Pa.C.S.A. 9545(b)(1). 

The Appellant attempted to invoke a timeliness exception based on the new constitutional right established in Miller v. Alabama, which the Supreme Court made retroactive in Montgomery v. Louisiana. However, the court concluded that these cases do not apply to the Appellant, who was twenty-three years old at the time of the offense, as Miller only pertains to defendants under eighteen. The Appellant argued for an extension of Miller's protections to those older than eighteen, citing theories of brain development, but this argument has been previously rejected in Commonwealth v. Furgess. Ultimately, the court affirmed the PCRA court's decision that the petition was untimely and that the Appellant did not successfully invoke any exceptions, granting the request for PCRA counsel to withdraw.