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United States v. Kevin Clardy
Citation: 877 F.3d 228Docket: 17-5094
Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; December 4, 2017; Federal Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Kevin Clardy appealed the denial of his motion to challenge his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), despite having explicitly waived such rights in his plea agreement. Clardy had pled guilty in 2009 to possessing a firearm as a convicted felon and to possessing over 50 grams of crack cocaine with intent to distribute, agreeing not to appeal his sentence or challenge it under various statutes, including § 3582(c). The district court had accepted his plea after confirming he understood the agreement, which included a clear waiver of the right to challenge the sentence in any collateral attack. After the Sentencing Commission amended the Guidelines to reduce drug offense levels, Clardy sought a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2), which the district court denied, citing his waiver. On appeal, the court reviewed whether Clardy had indeed waived his right to file the motion, affirming that he had knowingly and voluntarily signed the agreement. The court emphasized that the specific terms of the waiver clearly included § 3582(c) motions, regardless of the waiver's title, which was labeled 'Waiver of Appellate Rights.' Clardy’s arguments regarding the ambiguity of the waiver were rejected, reinforcing the conclusion that he had validly waived his right to challenge his sentence under the specified statute. Clardy contends the waiver of his rights is ambiguous because it categorizes a § 3582(c) motion as a collateral attack. He claims that while he waived rights to collateral attacks under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, § 2241, and § 3582(c), the term "collateral attack" traditionally refers to efforts to overturn a sentence via new lawsuits, not through sentence reductions like those permitted under § 3582(c). However, the court finds that the intent of the waiver is sufficiently clear, rendering the classification of § 3582(c) motions irrelevant. The court cites previous cases affirming that an explicit waiver of § 3582(c) motions is valid regardless of terminological classification. Clardy further argues the waiver is ambiguous because § 3582(c)(2) allows courts to reduce sentences "on its own motion," implying he cannot waive a court's inherent power. However, the court notes that Clardy does not consistently support this argument, as he later suggests the waiver should only apply to a specific subset of § 3582(c), which also allows court-initiated modifications. The court clarifies that while Clardy may waive his right to file a § 3582(c) motion, this does not negate the court's authority under that section; it simply means Clardy relinquishes his right to seek such relief. Ultimately, the court concludes that a valid waiver in a plea agreement precludes a defendant from challenging their sentence under § 3582(c), and affirms the district court’s order.