People v. Page

Citations: 225 Cal. Rptr. 3d 786; 3 Cal. 5th 1175; 406 P.3d 319Docket: S230793

Court: California Supreme Court; November 30, 2017; California; State Supreme Court

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Proposition 47, approved in 2014, reclassified certain theft- and drug-related offenses from felonies to misdemeanors, including amending Penal Code section 490.2, which states that theft of property valued at $950 or less is treated as petty theft. Additionally, Penal Code section 1170.18 allows individuals serving felony sentences at the time of Proposition 47’s passage to petition for resentencing to a misdemeanor if their offense would qualify as such under the new law. Timothy Wayne Page, who was serving a felony sentence for violating Vehicle Code section 10851 (taking or driving a vehicle without consent), filed for resentencing after Proposition 47 was enacted. The trial court denied his petition, a decision upheld by the Court of Appeal, which concluded that Proposition 47 did not alter the punishment for Vehicle Code section 10851 violations.

The Supreme Court found that the lower courts erred by categorically denying resentencing eligibility for Vehicle Code section 10851 convictions, noting that theft of a vehicle falls under the definition of theft as per Penal Code section 490.2. However, since Page's petition did not provide details regarding the nature of his conviction or the vehicle's value, the trial court's denial was deemed appropriate. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court modified the Court of Appeal's judgment to allow Page the opportunity to file a new petition to demonstrate his eligibility for resentencing. The original charges against Page included three felonies, and he had entered a guilty plea, resulting in a sentence of 10 years and 8 months, primarily for the Vehicle Code violation.

On November 4, 2014, Proposition 47 was approved by voters and took effect on November 5, 2014. Shortly thereafter, the defendant filed a “Motion for Modification of Sentence” without legal counsel, citing Proposition 47 as the basis for reducing his sentence. The superior court interpreted this as a petition for resentencing under section 1170.18 but ultimately denied it, stating the defendant did not meet the eligibility criteria set forth in Penal Code section 1170.18. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeal, which noted that while Proposition 47 reduced certain felonies to misdemeanors, it did not apply to offenses under Vehicle Code section 10851. The appellate court concluded that the defendant could not be considered guilty of only a misdemeanor under the new law at the time of his offense.

The court further clarified that Vehicle Code section 10851 does not fit within the new petty theft statute defined by section 490.2 of Proposition 47, as it addresses the act of taking or driving a vehicle without necessarily intending to steal it. Additionally, the defendant's argument regarding equal protection, comparing his conviction under Vehicle Code section 10851 to grand theft under Penal Code section 487 (for which misdemeanor resentencing is available under certain conditions), was rejected.

Proposition 47’s resentencing provision allows individuals serving sentences for felonies that would now qualify as misdemeanors under the new law to petition for resentencing. Specifically, section 1170.18 states that individuals serving sentences for certain felonies can request a recall of their sentence if they would have been guilty of a misdemeanor under the act when it was in effect. However, the court distinguished between Vehicle Code section 10851 and Penal Code section 487, noting that the former does not classify the offense as “grand theft” and encompasses a broader range of actions than theft traditionally defined. The key issue remains whether those convicted under Vehicle Code section 10851 can seek resentencing under section 1170.18, which is not clearly established.

Vehicle Code section 10851 criminalizes both the taking of a vehicle and driving it without the owner's consent with the intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the owner of possession, regardless of intent to steal. In contrast, theft necessitates the intent to permanently deprive the owner of possession. The distinction between these offenses was clarified in People v. Garza, which addressed whether a defendant could be convicted under both Vehicle Code section 10851 and Penal Code section 496 for the same vehicle. The court determined that if the Vehicle Code conviction was based on taking the vehicle with intent to permanently deprive the owner, it constituted theft, thus precluding a separate conviction for receiving stolen property. Conversely, if the driving occurred after the theft was complete or if the intent was only to temporarily deprive the owner, it would not constitute theft. Proposition 47 introduced a misdemeanor theft provision applicable to Vehicle Code section 10851 offenses for vehicles valued under $950, requiring such cases to be charged as petty theft rather than as felonies. For individuals serving felony sentences at the time Proposition 47 was enacted, section 1170.18 allows for resentencing to misdemeanor if the offense would qualify as a misdemeanor under the new provision. This applies regardless of whether the original conviction was under Penal Code section 487 or Vehicle Code section 10851.

A defendant convicted under California Vehicle Code section 10851(a) for unlawfully taking a vehicle with the intent to permanently deprive the owner is considered to have committed vehicle theft. Proposition 47 allows some defendants convicted under this section to be eligible for resentencing to a misdemeanor if the vehicle's value was $950 or less. The Attorney General argues against this eligibility, asserting that section 10851 is not included in the list of statutory sections amended by Proposition 47, suggesting that voters did not intend to alter the punishment for these convictions. However, the text of section 1170.18 does not limit eligibility strictly to the listed sections; rather, it allows those serving felony sentences who would qualify for misdemeanor treatment under Proposition 47 to request resentencing in accordance with section 490.2, which is on the list. This interpretation aligns with other provisions of Proposition 47, where the same list serves to indicate sentencing provisions rather than restrict eligibility. The absence of the list in subdivision (f), which pertains to designating completed felony sentences as misdemeanors, supports the conclusion that the list in subdivision (a) is not a limit on eligibility but rather a guideline for resentencing procedures.

Two sections in Penal Code section 1170.18, subdivision (a)—specifically, sections 459.5 and 490.2—were introduced by Proposition 47, indicating that no defendant could have been serving a felony sentence for these offenses when the initiative became effective. The list in section 1170.18 does not include sections that define felony or wobbler theft offenses like Penal Code section 487, suggesting it is not intended as a comprehensive list of eligible conviction statutes. Instead, it identifies statutes that establish new misdemeanor penalties that eligible defendants can be resentenced to after serving felony terms. 

The Attorney General points out that Vehicle Code section 10851 is not referenced in the relevant language of section 490.2, which states that theft of property valued at $950 or less shall be treated as petty theft and punished as a misdemeanor. This interpretation, however, is contested. The clause “Notwithstanding Section 487 or any other provision of law defining grand theft” is meant to ensure that the new misdemeanor classification applies regardless of other laws, thus not limiting the provision’s application solely to previously defined grand theft offenses. 

The omission of Vehicle Code section 10851 from the opening clause does not imply an exclusion from the new petty theft definition under section 490.2. The core message remains clear: obtaining property valued at less than $950 constitutes petty theft, irrespective of whether the theft is categorized as grand theft prior to Proposition 47’s passage. Moreover, while section 10851 does not explicitly classify the offense as theft, it encompasses actions that involve vehicle theft, which is treated as a form of grand theft when penalized as a felony.

Penal Code section 489, subdivision (c) pertains to grand theft, while Penal Code section 490 addresses petty theft, which carries a maximum penalty of six months in county jail. Proposition 47 mandates a broad and liberal interpretation to fulfill its intent, as indicated in the voters' guide. The Legislative Analyst clarified that theft of property valued at $950 or less could previously be charged as a felony if it involved certain items, such as vehicles, but under Proposition 47, such cases should not be classified as grand theft solely based on the type of property. 

If section 490.2 is ambiguous regarding theft under Vehicle Code section 10851, the voters' intent supports a broad interpretation, meaning theft of a vehicle worth $950 or less is classified as petty theft and punishable as a misdemeanor, irrespective of the charge under which the theft was prosecuted. Defendants serving felony sentences for such thefts at the time of Proposition 47's enactment are eligible for resentencing under section 1170.18, subdivision (a). The Court of Appeal's ruling that excluded Vehicle Code section 10851 convictions from resentencing was incorrect. 

To qualify for resentencing, a defendant must demonstrate eligibility by showing the vehicle's value and that the conviction was for theft rather than for post-theft driving or without intent to permanently deprive the owner. Previous Court of Appeal decisions asserting that Vehicle Code section 10851 convictions were ineligible for resentencing are disapproved to that extent.

Determining eligibility for resentencing under section 1170.18 often requires distinguishing between vehicle theft and unlawful driving after theft, as defined by Vehicle Code section 10851. This section addresses driving a stolen vehicle without the owner’s consent, intending to deprive the owner of possession. If there is a "substantial break" between the theft and the subsequent driving, the actions may lead to a distinct conviction under section 10851, separate from vehicle theft. A resentencing court can usually ascertain whether a conviction under Vehicle Code section 10851 was based on theft or post-theft driving from the record of conviction. 

If trial testimony or documentation indicates post-theft driving, a defendant cannot establish eligibility under section 1170.18 merely by claiming they also stole the vehicle, as such claims do not prove that the conviction was for theft rather than post-theft driving. While some facts may not be clear from the record and could warrant an evidentiary hearing, Vehicle Code section 10851 convictions are not inherently ineligible for resentencing, and defendants should have the chance to prove their eligibility.

In the case at hand, the defendant's petition did not provide sufficient allegations or evidence to demonstrate that his conviction under Vehicle Code section 10851 was based on theft or that the vehicle's value was $950 or less. Consequently, the petition was correctly denied. However, since the burden of proof and necessary facts for resentencing were not clearly articulated in Proposition 47 when the defendant filed his petition, he is entitled to submit a new petition that includes the required evidence for eligibility under section 1170.18. The Court of Appeal's judgment was modified to affirm the denial of the petition while allowing for future consideration of a petition that meets statutory requirements.