Joel Dufresne v. Carmen Palmer

Citation: 876 F.3d 248Docket: 17-1340

Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; November 21, 2017; Federal Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Joel Nathan Dufresne, a Michigan prisoner, appeals the district court's denial of his habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Convicted in 2006 on multiple counts of first-degree and third-degree criminal sexual conduct against his former girlfriend Angela Wiertalla, Dufresne was sentenced to 50 to 75 years for the first-degree counts and 25 to 50 years for the third-degree counts. His appeal includes claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, trial court errors, ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, violations of his rights related to post-arrest silence, and prejudicial references to his affiliation with the Creativity Movement, a white-supremacist group.

The Michigan courts, including a Ginther hearing, found no ineffective assistance of counsel, and subsequent motions for relief from judgment were denied. The district court ruled that Dufresne procedurally defaulted on some claims and denied relief on others. To proceed with his appeal, Dufresne must demonstrate a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, as outlined in 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). This standard requires showing that reasonable jurists could debate the outcome or that the issues deserve further consideration.

Petitioners whose claims are denied on procedural grounds must demonstrate that reasonable jurists could debate the validity of their constitutional claims and the correctness of the procedural rulings made by the district court. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), a district court is barred from granting habeas relief if a state court has previously adjudicated the claims on their merits unless the state court's decision was contrary to federal law, involved an unreasonable application of such law, or was based on an unreasonable factual determination. 

In Dufresne's case, the district court found his first two grounds for relief procedurally defaulted due to the Emmet County Circuit Court's refusal to review them under Michigan Court Rule 6.508(D)(3). Dufresne failed to show adequate cause and prejudice to overcome this default. Ground one of his petition claimed ineffective assistance of trial counsel, including failure to review key evidence and investigate critical aspects of his defense. Dufresne cited issues raised in his motion for relief from judgment, but the district court noted that he did not clearly assert claims raised on direct appeal. However, reasonable jurists might debate the district court's conclusion regarding this claim's procedural assertion. 

For a certificate of appealability (COA) to be granted, the petitioner must make a substantial showing of a constitutional right's denial, meaning claims must be not only constitutional but also arguably valid or meritorious, in line with AEDPA's stipulations.

The inquiry encompasses both the procedural aspects of the district court's ruling and the substantive merits of the claims involved. The Slack decision emphasizes assessing the "debatability of the underlying constitutional claim," rather than how the claim is articulated in the petition. The primary function of certificates of appealability (COAs) is to distinguish constitutional claims warranting further scrutiny from those lacking merit. While many petitioners may articulate plausible constitutional claims, this is not universally the case, as demonstrated in Dufresne's situation. Six circuits recognize that a claim's merits must be evaluated to some extent when considering COAs, as evidenced by several case citations. Although some circuits might follow a different approach, a minimal assessment of the merits is required. Ultimately, Dufresne needed to establish that reasonable jurists could debate the merits of his constitutional claim. The Michigan trial court noted that Dufresne's counsel's decisions regarding the Creativity Movement were integral to the case and not deficient. Furthermore, Dufresne's claims (c), (d), and (e) in his post-conviction relief motion were not reviewed due to Michigan Court Rule 6.508(D)(3), which bars claims that could have been raised previously unless exceptions apply. The Emmet County Circuit Court's ruling relied on this procedural bar and discussed the relevant exceptions, affirming its decision to deny relief.

Claims denied under Michigan Court Rule 6.508(D)(3) are procedurally defaulted in federal habeas review, as established in Amos v. Renico. The district court determined that subclaims (c), (d), and (e) were procedurally defaulted, a conclusion that reasonable jurists would support. Subclaims (a) and (b) were not presented in state court, either on direct appeal or in Dufresne’s post-conviction motion, leading to their procedural default due to being unexhausted with no remaining state-court remedies. 

In Ground Two of his habeas petition, Dufresne contended that the trial court violated his due process rights by excluding key evidence and that the state intimidated witnesses. The Emmet County Circuit Court denied his post-conviction motion, citing Dufresne's failure to demonstrate good cause for not raising these errors earlier and a lack of actual prejudice. This denial invoked Rule 6.508(D)(3) and was supported by reasonable jurists.

For claims that are procedurally defaulted, federal habeas review is barred unless the petitioner can show cause for the default and actual prejudice or establish a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Dufresne failed to demonstrate effective assistance from appellate counsel regarding his claims. Additionally, the district court found that Dufresne did not provide new reliable evidence of actual innocence needed for the miscarriage-of-justice exception. The affidavits he submitted did not indicate presence during the alleged crimes or relevant information about those acts. Police reports detailing prior offenses, which could have been discovered before trial, also did not qualify as new evidence and did not prove Dufresne's innocence. Consequently, Dufresne’s first two grounds for relief were deemed unmeritorious.

Dufresne's habeas petition alleges ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for not raising issues from his previous grounds on direct appeal. The district court upheld the Emmet County Circuit Court's determination that appellate counsel acted reasonably. Dufresne's appellate counsel did argue that trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to evidence regarding Dufresne's affiliation with the Creativity Movement. The court concluded that reasonable jurists would not debate the district court's decision to deny habeas relief based on Dufresne's claim about appellate counsel's performance.

Dufresne did not previously argue that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to present specific statements made to Detective White-Erickson, which may indicate he did not exhaust these claims. Despite this, the court chose to address these claims on the merits due to procedural default concerns. Dufresne contended that videotapes of his statements contradicted trial testimony but failed to provide any evidence, such as copies of the tapes or transcripts, weakening his claims. Consequently, the court found no basis for concluding that Dufresne's defense was prejudiced by trial counsel's alleged errors, making it unlikely that appellate counsel could have successfully argued these points.

Additionally, five remaining claims of ineffective assistance by appellate counsel were identified, including failures to argue that trial counsel should have investigated the murders related to Judge Lefkow’s family, presented helpful witnesses, and examined Wiertalla’s background. Dufresne also claimed that the trial court improperly excluded evidence and that the state intimidated witnesses. These claims were raised for the first time in Dufresne's motion for relief from judgment, and the court noted that appellate counsel is not required to raise every possible claim, with a presumption of effective performance.

To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, a petitioner must demonstrate that the issues not raised were significantly stronger than those presented and that there is a reasonable probability that, if the unaddressed issues had been raised, the outcome would have been different. Dufresne's claim regarding the murder of Judge Lefkow’s relatives lacks substantial support, as he failed to provide evidence that the murders were committed by someone unrelated to him or his organization. His assertion that trial and appellate counsel were deficient is unsubstantiated, leading to the conclusion that he cannot show deficient performance or prejudice.

Moreover, Dufresne did not inform appellate counsel of any potential witnesses not investigated during the trial, which limits the expectation for appellate counsel to investigate unknown individuals. The inclusion of two potential defense witnesses on the witness list does not mitigate this, especially since one witness's testimony was deemed inadmissible under state law, a determination that cannot be contested in federal habeas proceedings. Dufresne presented an affidavit from a witness who described a non-abusive relationship with his partner; however, even if this testimony were admissible, reasonable jurists would likely agree that it would not have changed the outcome of his appeal, given that evidence established Dufresne's assault on the partner.

On June 25, 2005, an assault occurred during Wood's friendship with Wiertalla, contradicting Wood's claim that Dufresne and Wiertalla were never violent with each other. Recorded calls revealed Dufresne apologizing to Wiertalla for his actions, undermining Wood's credibility regarding their relationship. Consequently, jurists would likely agree that Dufresne failed to demonstrate the necessary prejudice required for his claims.

Dufresne submitted a police report indicating Wiertalla had assaulted him, alongside her personal protection order against another individual and her history of misdemeanor and felony convictions. However, trial counsel may have reasonably decided that the minimal impeachment value of these records would detract from stronger arguments, such as suggesting Wiertalla fabricated allegations for custody purposes. As a result, Dufresne's ineffective assistance claim is unlikely to succeed on appeal.

Prior to trial, the state successfully filed a motion in limine to exclude various issues, including Wiertalla’s prior sexual conduct, unsubstantiated allegations against others, her mental health history, dismissed charges against Dufresne, her criminal record, and prior drug use. Defense counsel agreed not to raise some of these issues, leading the court to limit what could be discussed in front of the jury. Therefore, appealing this ruling would have had minimal chance of overturning Dufresne's convictions.

Lastly, Dufresne claimed appellate counsel was ineffective for not arguing that trial counsel should have raised a witness-intimidation argument. An investigator's affidavit indicated that a witness’s mother had been warned by police not to discuss her observations of an altercation between Dufresne and Wiertalla, supporting Dufresne’s claim.

Cuneo reported that a state trooper contacted her after her research on the case, expressing curiosity about her activities. Robert Poppell, an affidavit witness, claimed he had a close relationship with Wiertalla after Dufresne's departure for Florida and attended Dufresne's sentencing but was advised by a prosecutor and sheriff not to testify, as his presence could complicate matters. Cuneo's allegations of intimidation occurred post-Dufresne's direct appeal, and any hearsay regarding intimidation of DeGroff and his mother would be inadmissible. There was no indication that appellate counsel was aware of the alleged intimidation or Poppell's statements, which did not constitute witness intimidation.

In addressing Dufresne's claim regarding improper use of his post-arrest, post-Miranda silence, the district court assumed a violation of Doyle v. Ohio but deemed it harmless error. Doyle prohibits using a defendant's silence to impeach their testimony. The testimonies from White-Erickson and Trooper Armstrong were not used for impeachment and were responses to general questions about the interview process, with no reference to Dufresne's invocation of his Miranda rights during cross-examination or closing arguments. The Michigan Court of Appeals found that the officers' testimony did not breach Dufresne’s right to a fair trial, which was not an unreasonable interpretation of Doyle. Even if the testimony was a constitutional error, it didn't substantially influence the jury's verdict, as the references were brief and not prompted by the prosecutor.

Evidence of Dufresne’s guilt was substantial, undermining his defenses of consent and fabrication, which relied heavily on witness credibility and were largely irrelevant to his post-arrest silence. As a result, reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment that any Doyle error was harmless to be indisputable. Regarding prosecutorial misconduct, Dufresne alleged that the prosecutor improperly questioned him about his association with the Creativity Movement. The court evaluated this claim under the standard of whether the prosecutor's comments rendered the trial fundamentally unfair, referencing established case law. The district court determined that Dufresne was not entitled to habeas relief, as it accepted the state court's ruling that the testimony regarding his ties to the Creativity Movement was admissible. Furthermore, even if certain testimony was deemed inadmissible, the prosecutor could still ask questions that brought out such evidence without committing misconduct. Dufresne did not contest the truth of the testimony in question nor did he challenge any direct comments made by the prosecutor, who had advised jurors to concentrate on the evidence of Dufresne's actions against the victim rather than on his character. Consequently, the court denied Dufresne’s request for a certificate of appealability.