State of Washington v. Willie Charles Ritchey

Citation: Not availableDocket: 34637-4

Court: Court of Appeals of Washington; November 20, 2017; Washington; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Willie C. Ritchey appeals his conviction for theft of a motor vehicle, asserting that the trial court made errors by not providing a limiting instruction and by refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of second degree taking a motor vehicle without permission. The court holds that second degree taking a motor vehicle without permission is not an included offense of theft of a motor vehicle. The court affirms the conviction, determining that Ritchey did not demonstrate prejudicial error.

During trial, Ritchey was charged with theft of a motor vehicle under RCW 9A.56.065. The defense sought to instruct the jury on the lesser crime of second degree taking a motor vehicle without permission under RCW 9A.56.075, but the trial court denied this request. Ritchey, arrested by an undercover officer, initially claimed to have permission for the vehicle. Upon being informed it was stolen, he admitted to stealing a key for it. Although the officer described Ritchey as appearing truthful, the statement was struck from the record at the prosecutor's request, and the court declined to give a limiting instruction. Ritchey testified in his defense, claiming he had permission and was returning the vehicle, but was impeached by his history of dishonesty.

The court analyzed whether the trial court erred in denying the lesser included offense instruction. It emphasized that for a crime to qualify as a lesser included offense, it must meet both legal and factual prongs established by statute. The factual prong requires affirmative evidence showing that only the lesser crime was committed, which Ritchey failed to provide. Thus, the court concluded there was no basis for the lesser included offense instruction.

For a crime to qualify as an included offense, every element of the lesser offense must also be an element of the greater offense. The case law establishes that if a greater crime can occur without committing the lesser offense, they do not share a lesser included relationship. In this context, TMV (taking a motor vehicle without permission) is not an included offense of vehicle theft. The definition of vehicle theft requires exerting unauthorized control over a motor vehicle with the intent to deprive the owner of it, while TMV can occur simply by taking or driving a vehicle without permission, without the need for intent to deprive. The term 'taking' is interpreted as 'seizing,' and encompasses actions like driving away or riding in a stolen vehicle, which do not require the intent to deprive the owner. Furthermore, one can commit vehicle theft through methods like embezzlement or hiding a vehicle, which do not involve driving it away. Consequently, theft of a vehicle can occur independently of TMV. The trial court's decision to deny Mr. Ritchey an instruction on TMV as a lesser included offense of vehicle theft was correct. The majority of the panel concluded that only this portion of the opinion would be published, with the remainder having no precedential value.

Mr. Ritchey argued that the court erred by not providing a limiting instruction after striking an officer's testimony that he was 'honest' about taking a key without permission. The trial court's decision to remedy this by striking the testimony was within its discretion, as personal opinions on another witness's truthfulness are generally inadmissible in criminal trials. Courts assess whether such irregularities necessitate a new trial based on the seriousness of the irregularity, whether the statement was cumulative of properly admitted evidence, and if the irregularity could be remedied by an instruction. Deference is given to the trial court under an abuse of discretion standard, which applies similarly to motions for mistrial. Mr. Ritchey did not seek a mistrial concerning the officer's statement, leading to an assumption that no further relief was necessary. Although the jury was not immediately instructed to disregard the stricken testimony, they were later advised not to consider it during deliberations, which is presumed to be followed. The trial court had reasonable grounds for its approach, concluding that an immediate instruction might highlight the stricken testimony unnecessarily. Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion, and Mr. Ritchey's conviction was affirmed. The court found no need to evaluate whether any error was harmless.