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Armstrong v. Clarkson College
Citation: 297 Neb. 595Docket: S-16-717
Court: Nebraska Supreme Court; September 1, 2017; Nebraska; State Supreme Court
Original Court Document: View Document
In the case of Armstrong v. Clarkson College, the Nebraska Supreme Court addressed several legal principles regarding directed verdicts, evidence admissibility, jury instructions, and contracts. 1. A directed verdict is treated as an admission of the truth of all competent evidence against the moving party, requiring that all controverted facts be resolved in favor of that party. It is appropriate only when reasonable minds can reach only one conclusion from the evidence, indicating a legal resolution of the issue. 2. Appellate courts independently review legal questions and evaluate the formation and terms of implied contracts for clear error. The admissibility of evidence is governed by the Nebraska Evidence Rules, with judicial discretion applied only where specified. An appellate court reviews evidentiary decisions for abuse of discretion, especially when issues are committed to trial court discretion. 3. In civil cases, the admission or exclusion of evidence only constitutes reversible error if it prejudices a substantial right of the affected party. Jury instructions must reflect the theories presented in pleadings and supported by competent evidence, with the burden on the appellant to demonstrate reversible error in the absence of requested instructions. 4. It is permissible for trial courts to refuse requested instructions if the substance is adequately covered in the given instructions. If the overall instructions correctly state the law and are not misleading, they do not constitute prejudicial error. 5. An appellate court reviews denials of new trial motions for abuse of discretion, which occurs when a trial judge’s decisions are untenable or unfairly deprive a party of substantial rights. 6. An implied in fact contract exists when the parties' mutual intent to contract can be inferred from circumstances, while enforceability requires mutuality; if only one party is obligated to perform, the contract lacks requisite mutuality. Implied contracts can be defined by the parties' conduct and surrounding circumstances, with their terms determined by a jury based on presented evidence. An affirmative defense introduces new matters that, if the petition's allegations are true, serve as a defense to the claims. In the context of colleges and universities, academic deference does not constitute an affirmative defense but rather pertains to the standard of review for breach of contract claims based on academic judgments; not all institutional decisions warrant deference. A directed verdict is denied if there are disputed facts supporting the plaintiff's claims. The doctrine of impracticability excuses non-performance when unforeseen circumstances render it extremely difficult or impossible, provided the promisor did not assume the risk and has made reasonable efforts to overcome obstacles. Mere inconvenience does not satisfy the impracticability standard. A party's duty to perform may also be excused if the other party's actions hinder performance. To invoke this defense successfully, the party must demonstrate reasonable efforts to mitigate damages, which are only required to be mitigated if avoidable through such efforts. Factors considered in assessing mitigation reasonableness include the cost or difficulty of mitigation, the plaintiff's financial ability, and any actions by the defendant that obstructed mitigation. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies mandates that all available administrative options be pursued before seeking judicial review, applicable to both governmental and certain private entities. In employment contracts within colleges and universities, adherence to mandatory grievance procedures is a prerequisite for enforcing contractual rights, as these procedures form part of the contractual agreement. The appellate court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. A jury awarded Kelly Armstrong $1 million for breach of contract against Clarkson College, following her probation and administrative withdrawal from the institution. Clarkson appeals the district court’s denial of its motions for a directed verdict, several jury instructions, exclusion of evidence, and a new trial. The court concluded that it erred in denying Clarkson's requested jury instruction regarding Armstrong's alleged failure to exhaust the college’s grievance procedure, leading to a reversal and remand for a new trial. Clarkson College, a nonprofit health science institution in Omaha, Nebraska, established a master’s program in nursing with a specialization in nurse anesthesia in 2010. The program consists of a 12-month didactic portion followed by an 18-month clinical portion. Students gain practical experience at contracted clinical sites, which are divided into primary and specialty sites, the latter offering supplemental experience. Armstrong, who enrolled in the CRNA program in fall 2011, excelled in the didactic phase but faced issues during the clinical phase. Various Clarkson student handbooks and policies were presented at trial, including the code of conduct and grievance policy. Many documents contained disclaimers indicating they were not contractual. For instance, the CRNA program handbook and policies stated that the information was for informational purposes only and not to be regarded as a contract. Clarkson's student handbook and clinical site manual lack contractual disclaimers, but include clauses allowing Clarkson to modify policies at any time. Students in the CRNA program are required to adhere to the AANA's Code of Ethics as outlined in the program handbook. During her clinical training, Armstrong attended the AANA national conference in Washington, D.C., from April 14-17, 2013, accompanied by fellow student Kristal Hodges. They were the only Clarkson CRNA students at the event. The conference featured discussions on legislative issues relevant to nurse anesthetists, with a fundraiser held on the Potomac River on the first night. Attendees, including Armstrong and Hodges, were encouraged to dress in professional or 1980's-themed attire. Alcohol was served, and Armstrong consumed four drinks during the four-hour event, including beers purchased for her by others. After the fundraiser, attendees, including several Nebraska CRNAs and Clarkson faculty, took a bus back to the hotel. Witness testimonies about the bus ride conflicted. Armstrong recounted joking with Dennis Bless, an AANA leader, about 1980's costumes. She humorously borrowed Bless's fake mustache, made a joke about ungroomed pubic hair—an inside joke with Hodges—and referenced it in relation to Hodges' dating prospects. Witnesses Hodges, Gondringer, and Glidden provided differing accounts of an incident involving Armstrong on a bus, claiming she behaved inappropriately by exposing herself and making lewd comments about pubic hair. They urged her to stop, after which she complied. Armstrong disputed their accounts, labeling them as exaggerated. Following the incident, Hodges contacted Armstrong, expressing concern about potential repercussions and arguing about the events at the conference. Dr. Mary Hoversten, director of Clarkson’s CRNA program, was informed of the incident by Hodges, who described Armstrong's behavior as unprofessional and embarrassing. Hoversten subsequently instructed Armstrong not to return to her clinical site but to meet with her upon her return to campus. During a phone call, Armstrong acknowledged her behavior was unprofessional. On April 23, 2013, a meeting took place involving Armstrong, Hoversten, and Clarkson officials, where Armstrong was informed she would be placed on probation for violating the AANA Code of Ethics and the CRNA program handbook. Armstrong's attorney was not permitted to attend the meeting. The decision meant she could not return to her specialty clinical site, as students on clinical probation are barred from such assignments. Hoversten noted that the possibility of Armstrong’s clinical site not allowing her return was discussed. Damewood, present due to his role in student assistance, indicated that Armstrong had violated the Clarkson Code of Conduct, which applies to all Clarkson students. However, he later stated he did not believe Armstrong's conduct had violated this Code and no formal charges were filed against her under it. On April 24, 2013, the academic progression committee formally notified Armstrong of her probation status and discussed its terms. Attendees included Armstrong, Hoversten, and Dr. Ann Glow, with absentees to be briefed later. Hoversten informed Armstrong that she was being placed on probation due to a violation of rule 3.4 of the AANA Code of Ethics, which pertains to professional conduct. Armstrong received a copy of this code, along with relevant sections of the CRNA program handbook concerning professionalism and the consequences of failing to adhere to the ethical standards. The probation plan involved Armstrong returning to her primary clinical site at UNMC, pending approval from Glidden, who also had the authority to terminate her clinical experience. If UNMC did not allow her return, Clarkson would attempt to place her in an alternative site; failing that, she would have the option to withdraw from the program or face termination. The handbook specifies that violations of the AANA Code could lead to academic and professional misconduct reviews and potential dismissal. Armstrong was also briefed on the grievance policy, which permits students to contest decisions affecting their academic standing that violate published policies. Grievances must be filed within seven days and are resolved by a committee composed of various stakeholders, with final decisions made by the committee or the vice president of academic affairs, who only votes in the event of a tie. Armstrong received a grievance procedure document and a grievance form, along with the CRNA program handbook's withdrawal policy, which allowed her to withdraw and reapply to another program without a dismissal on her record. She was informed about the policy limiting clinical absences to 25 days. Despite feeling pressured to agree to probation—believing she had no alternative—Armstrong attended a meeting on April 25, 2013, where Hoversten learned that the CRNA education committee had unanimously decided not to allow Armstrong to return due to patient safety concerns related to her behavior during a trip. Hoversten expressed her intention to advocate for Armstrong by seeking alternative clinical sites, but all contacted sites declined to accept her. Hoversten clarified that her communication to these sites was honest about Armstrong's probation status but emphasized that there were no academic issues or patient safety risks. She explained that establishing a new clinical site would take 6 months to a year, and Armstrong could not temporarily return to her specialty rotation due to policy restrictions. Eventually, after Armstrong exhausted her allowed absences and refused to withdraw voluntarily, Hoversten coordinated with the registrar to administratively withdraw Armstrong from the program, ensuring her record reflected a withdrawal rather than a dismissal to facilitate any future applications. Armstrong sued Clarkson for breach of contract, leading to a pre-trial motion in limine that excluded references to a previous plagiarism incident involving Armstrong. The court accepted an "Academic Honesty Conference Form," which indicated that Armstrong's senior project largely replicated a prior student's work. Armstrong claimed this was a misunderstanding and not plagiarism. During the trial, Clarkson sought jury instructions on failure to fulfill a condition precedent regarding Armstrong's alleged failure to use the grievance procedure and on impossibility of performance, both of which the court denied. Clarkson also argued that Armstrong could have mitigated her damages by reapplying to other programs, but the court denied the related jury instruction. The jury ultimately awarded Armstrong $1 million. Clarkson filed a motion to set aside the verdict or for a new trial based on the court's refusal to grant directed verdict motions and the denial of its jury instructions. The court denied Clarkson's motion, prompting an appeal. Clarkson's assignments of error included the court's failure to grant the directed verdict, exclusion of plagiarism evidence, and refusal to instruct the jury on the grievance procedure, impossibility of performance, and mitigation of damages. The appellate court will independently review the trial court's decisions, treating directed verdict motions as admissions of the opposing party's evidence. In Nebraska, the admissibility of evidence is determined by the Nebraska Evidence Rules, with judicial discretion applied only when specified by the rules. When a trial court exercises discretion regarding evidence, appellate courts review for abuse of discretion. In civil cases, evidence admission or exclusion is not considered reversible error unless it unfairly prejudices a substantial right of the complaining party. A litigant is entitled to jury instructions only on theories presented in the pleadings and supported by competent evidence. To claim reversible error from a denied jury instruction, the appellant must demonstrate that the instruction was legally correct, warranted by the evidence, and that they were prejudiced by its denial. Appellate courts independently resolve questions of law, but a trial court is not in error for denying an instruction if its substance is covered by other instructions given. If the instructions collectively state the law correctly and adequately address the jury’s issues, no prejudicial error exists. Additionally, appellate courts review denials of motions for new trials for abuse of discretion, which occurs when a trial judge's decisions are untenable or unfairly deprive a litigant of substantial rights. In the context of Clarkson's assertion regarding its motion for a directed verdict, both parties acknowledge a contractual relationship. Clarkson argues for academic deference, asserting that no breach occurs unless actions are arbitrary and capricious, claiming entitlement to judgment as a matter of law due to a lack of evidence of such behavior. The court concludes that the terms of the contract between Clarkson and Armstrong are implied, noting that the Clarkson student handbooks do not explicitly state the relevant terms. An employee handbook that explicitly states it creates no contractual obligations is not treated as creating any such obligations. This lack of mutuality renders the contract unenforceable when one party is bound to perform while rights exist solely at the option of the other party. Clarkson's CRNA program handbook, which Armstrong allegedly violated leading to her probation, asserts that its statements are non-contractual and reserves Clarkson's right to amend the syllabus at any time. Such language is consistent across Clarkson’s handbooks. Consequently, any contractual terms between Clarkson and Armstrong are implied and determined by surrounding facts, circumstances, or the parties' conduct, which are generally factual issues for a jury to resolve. Clarkson contends that its actions related to Armstrong’s claims were academic judgments entitled to deference, while Armstrong argues that this standard does not apply in her case and that it constitutes a waived affirmative defense. Armstrong claims evidence supports a jury finding that Clarkson's actions were arbitrary and capricious. The court finds no merit in Armstrong’s assertion that the deferential standard is an affirmative defense, which would introduce new matters to the case, as Clarkson's argument does not constitute a defense against the merits of Armstrong's claims. The Nebraska Supreme Court addressed the standard of deference applicable to academic judgments in breach of contract claims in Armstrong v. Clarkson College. The court clarified that significant deference is owed to academic evaluations in such claims, as established in Doe v. Board of Regents, which asserted that universities' academic judgments are entitled to substantial deference regardless of whether the institution is public or private. However, not all academic decisions are shielded by this deference. The court emphasized that while some disciplinary actions involving specialized academic expertise may warrant deference, this does not extend to Clarkson College's failure to provide Armstrong with a clinical site necessary for her training in the CRNA program. Armstrong's claim, which included testimony that Clarkson had promised to secure clinical hours, was deemed sufficient for the jury’s consideration. Consequently, the directed verdict in favor of Clarkson was properly denied, allowing the case to proceed based on the potential for recovery under Armstrong's presented theories of liability. Clarkson did not demonstrate "actual exercise of professional judgment" in failing to provide Armstrong with a clinical site, as it did not contend that its actions were justified by any academic rationale or disciplinary reasons. Instead, Clarkson argued that Armstrong's inability to secure a clinical site was due to the decisions of the clinical sites themselves, not its own. The court found that such a claim does not warrant deference, as Clarkson was asserting it did not make the decision at all. The crux of the dispute between Clarkson and Armstrong centers on Clarkson's contractual obligation to provide a clinical site—whether this duty was fulfilled when it initially placed Armstrong at UNMC or if it was an ongoing responsibility throughout her program. The jury was tasked with determining this obligation, which could reasonably be viewed as ongoing, particularly after Armstrong was placed on probation and UNMC denied her return. Further, the jury could have found that Clarkson did not take adequate steps to help Armstrong find an alternative site, as required under the agreed terms of her probation. Armstrong testified that she accepted these terms, which outlined that she would return to UNMC if permitted, and that Clarkson would make reasonable efforts to find another site if not. The jury could conclude that Clarkson failed to meet this obligation by not thoroughly pursuing other clinical placement options for Armstrong. Clarkson's attempts to secure a clinical site for Armstrong after UNMC's refusal were deemed potentially unreasonable, a determination left for the jury. The jury could have concluded that Clarkson’s actions warranted a verdict for Armstrong due to her failure to provide a clinical site, which was not entitled to deference. Clarkson also contested the exclusion of evidence regarding Armstrong's alleged plagiarism, arguing it was relevant to the decision to place Armstrong on probation. However, the district court ruled that this evidence was properly excluded under Nebraska Rule of Evidence 403, as its probative value was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice and confusion regarding Armstrong's credibility. The evidence presented indicated that Armstrong's inability to progress in the program was the sole reason for her withdrawal, further undermining the relevance of the plagiarism allegations. Thus, the court did not err in excluding the evidence, as it had minimal probative value and posed a significant risk of unfair prejudice. The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of Armstrong’s alleged plagiarism. Clarkson appealed the court’s refusal to provide three proposed jury instructions, which included instructions on the impossibility of performance, Armstrong’s failure to mitigate damages, and her failure to fulfill a condition precedent. For a court’s failure to give a requested jury instruction to be considered reversible error, the appellant must demonstrate that the instruction was legally correct, warranted by evidence, and that they suffered prejudice from its absence. Regarding the impossibility of performance, Clarkson claimed that Armstrong’s conduct and the clinical site’s refusal to accept her made it impossible for Clarkson to fulfill its contractual duties. However, Armstrong countered that Clarkson's disciplinary action was unjustified and that alternative actions could have been taken to facilitate her return to a clinical site. The court concluded that it did not err in denying the jury instruction on impossibility of performance. This doctrine, now referred to as impracticability, relieves a party from contractual obligations when unforeseen circumstances render performance severely impracticable or impossible, contingent on specific criteria: the event causing impracticability must be unexpected, performance must be extremely difficult or impossible, and the promisor must not have assumed the risk of the event occurring. Performance of a contractual duty is not deemed impracticable solely due to inconvenience or increased expense; mere difficulty does not suffice to excuse performance. The critical issue is whether an unforeseen circumstance has significantly altered the performance expectations of both parties at the time of contracting. If such a change occurs, the risk should not be imposed on the promisor. A promisor's obligation may be excused if the other party's actions render performance impossible, but the party claiming impracticability must demonstrate reasonable efforts to overcome the obstacles faced. In the case of Clarkson, the jury instruction regarding impossibility of performance was legally accurate but not supported by the evidence. A tendered jury instruction requires sufficient evidence to create a genuine factual dispute. Clarkson's situation did not warrant the instruction since the difficulties encountered were anticipated, such as a student facing probation or dismissal from a clinical site. While specific behaviors of the student, Armstrong, may have been unexpected, the overall possibility of a student's unprofessional conduct and subsequent probation was foreseeable. Clarkson had established rules concerning professionalism and student probation, reinforcing that these scenarios were not unforeseen. Clarkson was aware that a clinical site could terminate or refuse to accept a student, as outlined in its clinical affiliation agreement with UNMC. This agreement specifies conditions for termination and states that Clarkson cannot reassign a terminated student without approval, which should not be unreasonably withheld. Armstrong’s probation and the refusal of clinical sites to accept her were anticipated, negating the applicability of the impracticability doctrine. Moreover, Clarkson did not make reasonable efforts to fulfill its obligation to provide Armstrong with a clinical site, failing to enforce its rights under the agreement with UNMC or other sites. The agreement permits UNMC to terminate a student for violations of its rules, but no evidence was presented that Armstrong violated any rules or posed a risk to patient services. Clarkson's inaction in demanding compliance from UNMC further undermines its claim of impracticability. Consequently, the district court correctly denied Clarkson’s jury instruction on impossibility of performance. Regarding mitigation of damages, Clarkson argued that the district court erred by not allowing its instruction, claiming Armstrong failed to mitigate her damages by not reapplying to Clarkson's CRNA program or other schools. Armstrong countered that reapplying would have been futile and that she could not afford alternative programs. The court found no error in refusing the instruction, as it was not warranted by the evidence, despite Clarkson’s instruction accurately reflecting the law. A jury instruction is justified when sufficient evidence exists to create a genuine issue of material fact for the jury's consideration. Nebraska Jury Instructions should be utilized whenever applicable, and the instruction provided by the district court in this case aligns with established legal standards regarding mitigation of damages. Under the doctrine of avoidable consequences, a plaintiff may be denied recovery for losses that could have been reasonably avoided. However, a plaintiff is only obligated to mitigate damages through reasonable efforts and is not required to take unreasonable actions or incur excessive costs. The court assesses the reasonableness of a party's mitigation efforts based on three factors: the cost or difficulty of mitigation, the financial ability to mitigate, and any actions by the defendant that may hinder mitigation. In this case, the evidence indicated that Armstrong's ability to complete her degree was severely constrained; transferring her nurse anesthesia credits was not feasible, requiring her to start a new program from scratch. Armstrong testified that she could not afford to reapply to Clarkson College, the sole CRNA program in Omaha, nor could she manage the financial burden or potential relocation necessary to mitigate her lost future income damages. Therefore, the court determined that Armstrong was not required to undertake unreasonable efforts or expenses to mitigate her damages. A plaintiff is not obligated to undertake mitigation efforts that exceed their financial means or require relocating to a different city or state. The court ruled that Armstrong did not fail to mitigate her damages by not reapplying to Clarkson or another CRNA program, rejecting Clarkson’s proposed jury instruction on mitigation as unsupported by evidence. Additionally, Clarkson contended that the district court erred by not instructing the jury on Armstrong's alleged failure to fulfill a condition precedent related to exhausting its internal grievance procedure. The court determined that although the jury should have been instructed on this issue, Armstrong's alleged failure to exhaust would be irrelevant if she did not agree to the grievance policy. Clarkson must prove that the grievance policy was part of the contract. The court clarified that while it did not conclude whether the grievance policy was indeed a contractual term, the jury should evaluate this alongside whether any exceptions to the exhaustion of remedies applied. Armstrong's argument that the exhaustion doctrine does not pertain to private entities like Clarkson was deemed incorrect, as the doctrine generally applies to both governmental and private entities with internal administrative review processes. Equitable relief against a private association is generally not granted unless the plaintiff-member has exhausted all remedies within the association. Individual stockholders must similarly exhaust internal remedies before pursuing a derivative suit. This exhaustion doctrine applies to both state agencies and voluntary associations, mandating that members utilize internal procedures prior to seeking court intervention. The case of McGuire v. Continental Airlines illustrates this principle, where an employee failed to complete all stages of the internal grievance process before bringing a breach of contract claim. The court emphasized that typically, employees must exhaust their employer's internal grievance mechanisms before seeking judicial relief, affirming that Continental's grievance process was the exclusive remedy for disputes regarding employment policy. Armstrong's argument against the applicability of the exhaustion requirement to Clarkson's grievance procedure was deemed unpersuasive. The court concluded that the plaintiff's breach of contract claim was unsuccessful due to his failure to exhaust available remedies within the grievance procedure, leading to a reversal of the jury's verdict. Under Colorado law, any ambiguity regarding grievance procedures should be interpreted in favor of their exclusivity. The court referenced Neiman v. Yale University, where a professor's claim against Yale for breach of contract was dismissed because she did not utilize the faculty handbook's grievance procedure. The court emphasized the necessity of exhausting internal grievance processes in academic institutions, arguing that bypassing these procedures would weaken their effectiveness. Additionally, it clarified that despite the grievance procedure's permissive language, it was effectively mandatory, allowing plaintiffs the option to either use the grievance process or accept the decision. The court also cited Lucero v. UNM Bd. of Regents, where a plaintiff's breach of contract claim was reversed for failing to file a grievance as outlined in the employee handbook. The Nebraska Supreme Court determined that when a contract includes a mandatory grievance procedure, a party's rights under that contract are contingent upon exhausting that grievance process before filing claims for breach of contract. This principle is consistently upheld across various jurisdictions, regardless of whether the employer is a public or private entity. The court emphasized that requiring exhaustion of remedies allows organizations, such as employers or universities, to resolve internal disputes without overburdening the judicial system. This process not only provides the organization a chance to correct potential errors but also conserves judicial resources by preventing unnecessary litigation. Furthermore, the exhaustion requirement helps establish a clear record for any subsequent judicial proceedings and refines the issues at stake. The court rejected Armstrong's arguments against this requirement, asserting that mandatory grievance procedures are integral to the contractual agreement and must be completed before seeking judicial review. Armstrong's claim that the grievance policy does not explicitly state it is a condition precedent to enforcing contractual rights was also dismissed as unfounded. Exhausting a mandatory grievance procedure is a prerequisite for enforcing contractual rights. A grievance procedure does not need explicit language stating it as a condition precedent; an implied duty suffices. Clarkson College's instruction regarding this procedure was legally correct and supported by evidence. Clarkson provided Armstrong with the grievance policy and form upon her probation and included references to the policy in student handbooks, indicating Armstrong's awareness of it. The grievance policy was intended to be mandatory, outlining the process for filing grievances and stating that decisions by the Grievance Committee are final. There is no presumption that Clarkson intended the procedure to be optional. The court found sufficient evidence to raise a factual issue for the jury regarding whether the grievance policy was part of the contract between Clarkson and Armstrong. However, the court did not comment on exceptions to the exhaustion requirement that might apply, such as futility or inadequacy of remedy. While Armstrong could have appealed her probation decision through the grievance process, it is uncertain whether she could have done so after her administrative withdrawal from the program. Armstrong claimed she believed she couldn't file a grievance post-withdrawal. The grievance policy lacks clarity about the rights of former students to challenge dismissals after withdrawal. This matter is suitable for jury determination, contingent on proper instruction regarding the grievance process's applicability to Armstrong's situation. Clarkson's argument regarding Armstrong’s failure to file a grievance is not addressed in relation to a potential estoppel based on a statement from Damewood, the vice president of operations, about a Code of Conduct violation, as this situation involves factual determinations for the jury. Armstrong may claim that Damewood's statement excused her from following Clarkson's grievance procedure; however, this does not negate the validity of Clarkson's instruction grounded in evidence. Armstrong contends that the grievance policy is irrelevant since it does not apply to Code of Conduct violations, but she was disciplined for breaching the CRNA program handbook and AANA Code of Ethics, not the Code of Conduct. Despite Damewood's assertion that her conduct violated the Code of Conduct, no official charges were filed against her regarding that violation. During a probation meeting, Armstrong acknowledged that her probation was based on the handbook and code of ethics violations. Therefore, her argument regarding the grievance policy's applicability is unfounded. The court's failure to grant Clarkson's requested jury instruction on Armstrong's non-fulfillment of a condition precedent due to not filing a grievance is considered prejudicial, as Armstrong's assertion of no prejudice is countered by the need for clarity on the contractual obligations. The determination of whether a condition precedent was met differs from assessing whether a party has substantially performed a contract. In this case, using the grievance procedure was necessary to enforce Clarkson's duties under the contract. If filing a grievance was merely one of Armstrong's responsibilities, the jury could find that she substantially performed her obligations despite not filing. Armstrong's claim that the substantial performance instruction covered the condition precedent issue is legally inaccurate, as no jury instruction sufficiently addressed her failure to file a grievance. Clarkson's proposed jury instruction was a correct legal statement supported by evidence, and the district court's failure to deliver it was prejudicial to Clarkson. Consequently, the district court erred in denying Clarkson's motion for a new trial, which was based on this error. The judgment of the district court is reversed, and the case is remanded for a new trial.