Linda Linn and Mark Shuck v. Pat Montgomery, Christy Schrader, and Brad Allen

Citation: 903 N.W.2d 337Docket: 16–1136

Court: Supreme Court of Iowa; October 27, 2017; Iowa; State Supreme Court

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The Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants Pat Montgomery, Christy Schrader, and Brad Allen in a case involving Linda Linn and Mark Shuck. The appeal focused on two main issues: whether the district court correctly dismissed the defamation claim based on the statute of limitations and whether it properly dismissed the malicious prosecution claim due to the defendants merely providing information to law enforcement without instigating prosecution. The court found that, due to a jury's special interrogatory, it would not address the statute of limitations regarding the defamation claim. However, it upheld the lower court's ruling on the malicious prosecution claim, determining that the defendants did not instigate the criminal charges against Shuck. Relevant facts include that Linn and Shuck lived in a condominium where Shuck had served as president of the homeowners' association. In 2012, Montgomery and Schrader reported alleged wrongdoings by Linn and Shuck to law enforcement, leading to criminal charges against Shuck, which were later dismissed due to the statute of limitations.

On March 10, 2015, Linn and Shuck initiated a lawsuit in Scott County District Court against Montgomery and Schrader, alleging defamation and malicious prosecution, with Linn also claiming loss of consortium. Montgomery and Schrader filed motions for summary judgment, arguing that the defamation claims related to statements made before March 10, 2013, were barred by the two-year statute of limitations. Schrader contended there was no evidence of defaming Linn. Montgomery sought summary judgment on Linn’s loss of consortium claim as well. For the malicious prosecution claim, they asserted that the county attorney's office ultimately decided whether to pursue criminal action, asserting that the claim should fail.

In their response, Linn and Shuck argued for the application of the discovery rule for secretive statements and contended that the original defamer could be liable for any foreseeable republication of those statements. They also claimed that Montgomery and Schrader knowingly misrepresented facts regarding a water line scheme, implying they did not believe it constituted criminal wrongdoing.

The court granted summary judgment in favor of Montgomery on both defamation and malicious prosecution claims and partially in favor of Schrader on Shuck’s defamation claim related to statements made prior to March 10, 2013. The court denied Montgomery's summary judgment for Linn’s loss of consortium claim, allowing it to proceed to trial along with Shuck’s defamation claim against Schrader for statements made after March 10, 2013. During the trial, the jury found in favor of Montgomery and Schrader. Shuck and Linn appealed, but only Shuck raised issues, challenging the summary judgment grants based on the statute of limitations and the malicious prosecution claim.

The court's review of summary judgment motions focuses on identifying genuine issues of material fact and verifying correct legal application, as established in previous case law.

A fact is deemed material if its resolution could influence the outcome of a lawsuit, as established in *Walker v. State*, 801 N.W.2d 548, 554 (Iowa 2011). A genuine issue of material fact exists when reasonable minds could disagree on the resolution of a factual question. Moving parties, Montgomery and Schrader, must demonstrate the absence of material facts, while Shuck, the nonmoving party, must provide evidence beyond mere assertions in his pleadings to show a genuine issue exists. In assessing summary judgment, the court views the record favorably for the nonmoving party and draws all legitimate inferences to establish a genuine issue of material fact. If no genuine issue exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment must be granted, per *Nationwide Mut. Ins. v. Kelly*, 687 N.W.2d 272, 274 (Iowa 2004).

Shuck argues that Iowa Code section 614.1(2), which imposes a two-year statute of limitations on defamation actions, is subject to the discovery rule. While the discovery rule has been applied to negligence claims, its application to defamation claims remains undecided. Shuck also contends that each republication of a defamatory statement restarts the statute of limitations. However, the court will not address these statute of limitations issues, as the jury found no defamation by Montgomery or Schrader before March 10, 2013, which is critical for Shuck’s defamation claim and his spouse Linn’s loss of consortium claim. The court instructed the jury that only actions or statements occurring after March 10, 2013, should be considered for Shuck’s defamation claim. Ultimately, the jury's finding negated any defamation claim prior to that date, meaning even if the court had ruled in favor of Shuck regarding the statute of limitations, the jury's conclusion would result in judgment against him for the precluded defamation claim.

The doctrine of issue preclusion bars parties from relitigating issues that were resolved in a previous legal action, promoting judicial efficiency. Mutuality of parties is not required for its application. Four prerequisites must be met: (1) the issue must be identical, (2) it must have been raised and litigated in the prior action, (3) it must be material and relevant to the prior action's outcome, and (4) the prior determination must be essential to the judgment. In this case, the prerequisites were satisfied regarding Linn’s loss of consortium claim, as the jury found no defamatory statements concerning Shuck, which Linn needed to prove. If the court had ruled differently on Shuck’s defamation claim due to a statute of limitations error, a new trial would not be required because of issue preclusion. The discussion also touches on Shuck’s malicious prosecution claim, which requires proof of a previous prosecution instigated by the defendant, termination of that prosecution, lack of probable cause, malice, and damages. Shuck alleges that Montgomery and Schrader exceeded mere reporting by instigating his prosecution.

In the case of Wilson v. Hayes, the central issue pertains to whether the actions of Montgomery and Schrader constituted instigation or procurement of a criminal prosecution. The court determined that there was no genuine issue of material fact, as Montgomery and Schrader only provided information to the authorities, who independently decided to file criminal charges concerning a water line issue. Citing precedent, the court clarified that simply providing information does not amount to instigation if the authorities have the discretion to choose whether to initiate proceedings.

Shuck argued that the rule against considering mere information provision as instigation should not apply in cases where false information is knowingly given. He contended that Montgomery was aware of a potential water line scheme but failed to disclose it during his initial meeting with the assistant county attorney, only mentioning it afterward, once he learned the statute of limitations had barred claims of wrongdoing. Shuck also pointed out that Schrader had previously shut off the water line, suggesting Montgomery should have been aware of the issue.

The court referenced the case of Rasmussen Buick-GMC, where it was noted that the general rule does not apply if false information is knowingly provided, leading to an implication that such information could influence the prosecution's decision. However, it did not definitively conclude whether knowingly providing false information alone satisfies the instigation element without demonstrating that the prosecution relied on that false information. The Texas Supreme Court's position was also referenced, emphasizing that both the act of knowingly providing false information and the reliance of the public official on that information should be necessary to establish procurement of prosecution. If the prosecution would have occurred regardless of the false information, then the act of providing it could not be deemed as procuring the prosecution.

In Perzynski v. Cerro Gordo County, the court examined a case involving allegations of malicious prosecution. The defendants reported unauthorized edits to the plaintiff's time cards to the chief deputy, who subsequently conducted an investigation and filed criminal charges against the plaintiff for theft after she turned herself in. The court dismissed the charges, leading the plaintiff to sue for malicious prosecution, claiming the defendants instigated the prosecution.

The court found that the plaintiff failed to provide evidence showing that the defendants improperly influenced the assistant attorney general or that he relied on knowingly false information for the prosecution decision. It emphasized that the chief deputy and assistant attorney general independently decided to file charges, not the defendants. The court concluded that even if the defendants had provided false information, it did not instigate the prosecution since Detective Levetzow made his determination based on an independent investigation and hard evidence. 

To succeed in her claim, the plaintiff needed to demonstrate that the prosecution would not have occurred without the false information from the defendants, which she could not do. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment, ruling that no genuine issue of material fact existed regarding whether the defendants instigated or procured the prosecution against the plaintiff. All justices concurred except for Cady, C.J., who did not participate.