Allyson B. Allen v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

Citation: Not availableDocket: 30A04-1702-CR-268

Court: Indiana Court of Appeals; October 20, 2017; Indiana; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the Hancock Superior Court's decision that Allyson B. Allen violated the terms of her probation, leading to the enforcement of her previously suspended sentence in jail. Allen, who was charged with operating a vehicle while intoxicated and later pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor, was placed on probation with specific conditions, including not being arrested for another crime and attending a Victim Impact Panel. 

On October 16, 2016, police responded to reports of an intoxicated woman at a gas station. Officer Glen Jennings found Allen in her vehicle with the engine running, exhibiting signs of impairment, including slurred speech and difficulty maintaining balance. After failing two out of three field sobriety tests, Allen was suspected of being under the influence of opiates, corroborated by her symptoms. 

Allen's appeal raised two issues: the alleged denial of her right to counsel and whether the correct burden of proof was applied in her probation violation hearing. The court concluded that both issues were without merit, thus affirming the trial court's ruling.

Allen was hospitalized for a blood draw and acknowledged taking Klonopin, leading to her arrest for operating a vehicle while intoxicated. She failed to notify the Hancock County Probation Department of her Shelby County arrest and did not attend the mandated Victim Impact Panel. On October 18, 2016, the Probation Department filed a petition to revoke her probation, citing the Shelby County arrest. During an initial hearing on November 7, 2016, the trial court explained the rights involved and the lower standard of proof for probation revocation. Allen was granted bond. The State later filed an additional petition for failing to attend the Victim Impact Panel, resulting in a scheduled hearing for January 4, 2017.

At the January 4 hearing, the court reiterated Allen's rights, including the right to counsel, and she denied the allegations. When asked if she was ready to proceed, she stated she was not. The State requested a later hearing for both petitions, which was set for January 11, 2017. The court reminded her that the State needed to prove its case by a preponderance of the evidence. Allen did not initially request counsel but later retained an attorney who filed an appearance on January 11. Her attorney sought a continuance due to the late entry, but the State objected, indicating its witnesses were present. The court expressed its inclination to proceed, allowing a brief recess for Allen's counsel to consult with Officer Jennings.

After the break, Allen's counsel confirmed readiness to proceed. Ultimately, the trial court found Allen in violation of her probation terms and ordered her to serve her previously suspended sentence in the Hancock County Jail. Allen has since appealed this decision.

Allen asserts that her right to counsel was violated during her probation revocation hearing. While probation is a privilege granted by the State and not an inherent right, revocation of probation does involve a liberty interest that necessitates some due process protections. These include written notice of violations, access to evidence, the opportunity to present a defense and witnesses, the right to confront witnesses, a neutral adjudicator, and a written explanation of the decision. However, probationers do not have a constitutional right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment, although Indiana law provides a statutory right to counsel in such proceedings.

Allen argues that the trial court failed to inform her of her right to counsel and did not secure a knowing waiver of that right. The trial court clarified to all defendants, including Allen, their rights during the initial hearing. Importantly, at a subsequent hearing, the court explicitly advised Allen of her right to counsel and confirmed that one would be appointed if she could not afford one. Since Allen had legal representation during the hearing, her claim of being denied counsel is unfounded.

Additionally, Allen contends that the trial court denied her right to counsel by refusing her attorney's request for a continuance. Although the court did not reschedule the hearing, it allowed a delay for her counsel to interview the State’s key witness. The cases cited by Allen in support of her argument are not applicable here, as they involved situations where the probationer was unrepresented at the hearings.

Allen argues that the trial court erred in denying her request for a continuance to obtain counsel, citing In re Jennings, which held it was reversible error for a trial court to deny a juvenile probationer’s request for a continuance without informing them of their right to counsel. However, unlike in Jennings, the trial court informed Allen of her right to counsel and appointed representation for her at the revocation hearing. Her counsel requested a short continuance, which the court granted, and Allen's counsel affirmed readiness to proceed with the hearing. Therefore, the court did not err in denying Allen's request for a longer continuance.

Additionally, Allen claims the trial court applied the incorrect burden of proof, arguing it used the lower "probable cause" standard instead of the required "preponderance of the evidence" standard as established in Heaton v. State. The trial court's comments included references to probable cause, leading Allen to assert that this indicated improper application of the burden of proof. However, the court explicitly stated it found violations by a preponderance of the evidence, suggesting awareness and adherence to the correct standard. The presumption exists that trial courts know and follow the law, and the court informed Allen multiple times about the appropriate burden of proof in probation revocation hearings.

The trial court applied the correct preponderance-of-the-evidence standard in its decision. Initially, the court referenced this standard and acknowledged the Shelby County authorities' belief in probable cause for new charges against Allen. The court explicitly found that the State proved Allen committed a new offense while on probation by a preponderance of the evidence, thus rejecting Allen’s claim regarding the burden of proof. Furthermore, Allen’s statutory right to counsel was upheld during the probation revocation proceeding, as she was informed of this right and had legal representation. Although her counsel's request for a longer continuance was denied, a brief continuance was granted for the counsel to interview the State’s main witness. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment.