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In Re: Adam Anthony Abdalla

Citation: 236 So. 3d 1223Docket: 2017-B -0453

Court: Supreme Court of Louisiana; October 18, 2017; Louisiana; State Supreme Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Adam Anthony Abdalla, attorney licensed in Louisiana (Bar Roll number 30370), has been disbarred retroactively to October 22, 2014, following an interim suspension. The disbarment is based on findings from the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) and a disciplinary board, which reviewed allegations of misconduct against Abdalla. Key infractions include:

1. Writing three unauthorized checks totaling $12,625 to Orange Ocean, LLC (his own company) from a client escrow account.
2. Issuing two unauthorized checks totaling $2,800 to Abdalla Enterprises, LLC (also his company) from the client escrow account.
3. Writing an unauthorized check for $5,910.86 to Belle Realty of Lafayette, LLC, a company owned by his parents, from the firm’s operating account, despite lacking signing authority.
4. Endorsing a $1,000 retainer check meant for the firm and depositing it into his personal account without remitting it to the firm.
5. Creating fraudulent invoices on fictitious letterhead for two clients, resulting in $11,500 being paid directly to him, which he did not forward to the firm.
6. Performing legal services for three clients for cash payments totaling $1,250, which he kept for himself.

Costs and expenses from this matter will be assessed against Abdalla, with legal interest accruing from thirty days after the judgment's finality. Judges Hughes, Crichton, and Genovese dissented with reasons provided by Justice Crichton.

Blanc Bridal, LLC paid the respondent in cash for legal services, resulting in a $3,500 invoice that was later voided, leaving the firm without the payment. Similarly, client Corey Devan Willis provided $500 in cash, but the respondent marked the invoice as paid while failing to transfer the funds to the firm. In September 2015, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) filed formal charges against the respondent, alleging violations of Rules 8.4(a), 8.4(b), and 8.4(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The respondent admitted to the misconduct and sought a mitigation hearing. 

During the mitigation hearing in July 2016, the parties agreed on a joint stipulation of facts, confirming that the respondent took funds from the firm, not individual clients, and that he had reimbursed the firm for the amounts converted. The respondent's theft stemmed from a hydrocodone addiction, leading him to voluntarily enter a 90-day rehabilitation program and subsequently join the Judges and Lawyers Assistance Program (JLAP) under a five-year contract. Notably, there are no pending criminal charges against the respondent. 

The misconduct harmed the firm, the public, and the legal profession, with aggravating factors including a pattern of misconduct and multiple offenses. Mitigating factors included the absence of prior disciplinary issues, personal challenges, timely restitution efforts, full disclosure during proceedings, and expressions of remorse. The ODC did not present witnesses, while the respondent provided testimony and called several character witnesses, including those from JLAP and his family, who attested to his recovery and good character. The medical director of the rehab center confirmed the respondent's successful treatment for severe opioid addiction.

In July 2012, the respondent transitioned to a new law firm, and by December of the same year, he began experiencing severe back pain. He started using leftover Percocet from a previous surgery, which led to an euphoric reaction and subsequent daily use. This escalated to purchasing Oxycontin on the street, consuming five to seven pills daily. To fund his addiction, he misappropriated funds from the firm between November 2012 and 2014, totaling approximately $39,000, which he later repaid. The firm terminated his employment in August 2014 due to suspicious financial activities, prompting a forensic accounting investigation.

In June 2015, after an intervention, he entered an inpatient treatment program at Palmetto, where he was diagnosed with severe opioid use disorder and moderate stimulant use disorder (related to Adderall). He completed the program and signed a five-year JLAP agreement, ensuring compliance with treatment recommendations. Currently, he claims to be sober, having not used opioids or Adderall, and believes he can maintain his sobriety.

The Hearing Committee found that the respondent knowingly violated the Rules of Professional Conduct, warranting disbarment as the baseline sanction. While acknowledging his severe addiction and subsequent recovery, the committee noted that the misconduct involved deliberate planning and occurred over an extended period, with eleven separate thefts executed with his professional knowledge. Although the respondent argued for leniency based on his mental condition, the committee determined that he must demonstrate clear evidence that his addiction directly caused his misconduct for any mitigating factors to apply.

The committee determined that the respondent failed to provide adequate evidence to establish a direct causal link between his chemical dependency and his misconduct. Testimonies from friends and family indicating that he changed during his addiction did not substitute for expert testimony proving that his disability caused his actions. Although he may have used stolen money to support his addiction, this alone did not demonstrate that the addiction was the cause of his misconduct. The respondent knowingly engaged in wrongful conduct using sophisticated methods over an extended period, contradicting his claim that his behavior was an anomaly. 

Despite the respondent's cooperation with the disciplinary process and efforts toward recovery, the severity of his misconduct warranted disbarment, as he did not meet the four criteria outlined in ABA Standard 9.32(i). These criteria require medical evidence of chemical dependency or mental disability, proof that such conditions caused the misconduct, evidence of sustained rehabilitation, and assurance that the misconduct is unlikely to recur. The commentary on Standard 9.32 emphasizes the importance of establishing direct causation and assigns varying weights to the mitigating factor of disability depending on its role in the offense.

The disciplinary board accepted stipulated facts regarding the respondent's misconduct, confirming violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct through unauthorized actions involving the firm’s funds. While no clients were harmed, the misconduct was acknowledged as damaging to the firm and the legal profession. Aggravating factors included a pattern of misconduct and selfish motives, while mitigating factors included an absence of prior discipline and a cooperative attitude. Ultimately, despite the mitigating factors, the baseline sanction for the misconduct was determined to be disbarment. The respondent contested the committee's findings and recommended sanction.

Respondent contests the committee's finding that evidence was insufficient to establish a causal link between his misconduct and chemical dependency. The Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) acknowledged that expert testimony on this connection was presented, which the board accepted, leading to the conclusion that the committee incorrectly determined the respondent did not prove mental disability as a mitigating factor. However, the board noted that the significance of this factor relies on whether the addiction was the sole or a major contributor to the misconduct; the evidence lacked specificity for such a determination.

Additionally, the record indicated other financial issues that might have contributed to the misconduct, and the first act of misconduct occurred before the addiction intensified. Even if addiction were heavily weighted as a mitigating factor, the board concurred with the committee that aggravating factors were equally significant, thus not justifying a reduction from the disbarment baseline. Historical cases show sanctions for theft from law firms ranging from a three-year suspension to disbarment, with respondent’s theft of nearly $40,000 over an extended period viewed as serious. The respondent employed sophisticated methods for the theft, including fraudulent invoices, and delayed treatment for nine months after being fired, raising concerns about his commitment to recovery.

The board found that the first theft predates the respondent's full addiction, further complicating the argument for mitigation. Consequently, the board recommended disbarment, which the respondent objected to, leading to the case being set for oral argument as per Supreme Court Rule XIX. 11(G)(1)(b). Bar disciplinary matters are within the original jurisdiction of the court as stated in the Louisiana Constitution.

The court acts as the trier of fact and independently reviews the record to assess whether the alleged misconduct has been established by clear and convincing evidence. The findings of the hearing committee and disciplinary board are not binding, but the court applies the manifest error standard to their factual determinations. The respondent, Adam Anthony Abdalla, converted $39,085.86 from his law firm through unauthorized checks, fraudulent invoices, and directing client payments to himself over approximately eighteen months. Abdalla admitted to violating specific rules of professional conduct and the only issue for the court is determining the appropriate discipline. 

Disciplinary proceedings aim to uphold professional standards, protect the public, and deter future misconduct. The baseline sanction for the offenses is disbarment, which is uncontested. While Abdalla acknowledges the aggravating and mitigating factors identified by the disciplinary board, he disputes the weight given to his addiction as a mitigating factor. The court agrees with the board that even if great weight is assigned to his addiction, it does not outweigh the aggravating factors, and thus, a downward adjustment from disbarment is not justified. 

Despite recognizing Abdalla's positive personal changes, the misconduct warrants disbarment. Consequently, the court adopts the disciplinary board's recommendation, disbarring Abdalla retroactively to October 22, 2014, and revoking his law license in Louisiana. All related costs are to be borne by Abdalla, accruing interest from thirty days after the final judgment. Justice Hughes dissents, aligning with the reasons articulated by Justice Crichton.

Justice Crichton dissents from the Supreme Court of Louisiana's decision to impose disbarment on Adam Anthony Abdalla, arguing that the sanction is excessively severe. Crichton believes Abdalla should receive a three-year full suspension instead, emphasizing his serious opioid addiction and ongoing recovery. The majority opinion contends that Abdalla did not demonstrate a direct connection between his addiction and his initial act of conversion in November 2012, which Crichton disputes, arguing that a one-month gap is insufficient to exclude the impact of his addiction.

Crichton highlights several mitigating factors: Abdalla's full restitution of nearly $40,000 to his law firm, his participation in a five-year agreement with the Louisiana Lawyers Assistance Program (JLAP), completion of a three-month inpatient treatment program, consistent sobriety since, and full cooperation with the disciplinary investigation without facing criminal charges. Crichton points out that the majority's determination of disbarment appears to overlook the significance of these mitigating circumstances, which he feels should warrant a lighter sanction.

He compares the case to In re: Kelly, where a respondent who converted a larger sum was sanctioned with a three-year suspension due to similar mitigating factors, including mental health issues and lack of client harm. Crichton asserts that Abdalla's addiction is a disease comparable to depression and should be treated with similar consideration. He concludes that the mitigating factors in Abdalla's case justify a downward departure from the standard disbarment sanction. Justice Genovese concurs with Crichton's dissent.