Janelle Harrison v. City of Ankeny Police Department and Matt Lnu

Citation: Not availableDocket: 16-0123

Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa; October 11, 2017; Iowa; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Janelle Harrison, a plaintiff and confidential informant for the Mid-Iowa Narcotics Enforcement Task Force, filed a civil suit against the City of Ankeny Police Department and an individual officer after being sexually assaulted by the target of an investigation. She alleged negligence in supervision and tortious infliction of emotional distress. The Iowa District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on several grounds: statutory immunities barred Harrison’s claims; the public duty doctrine negated any duty owed to her; her assailant’s actions were legally unforeseeable; her claims were limited by the assumption of risk doctrine; and her tortious interference claim was legally deficient.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, emphasizing that summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. They highlighted that the burden is on the moving party to demonstrate this entitlement, and even with undisputed facts, summary judgment is improper if reasonable minds could draw different inferences. Harrison contended that the district court improperly weighed evidence and resolved factual disputes, which is a recognized error in summary judgment proceedings.

The district court's decision on the motion for summary judgment does not require reevaluation of disputed factual issues, as these issues are not material to the case's resolution. Iowa Code chapter 670 outlines municipal liability for the negligent acts of its officers and employees, establishing that a municipality is liable unless an exemption in section 670.4 applies. Specifically, section 670.4(1)(j) grants immunity for claims arising from acts or omissions of municipal employees if the damage was caused by a third party not under municipal control, unless actual malice or a criminal act is involved. The court found the defendants immune from liability because the sexual assault occurred during an investigation involving a third party—the target of the investigation—who was not under municipal supervision or control. This aligns with the precedent set in Hameed v. Brown, where the court ruled that a municipality is only liable if it had oversight of the third party's conduct at the time of the damage. The facts of Harrison’s case closely mirror those in Hameed, confirming the target of the investigation was not supervised by the municipality. Harrison argues that Hameed was restricted by Messerschmidt v. City of Sioux City, where immunity was denied due to direct municipal action leading to an injury. However, this case does not alter the applicability of the immunity granted in Hameed.

The court ruled that moving a road barricade is not an act covered by the immunity statute, specifically not falling under the term 'otherwise.' The statute includes specific actions related to municipal responsibilities, such as issuing permits and conducting inspections. The term 'otherwise' is interpreted through the doctrine of ejusdem generis, which limits its scope to actions similar to those explicitly listed. In this case, the city's actions did not involve inspection, investigation, or permit issuance. The precedent set in Messerschmidt is not applicable, as it similarly found that moving a road barricade does not qualify under the statute.

The court affirmed that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment for the defendants based on statutory immunity per Iowa Code section 670.4(1)(j), as the assault in question occurred during a police investigation, which is expressly covered by the statute. The court did not address other arguments since the immunity rationale sufficed.

Chief Judge Danilson concurred but noted separately that a special duty might exist between law enforcement and a confidential informant to take reasonable precautions for their protection. However, even assuming such a duty existed, the informant could not justifiably rely on the officers for protection under the circumstances, as she was aware no officer was present to assist her, lacked a listening device, and did not have a prearranged meeting with the third party. The court referenced existing case law regarding the requirements of a special relationship for duty to protect.