Tyler James Schaeffer v. State of Tennessee

Citation: Not availableDocket: E2016-01614-CCA-R3-PC

Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee; October 6, 2017; Tennessee; State Appellate Court

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Tyler James Schaeffer pled guilty to multiple serious charges, including vehicular homicide and aggravated assault, resulting in a total effective sentence of forty years, to run concurrently with a 100-year federal sentence for robbery-related offenses. Schaeffer's appeal for post-conviction relief was based on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, specifically citing the failure to hire a mental health expert, request a change of venue, investigate witnesses adequately, and explain the implications of concurrent state and federal sentencing. The State acknowledged that Schaeffer received ineffective assistance regarding the sentencing issue alone. The court reviewed the case and ultimately agreed with the Petitioner, reversing the post-conviction court's judgment and remanding the case for further proceedings. The factual background notes that Schaeffer's offenses stemmed from a fatal car crash while he was under the influence of controlled substances, culminating in a series of serious charges at both state and federal levels.

Petitioner pled guilty to multiple charges, including two counts of vehicular homicide and received a 40-year sentence concurrent with a 100-year federal sentence. He did not appeal the plea. A year later, he filed a pro se post-conviction relief petition claiming he involuntarily entered the plea without understanding its consequences and received ineffective assistance of counsel. He alleged counsel failed to secure a mental health expert, request a change of venue, investigate the case properly, and advise him correctly on concurrent sentencing.

At the post-conviction hearing, trial counsel, a District Public Defender since 1989, testified about his multiple meetings with Petitioner over two months, discussing defenses, sentencing, and accident reconstruction. However, Petitioner claimed counsel coerced him into pleading and did not adequately review discovery materials. While Petitioner mentioned potential witnesses, trial counsel could not recall discussing them and did not see a need for a mental evaluation. Counsel did retain an accident reconstruction expert, but he stated this expert would not be called at trial.

Petitioner expressed concerns about media coverage affecting his trial and stated that this, along with the belief that his sentences would run concurrently, influenced his decision to accept the plea agreement. Trial counsel acknowledged discussing a change of venue but did not file a motion, as it would be determined at jury selection.

Trial counsel acknowledged limited discussions regarding Petitioner’s federal case, stating he was aware of Petitioner’s defense but did not elaborate extensively. He informed Petitioner that if convicted, the court could impose a consecutive sentence to the federal sentence. However, Petitioner claims he specifically asked counsel if his state sentence would run concurrently with the federal sentence, to which counsel reportedly affirmed. Counsel believed that the timing of the state proceedings allowed for a concurrent agreement. He reviewed the plea forms with Petitioner, which indicated the state sentence would run concurrently with the federal sentence. 

At a post-conviction hearing, Petitioner insisted that trial counsel repeatedly assured him of the concurrent nature of the sentences and that this understanding was a critical factor in his decision to accept the plea agreement. The plea agreement explicitly stated in bold that all sentences were to run concurrently with the federal sentence. Petitioner emphasized that he would not have accepted the plea had he known otherwise and would have opted for a trial.

During the post-conviction proceedings, there was a clarification request regarding the concurrent nature of the sentences. The state indicated that records showed the state sentence was running concurrently, while defense counsel confirmed this based on state judgments. However, it was noted that the federal system was not granting credit for this concurrent designation. Ultimately, the post-conviction court denied Petitioner’s request for relief, concluding that he received effective legal counsel and was not entitled to relief based on claims of inadequate advisement regarding sentencing, among other arguments.

The post-conviction court determined that the trial court lacked the authority to mandate that the federal sentence run concurrently with the state sentence. It found no evidence from the Petitioner indicating any mental defect, concluding that without substantial medical or lay evidence, there was no basis for trial counsel to seek a mental health evaluation. The court noted that the Petitioner fully understood the plea agreement and received the sentence as stipulated, suggesting that the Petitioner was experiencing "buyer's remorse."

On appeal, the Petitioner claimed ineffective assistance of counsel based on several factors: failure to hire a mental health expert, request a change of venue, investigate potential witnesses, and clarify the implications of concurrent sentencing. The State conceded that the trial counsel was ineffective regarding the explanation of concurrent sentencing. Upon review, the court agreed with both parties that the trial counsel's performance was deficient in this regard.

To succeed in a post-conviction relief claim, a petitioner must prove factual allegations by clear and convincing evidence, as stated in T.C.A. 40-30-103 and 40-30-110(f). Both the U.S. and Tennessee constitutions guarantee the right to effective counsel. The ineffective assistance of counsel claim is assessed using the two-pronged Strickland v. Washington test, which requires showing that counsel's performance was deficient and that this deficiency prejudiced the defense. The court emphasized that failure to prove either element is sufficient for denial of relief and noted that addressing the components of the claim is not obligatory if one element is insufficiently demonstrated. The determination of whether a petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel involves both legal and factual assessments.

The Court reviews post-conviction findings of fact using a de novo standard, presuming correctness unless evidence strongly indicates otherwise. It refrains from re-evaluating evidence or substituting its own conclusions regarding witness credibility or factual disputes, which are determined by the post-conviction court. However, legal conclusions and the application of law to facts are assessed without any presumption of correctness.

In determining ineffective assistance of counsel, the standard is whether counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness based on prevailing norms. The Court evaluates conduct from the attorney's perspective at the time, maintaining a strong presumption in favor of reasonable professional assistance. It will not second-guess trial strategy unless it is shown that decisions were made without adequate preparation.

A petitioner claiming ineffective assistance must demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting prejudice, meaning that the trial outcome was unreliable or fundamentally unfair due to counsel's errors. Specifically for guilty plea cases, the petitioner must show that had counsel acted differently, they would not have pled guilty and would have opted for a trial.

In the case of a claim regarding the failure to retain a mental health expert, the Court emphasizes that neither it nor the post-conviction court can speculate on the potential impact of such expert testimony. Claims based on failure to present evidence require explicit proof of what the evidence would have shown and its potential benefits to the defense.

Post-conviction relief was denied due to the absence of evidence supporting the need for a mental health expert in the defense of Petitioner William Darryn Busby. The court noted that Petitioner did not request such an expert during the trial and failed to provide any evidence of mental defects or how an expert's testimony would have benefited his case. The post-conviction court's conclusion was that without medical proof or substantial lay evidence, there was no basis to claim ineffective assistance of counsel for not seeking a mental evaluation.

Regarding the failure to request a change of venue, the court emphasized that a request can only be granted upon showing undue excitement or other factors leading to an unfair trial. Since Petitioner did not demonstrate prejudice from trial counsel’s decision to delay this request as a tactical choice, the claim of ineffective assistance in this regard was also rejected. Petitioner acknowledged that media coverage influenced his decision to accept a plea deal, further weakening his argument.

Finally, Petitioner argued trial counsel was ineffective for not interviewing potential witnesses. However, to substantiate this claim, Petitioner needed to present these witnesses at the evidentiary hearing. The court reaffirmed that without such testimony, Petitioner could not establish that any failure in investigation resulted in prejudice or denied him critical evidence.

A petitioner seeking post-conviction relief must present a material witness at the evidentiary hearing who could have been located through reasonable investigation and would have provided favorable testimony for the defense. In this case, the petitioner claimed that trial counsel should have interviewed two potential witnesses but failed to call them during the post-conviction hearing. Consequently, the petitioner could not demonstrate the required prejudice under the Strickland test for ineffective assistance of counsel.

Additionally, the petitioner argued that trial counsel inadequately advised him regarding the implications of concurrent state and federal sentences. Although the plea agreement and judgments indicated that the state sentence would run concurrently with the federal sentence, neither trial counsel nor the court could guarantee this with respect to federal custody. This situation left the petitioner at risk of serving consecutive sentences, which he claimed resulted from trial counsel's ineffective assistance. The court referenced similar cases where ineffective assistance was established due to erroneous legal advice concerning the fulfillment of plea agreements. Specifically, it highlighted that counsel’s failure to investigate the feasibility of concurrent sentences constituted deficient performance, as it led to a promise that could not be legally upheld.

Trial counsel failed to adequately investigate the plea agreement's terms, particularly regarding the state court provision for concurrent sentences, which is deemed ineffective as it serves merely as a recommendation to federal authorities. The court cited several cases, including Hill v. Lockhart and Bernard Frazier, emphasizing that guilty pleas based on unfulfillable promises of concurrent sentences are invalid. Unlike in Bernard Frazier, where the defense counsel engaged extensively with federal counsel and clearly communicated the lack of guarantees for concurrent sentencing, the trial counsel in this case did not have significant discussions with federal counsel or inform the petitioner of the risks regarding concurrent sentences. The plea agreement highlighted the importance of concurrent sentencing, which was the petitioner’s primary reason for accepting the plea. The court concluded that trial counsel’s deficiencies directly influenced the petitioner’s decision to plead guilty, resulting in a reasonable probability that the petitioner would have opted for trial if properly informed. The court determined that the petitioner experienced ineffective assistance of counsel and noted the necessity for collaborative efforts to provide relief for the petitioner in similar cases.

The parties must prioritize fulfilling the intent of the plea bargain, though specific performance may not be feasible. Both defense counsel and the district attorney should engage federal authorities to explore the acceptance of the petitioner for federal sentencing. If specific performance is unachievable, new plea negotiations should reflect the intentions of the original agreement, which failed without the petitioner's fault. Sentencing must consider the time the petitioner has already served in prison and county jail. If these efforts do not lead to a satisfactory outcome, the petitioner may withdraw guilty pleas and opt for trial.

Concurrent state and federal sentencing is complex and contingent on federal Bureau of Prisons’ decisions. State judges’ recommendations for concurrent sentences lack binding authority, as federal officials can impose consecutive sentencing by denying transfer or credit for state custody time. Thus, it is advised that District Attorneys, defense attorneys, and trial judges refrain from making or accepting plea agreements that guarantee concurrent state and federal sentences without written federal assurance. 

The judgment of the post-conviction court is reversed and the case is remanded for proceedings aligned with the proposed avenues of relief.