Blomstrom v. Tripp

Citation: Not availableDocket: 91642-0

Court: Washington Supreme Court; October 5, 2017; Washington; State Supreme Court

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The Supreme Court of Washington addressed a case involving three DUI defendants: Cortney L. Blomstrom, Brooke M. Button, and Christopher V. Cooper, all challenging their pretrial urinalysis testing conditions. Each petitioner was arrested for DUI and subjected to random urinalysis as a condition of their pretrial release. They sought a writ of review in Spokane County Superior Court, which denied their applications; however, the Supreme Court reversed that decision. The Court determined that the petitioners were entitled to statutory writs of review due to the absence of an adequate legal remedy to contest their pretrial conditions and because the urinalysis requirements violated article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution.

In the factual background, Cortney Blomstrom was arrested on February 1, 2015, with a BAC of 0.191 and 0.184, having no prior criminal record. During her first court appearance, the State requested four times monthly urinalysis testing based on studies suggesting that individuals with a BAC over 0.15 are more likely to reoffend. Blomstrom objected, arguing that the existing conditions prohibiting alcohol and drug use were sufficient. Ultimately, the court imposed twice monthly urinalysis testing, citing concerns about her likelihood of reoffending based on her high BAC and the specifics of her case while also ordering her to abstain from alcohol and unprescribed drugs.

Christopher Cooper was arrested for DUI on February 7, 2015, with an open bottle of whiskey in his vehicle and a breath test showing a BAC of 0.175 and 0.174. He had no prior alcohol-related convictions or DUI arrests. The State requested four times monthly random urinalysis testing due to his high BAC and driving record, citing studies indicating a higher risk of reoffending and fatal accidents at BAC levels above 0.15. Cooper's counsel opposed the testing, arguing there was no evidence he would disregard court orders or pose a danger. The court ordered the testing and imposed a condition for Cooper to abstain from alcohol and unprescribed drugs, citing the need to reduce community danger.

Brooke Button was arrested for DUI involving marijuana, with a criminal record primarily of minor theft and driving offenses, including a 2009 DUI conviction in Idaho. The State requested four times monthly urinalysis testing, referencing Button's prior DUI and three charges for failing to install an ignition interlock device (IID). Button's counsel objected, emphasizing that the current charge did not involve alcohol. The court agreed to the urinalysis testing based on Button's DUI history and recent arrest but decided against requiring an IID, noting uncertainty about whether both offenses involved alcohol.

Petitioners sought a statutory writ of review from the superior court to contest their pretrial release conditions, including urinalysis testing, claiming violations of CrRLJ 3.2(a), the Fourth Amendment, and the Washington Constitution. The superior court denied the applications, stating that an adequate remedy was available through a RALJ appeal only after conviction or guilty plea, without commenting on the legality of the district court's conditions. Petitioners then filed a motion for discretionary review, asserting two main errors by the superior court: (1) the existence of an adequate remedy via RALJ appeal and (2) the failure to recognize the unconstitutionality of the pretrial conditions. The court accepted the review.

The review standard for a statutory writ of review is de novo, focusing on whether the inferior tribunal acted illegally or exceeded its jurisdiction, and whether no adequate remedy exists. A tribunal acts illegally if it commits an obvious error, probable error affecting substantial rights, or significantly deviates from usual judicial proceedings. The court emphasized the importance of statutory interpretation, seeking to fulfill legislative intent through the statute's plain meaning and context. The petitioners contended they lacked an adequate legal remedy and alleged probable error in the district court's conditions, which imposed significant restrictions on their liberties. Before addressing the merits, the court noted two preliminary issues to resolve: the standing of any party to challenge IID searches and whether the petitioners preserved their constitutional challenges by objecting in the district court.

The petitioners do not have standing to challenge the ignition interlock device (IID) requirements. Standing requires a personal stake in the outcome, meaning that at least one petitioner must be adversely affected by the IID action. While one petitioner, Button, was briefly subjected to an IID requirement, this condition was revoked before her application for a writ of review was filed. Consequently, she cannot challenge an order that no longer existed at the time of her complaint. Furthermore, her application did not explicitly address the IID requirement, and any ambiguities regarding her challenge do not support a claim against an already revoked order. The lack of a record of the IID order further complicates the ability to review any reasoning behind it. The petitioners claim the issue is of public importance and should be reviewed despite being moot; however, they provide no legal authority to support this claim. Past cases reviewed under mootness exceptions involved claims that became moot after a hearing, which is not the situation here. Ultimately, since the IID requirement was revoked prior to any formal objection or hearing, and the other petitioners were not subject to IID requirements, the petitioners lack standing to challenge the IID, leading to a focus on urinalysis testing as a pretrial release condition.

The petitioners assert that urinalysis testing infringes upon their right to privacy under article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution. The State contends that this challenge was not preserved because it was not raised in the trial court. However, one petitioner cited a relevant case, State v. Rose, during the initial district court appearance, claiming that this citation was sufficient to preserve the constitutional issue for review. The court acknowledges that an objection can be preserved if the grounds are clear from the circumstances, and that a party can raise an issue if another party on the same side has done so. Given the context and the time constraints inherent in a court of limited jurisdiction, the court concludes that the citation to Rose adequately invoked the constitutional analysis, thus allowing the petitioners to raise the issue collectively.

Next, the court addresses whether the petitioners are entitled to statutory writs of review, which require demonstrating that (1) the trial judge committed probable error and (2) there is no adequate remedy at law. Under RCW 7.16.040, parties can challenge an inferior tribunal when there is no adequate legal remedy. While the court has not defined "adequate remedy," it has indicated that a remedy can still be deemed adequate despite being imperfect or burdensome. The petitioners identified two potential remedies: a direct appeal from a limited jurisdiction court and a motion to amend release conditions in the district court. However, the court concludes that neither remedy is adequate for contesting the district court's imposition of pretrial release conditions.

A direct appeal from a court of limited jurisdiction is inadequate for challenging pretrial release conditions. The superior court incorrectly concluded that such an appeal suffices, relying on the Commanda case, which dealt with postconviction consequences rather than pretrial orders. If petitioners are forced to wait until their cases conclude, they face potential unlawful searches or detention without a remedy. The State has conceded that a RALJ review is insufficient for addressing pretrial issues as any appeal after trial would be moot.

Furthermore, a motion to amend pretrial release conditions in the district court is also deemed inadequate. The State argues that this motion allows defendants to express concerns, but petitioners contend it would be futile due to the district court's history of rejecting similar objections. Statutory interpretation supports the petitioners, as RCW 7.16.040 specifies that an adequate remedy should be available from a court other than the one issuing the original order. Thus, a district court cannot adequately review its own decisions through amendment.

The document concludes that there is no adequate legal remedy for reviewing the challenged pretrial release conditions, and moves to assess the petitioners' claims, determining that the urinalysis testing requirements imposed on them likely constitute unconstitutional searches under both the Washington Constitution and the Fourth Amendment. The parties also seek clarification on whether the Washington Constitution offers greater protection than the Fourth Amendment in this context.

Article I, Section 7 of the Washington Constitution offers broader privacy protections than the Fourth Amendment, particularly regarding pretrial defendants' rights concerning bodily functions. While both the state and federal constitutions protect privacy, the Washington Constitution explicitly safeguards "private affairs," a distinction that may confer greater privacy rights. The court has established a nonexclusive set of six factors to evaluate whether state constitutional rights exceed those under federal law, focusing on textual language, differences in texts, constitutional history, preexisting state law, structural differences, and matters of local concern.

In examining preexisting state law, it was found that historical concerns for pretrial detainees' rights were not significantly different from federal standards, with no specific laws addressing pretrial release conditions in the late nineteenth century. However, existing jurisprudence indicates that bodily functions deserve heightened protection under Article I, Section 7. 

The sixth factor, addressing matters of local concern, highlights that pretrial release conditions are traditionally managed by the judicial branch at the county level, further supporting a tailored application of Article I, Section 7 in these cases. Consequently, the analysis suggests that the urinalysis testing required of petitioners as a condition of pretrial release violates their rights under Article I, Section 7, which states that individuals shall not be disturbed in their private affairs without legal authority. Violations of this section are reviewed through a two-step process.

Determining whether an action constitutes a disturbance of private affairs involves assessing the implications of urinalysis as a condition of pretrial release. Washington courts, referencing the state's Constitution, provide heightened protections regarding private affairs, particularly bodily functions. While the State claims that DUI, being a traffic crime, lacks local concern, the focus is specifically on the privacy implications of urine testing. The State concedes that urinalysis testing intrudes on private affairs, yet attempts to downplay its significance by labeling it a "limited incursion." This characterization is contested, as urination is an inherently private act, traditionally performed in private settings and legally protected from public observation. Past rulings emphasize that urine testing is particularly invasive and a significant violation of personal dignity. Comparisons are drawn to other forms of searches, like roadblocks and pat-downs, which are similarly considered intrusive. Ultimately, court-ordered urinalysis testing is recognized as a substantial invasion of privacy by the State.

Petitioners' urinalysis requirements lack legal authority under relevant law, which can stem from a valid warrant, recognized exceptions to warrant requirements, constitutional statutes, or court rules. The State must demonstrate that any invasion of privacy is narrowly tailored and less intrusive than alternative methods. It appears the State conceded there are less invasive means to achieve its goals but dismissed them due to cost and inconvenience. Exceptions to warrant requirements include exigent circumstances and consent, among others. The framers intended for both the legislature and the courts to provide authority for disturbing citizens' privacy. However, neither a constitutional statute nor a court rule has been identified that grants the necessary authority for periodic urinalysis as a condition for pretrial release. Although the court may affirm on any grounds supported by the record, it remains unclear if any statute or court rule could provide the required legal authority. Specifically, RCW 10.21.055 is inapplicable as it pertains only to individuals with prior DUI convictions.

None of the petitioners had prior DUI convictions or current alcohol-related charges. The authority under RCW 10.21.030 is ambiguous, as it pertains specifically to bail for felony offenses, while the petitioners were charged with misdemeanors. CrRLJ 3.2(d) is inapplicable because the district court did not establish that the petitioners were likely to commit violent crimes, intimidate witnesses, or interfere with justice before imposing conditions. DUI has not been classified as a violent crime by any statute or court ruling, and the ordinary definition of "violence" suggests deliberate harm, which does not apply to DUI. The dissent argues that DUI should be considered violent due to related offenses like vehicular homicide, but this court concludes that DUI alone does not meet that criterion. The trial court's reference to "public safety" lacks a legal basis for the pretrial release conditions.

Regarding warrantless searches, the parties concur that the urinalysis testing imposed on the defendants falls outside recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement, as it was not for law enforcement purposes. The court declines to adopt a state version of the federal "special needs" exception, which allows certain warrantless searches under special circumstances. To invoke such an exception, the government must demonstrate a purpose beyond general law enforcement.

Obtaining a warrant or probable cause may be impracticable when the purpose of a search outweighs the individual's privacy interests, as established in Skinner. The court has not recognized a special needs exception under article I, section 7 of the state constitution, nor has it adopted a general special needs exception that would allow the state to bypass the warrant requirement for special needs outside normal law enforcement. Limited instances of upholding suspicionless searches have occurred, mainly relying on federal law, particularly in cases involving individuals already convicted or subjected to adversarial proceedings. Key cases include State v. Meacham, where mandatory blood tests were upheld after adversarial hearings, and In re Juveniles A, B, C, D, E, which upheld mandatory HIV testing of convicted offenders based solely on federal analysis. The court has emphasized the narrow application of these precedents and has declined to adopt a special needs exception in recent cases, such as York, which ruled random drug testing of student athletes violated privacy rights. In State v. Olsen, although suspicionless urinalysis testing of misdemeanant probationers was upheld, the court adopted a balancing test due to probationers' reduced privacy expectations and the rehabilitative aims of probation. In contrast, the current case involves prophylactic testing of defendants who are charged but not yet convicted. The State claims these individuals have a reduced privacy interest, referencing an amicus brief, but fails to provide legal authority for this assertion, which misinterprets prior holdings regarding the privacy expectations of pretrial releasees.

In the case of Puapuaga, the defendant contested the legality of an inventory search performed while he was detained in state custody. The court acknowledged that an inmate's expectation of privacy is significantly diminished while in custody due to necessary administrative procedures. It has not yet addressed the privacy expectations of defendants released on their own recognizance, nor have other courts clearly established the privacy rights of pretrial releasees compared to pretrial detainees. Generally, pretrial releasees retain greater privacy rights than probationers, as they have not yet been convicted and have not experienced judicial limitation of their rights.

The court emphasized that while detainees can expect certain intrusions—such as disarming by officers and inventorying of belongings—these are justified by the needs of the system rather than individual expectations. The privacy rights of pretrial releasees are notably higher than those of convicted individuals, who no longer enjoy a presumption of innocence. The court also referenced differing opinions on the privacy expectations of pretrial releasees, with some courts arguing that these rights are reduced due to conditions imposed, such as drug testing.

Ultimately, the court rejected the state's argument regarding the petitioners' privacy interests, stating there was no sufficient reduction in their privacy rights to warrant the application of the federal special needs test. It concluded that the superior court erred by not granting the petitioners' requests for statutory writs and by failing to recognize that pretrial urinalysis testing violated article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution. Additionally, the petitioners' motion to exclude a declaration from consideration was denied, as the declaration was part of the state's amicus brief and relevant to the case.

The "Applicant's Interest" section references a declaration to assist the court in determining the State's justification for filing an amicus brief, which was not cited in the State's brief as claimed by the petitioners. The petitioners argue for the declaration's dismissal on the grounds that it does not aid the court in resolving current issues, citing In re Adoption of B.T. However, the motion to strike is denied as the declaration served to clarify the State's interest in the constitutionality of ignition interlock devices (IIDs), which the State frequently mandates. The court concluded that the declaration was relevant and supportive of the State's position on filing an amicus brief.

The superior court erred by not granting the petitioners' applications for statutory writs, as they lacked adequate legal remedies to challenge pretrial release conditions. Additionally, the imposed urinalysis testing conditions violated article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution due to insufficient justification for invasive testing. The court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings.

In a dissenting opinion, Judge Gonzalez contended that courts have the authority to impose conditions like random urinalysis for defendants arrested on probable cause for DUI, arguing that such measures are necessary to monitor compliance with prohibitions on drug and alcohol use during pretrial release. The dissent expressed concern that the majority's interpretation of constitutional privacy rights undermines judicial authority over pretrial conditions.

The court has the authority to impose bail or conditions of release under CrR 3.2, particularly when an individual is arrested on probable cause for a dangerous offense, which diminishes their expectation of privacy. In *State v. Olsen*, the court upheld that random urinalysis can be mandated as a condition of probation due to the reduced privacy rights of probationers. Any state intrusion into personal privacy must serve a compelling interest and be narrowly tailored, as emphasized in *Olsen* and *Maryland v. King*. The ruling also highlights that defendants under court supervision face less privacy than the general public, justifying conditions that ensure their appearance at trial and public safety. Pretrial detention significantly impacts a defendant's ability to prepare a defense and maintain stability in their personal life. Additionally, in *York v. Wahkiakum School District No. 200*, it was ruled that drug testing without individualized suspicion is impermissible, but in DUI cases, conditions may be established based on such suspicion stemming from probable cause.

Bail and pretrial release programs aim to mitigate the negative effects of pretrial detention while primarily ensuring an accused individual's court appearance. Courts may regulate pretrial release to address compelling interests, notably public safety, but such regulations cannot be punitive since pretrial defendants have not been convicted. Government interests in detaining an accused are limited to ensuring court attendance, maintaining justice integrity, and protecting public safety. Pretrial conditions can only be imposed if probable cause of wrongdoing is established; otherwise, the accused must be released unconditionally. If probable cause is found, release is mandatory unless the offense is capital, or there are concerns about nonappearance or the potential for violent crime, which includes broad definitions encompassing misdemeanors. Courts may impose conditions, such as prohibiting the use of intoxicants not prescribed to the accused, only if there is a "likely" or "substantial" danger of violent crime. These governmental interests align with common law bail powers, allowing courts to impose necessary monitoring conditions, such as random urinalysis, to ensure compliance with prohibitions on drug and alcohol use.

Judges imposing conditions on defendants must consider factors such as the defendant's criminal record and the nature of the charge, according to CrRLJ 3.2(e). However, the majority opinion restricts judges from imposing random urinalysis conditions on DUI defendants, arguing that DUI is not classified as a violent offense under RCW 9.94A.030. This interpretation neglects that CrRLJ 3.2(a) allows for a broad definition of "violent" that includes misdemeanors and gross misdemeanors, suggesting legislative intent for judges to determine the violence of a crime. Specific examples of gross misdemeanors that may be considered violent include DUI, stalking, and reckless endangerment. The legislature explicitly categorizes vehicular assault and homicide while under the influence as violent crimes, indicating that DUI-related offenses should not be excluded from this classification. The distinction between DUI and other violent crimes is challenged by referencing the common law understanding of "breach of peace," which includes threats of violence. Relevant case law supports the authority of courts to impose pretrial release conditions to protect the public from potential DUI reoffending, especially when probable cause for DUI has been established. This aligns with the legislature's stance that public safety considerations can justify limiting an individual's rights in the context of serious offenses.

Each defendant had a reduced expectation of privacy, allowing the court to implement random urinalysis under CrRLJ 3.2, considering the factors in CrRLJ 3.2(e). The court's authority is justified when there is a compelling state interest, as established in previous cases, including Olsen. The majority's insistence on a causal link between harm and DUI is outdated, contradicting the legislative stance since 1991. Courts can lawfully prohibit drug and alcohol use during a DUI defendant's pretrial release. The judge's imposition of individualized conditions was supported by prior DUI convictions and breath samples indicating high alcohol levels, which correlated with the risk of reoffending. The compelling interest of public safety justifies the restrictions placed on DUI defendants. Random urinalysis serves the purpose of monitoring substance use and preventing crime, not as a punitive measure. A reviewing court's suggestion of less invasive methods does not negate a judge's authority to impose reasonable conditions under CrRLJ 3.2. The dissent emphasizes that judges should retain discretion to impose necessary, narrowly tailored conditions to safeguard public safety.