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Bobbie Jean Lowe v. City of Moss Point, Mississippi, a Municipal Corporation
Citation: 243 So. 3d 753Docket: 2016-CA-01012-COA
Court: Court of Appeals of Mississippi; October 3, 2017; Mississippi; State Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Bobbie Jean Lowe filed a personal injury lawsuit against the City of Moss Point, Mississippi, following an injury she sustained at a municipal event on October 20, 2012. During the event, she fell into a grass-covered hole while walking to her car, leading to an ankle injury. Lowe claimed the City was negligent in maintaining the lawn and facility at Pelican Landing, where the event took place. The City denied any negligence and asserted immunity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA), specifically citing sections 11-46-9(1)(d) and (v). After limited discovery, the City moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was immune from suit. The Jackson County Circuit Court granted this motion, concluding that the City was immune based on discretionary-function immunity, which protects governmental entities when performing discretionary duties. Lowe appealed the decision. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's ruling, determining that the maintenance of the lawn at Pelican Landing constituted a discretionary function under the MTCA. The court emphasized that governmental immunity is a legal question appropriate for summary judgment, which was reviewed de novo. The appeal confirmed that there were no genuine issues of material fact, and the City was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In Boroujerdi v. City of Starkville, the Mississippi Supreme Court defined discretionary functions as those not mandated by law, relying on the judgment of government entities or employees. Activities related to these discretionary functions are afforded immunity. Conversely, ministerial functions, which are explicitly required by law, do not enjoy such immunity. The court established a framework for determining whether a function is ministerial or discretionary by first assessing the broad function before analyzing any narrower duties to see if they are rendered ministerial by statutes or regulations. In this case, Lowe argues that the lawn maintenance is the broad function, while the ownership and operation of Pelican Landing is narrower. However, the court clarifies that the overarching function is the City’s ownership of Pelican Landing, as Mississippi law allows municipalities to purchase and hold real estate but does not impose an obligation to do so. Therefore, the City’s ownership is deemed a discretionary function. The court also emphasizes that a broader discretionary function can encompass narrower duties that may be classified as ministerial through specific statutes or regulations, allowing for potential immunity for discretionary actions. No statute, regulation, or directive imposes a legal duty on the City to maintain its properties, including the lawn at Pelican Landing, making the maintenance a discretionary function. Lowe concedes this point but argues that the broader discretionary function of lawn maintenance should be distinguished from the narrower ministerial duty of managing Pelican Landing as municipal property. This argument is deemed illogical and unsupported. Lowe has not proven that any discretionary act related to lawn maintenance is subject to loss of immunity due to a more narrowly defined ministerial duty established by law. Both the governmental function and the activity in question are discretionary and thus entitled to immunity. The City was granted summary judgment under section 11-46-9(d)(1), and since immunity is established, further arguments from the parties were not considered. The decision is affirmed by the court.