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Felicia Pierce v. Debbie Blalack
Citation: 535 S.W.3d 35Docket: 06-17-00013-CV
Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; September 29, 2017; Texas; State Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Felicia Pierce's trespass to try title lawsuit against Debbie Blalack and others was dismissed with prejudice due to her noncompliance with court orders to amend her pleadings and join necessary parties. On appeal, Pierce contended that the trial court incorrectly identified the unjoined parties as necessary under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 39(a), argued that her suit should not have been subject to dismissal under this rule, claimed error in the denial of her motion to sever claims against unserved parties, and asserted that dismissal with prejudice was unjustified. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment, ruling that Rule 39 applied to Pierce's claims and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its decisions. The case involved a 366.7-acre property in Gregg County, Texas, originally belonging to James R. Oliver and later claimed by A.A. King through a series of legal actions, including an adverse possession claim. Pierce, believing she was a rightful heir and that King improperly acquired the property, filed her lawsuit on September 10, 2015, initially against Lottie Guttry, an alleged heir of King. Her suit sought to quiet title, nullify conveyances related to King, and prevent unauthorized oil and gas royalties. The trial court had jurisdiction concurrent with district courts, except for capital felony cases. Pierce raised additional points about the trial court's consideration of her thirteenth amended petition and the absence of a legal property description in the judgment, but these were deemed non-dispositive. On October 15, 2015, Guttry filed a plea in abatement, asserting that Pierce needed to serve other interested parties before seeking a declaration of sole ownership of the property. The trial court ruled that Guttry had no interest in the property and ordered Pierce to amend her petition to include all affected parties. However, Pierce’s second amended petition failed to do so, leading the court to abate the case again on November 12, 2015, giving her ninety days to join additional necessary parties, as per Rule 39(a). The court noted that a judgment in favor of Pierce would impact other heirs of Lettuce and Emily, necessitating their inclusion as plaintiffs. Despite multiple amended petitions, Pierce did not name all parties with interests under the conveyances, listing only a few defendants. Some defendants moved to dismiss or abate the case for additional parties to be named. During a March 4, 2016, hearing, it was revealed that Pierce had only added surface owners as defendants, neglecting mineral owners. The trial court denied her request to sever claims against surface and mineral owners but granted another ninety days to amend. Pierce’s tenth amended petition on May 3, 2016, included 117 defendants, but she sought to serve them by publication without demonstrating prior service attempts. Her twelfth amended petition listed 172 defendants and identified 22 heirs as 'involuntary plaintiffs' claiming a 4.35 percent interest, though these individuals were neither sued nor served. A September 2, 2016, hearing disclosed that Pierce had served only 55 defendants, despite receiving a document schedule on January 6, 2016, that identified necessary parties, including unnamed easement holders. The trial court concluded that while some necessary parties were named, they had not been served, and indicated its intent to grant motions to dismiss from several defendants, noting that Pierce had not attempted to add the necessary easement holders. Pierce submitted a thirteenth amended petition, retaining only 55 defendants she had served and eliminating others, including 22 heirs. She claimed damages of three trillion dollars and requested the restoration of title to the heirs of Lettuce Beall Oliver, as well as an order for the defendants to cease drilling on the property. On October 13, 2016, the trial court dismissed Pierce’s claims with prejudice, preventing future refiling. The trial court's decision to require the joinder of absent parties was justified under Rule 39(a) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, which mandates that individuals subject to service of process must be joined if their absence prevents complete relief or impairs their ability to protect their interests. This rule applies to trespass to try title lawsuits, as confirmed by relevant case law. Additionally, the Declaratory Judgment Act requires joining affected parties, particularly since Pierce sought declaratory relief to annul prior transactions and judgments involving the defendants. The Declaratory Judgment Act is intended to clarify legal rights and relations and allows for liberal interpretation. While a declaration does not affect non-parties, the trial court can deny a declaratory judgment if it doesn't resolve the underlying uncertainty or controversy. Trial courts have broad discretion in party joinder matters, and their decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion. A trial court can be found to have abused its discretion if it acts unreasonably or arbitrarily, or fails to follow guiding legal principles. Rule 39 mandates the joinder of parties but lacks a specific standard for determining who qualifies for joinder. In evaluating a trial court's discretion under Rule 39(a), the court examined whether absent parties should be joined in a case where the plaintiff sought title to real property. The plaintiff identified 172 defendants but excluded entities holding approximately 104 pipeline easements. The trial court found that a judgment favoring the plaintiff could negatively impact the rights of these absent parties, affecting both surface and mineral estate owners and creating uncertainty in property titles. The potential for inconsistent outcomes in future litigation was also a concern, as the plaintiff's decision to exclude a significant number of heirs would necessitate further legal action. The trial court referenced the case Longoria I, where the court emphasized that individuals claiming an interest in the action must be included if their absence could impede their ability to protect that interest. The ruling indicated that resolving the title in favor of the plaintiffs could diminish the interests of absent parties and disrupt royalty payments. Ultimately, the trial court's decision to join absent parties under Rule 39(a) was upheld, as it was made in accordance with established legal principles. The trial court's ruling to require the joinder of absent parties under Rule 39(a) was upheld, as settling the title without their involvement could hinder their ability to protect their interests. Consequently, there was no abuse of discretion in denying Pierce's request for severance under Rule 41 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Severance is appropriate when claims involve distinct causes of action that could be independently litigated, but here, Pierce's claims were interwoven, relying on the same facts regarding both surface and mineral estate owners. The trial court correctly noted that severance could lead to inconsistent verdicts, thus justifying the denial of Pierce's request. Regarding the dismissal of Pierce's claims with prejudice, the trial court acted within its duties after determining the necessity of joining absent parties under Rule 39. Despite being given ample opportunity to join these parties, Pierce failed to do so, and her situation mirrored the Longoria I case, which led to a dismissal without prejudice. However, this case involved a dismissal with prejudice, supported by precedent from Longoria II, which dealt with similar circumstances. The San Antonio Court of Appeals addressed the dismissal of Pierce's claims due to her failure to amend her pleadings as directed by the trial court. The court had ordered her on two occasions, November 12, 2015, and March 4, 2016, to join all parties with an interest in a specific 320-acre property in Gregg County, Texas, granting her ninety days to comply. Despite her attempts to amend her pleadings thirteen times, she did not successfully include the necessary parties. On October 13, 2016, the trial court dismissed her claims with prejudice, emphasizing that Pierce failed to demonstrate that the absent parties could not be served and erroneously argued that Rule 39 was inapplicable to her case. The court concluded that the trial court did not err in its decision and affirmed the judgment.