Harcon Barge Co., Inc. v. D & G Boat Rentals, Inc., Third-Party and M/v Charles D, Cross-Appellant v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., Third-Party Appellant-Cross-Appellee. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. M/v I.C. Hoskins, Her Engines, Boilers, Tackle, Etc., in Rem, Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. M/v Iberville, Her Engines, Boilers, Tackle, Etc., in Rem, Southern Pacific Transportation Co., Cross-Appellee v. M/v Charles D, Her Engines, Boilers, Tackle, Etc., in Rem, and D & G Boat Rentals, Inc., Cross-Appellants. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., Cross-Appellee v. M/v Marion Hagestad, Cross-Appellants

Citation: 746 F.2d 278Docket: 82-4584

Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; November 11, 1984; Federal Appellate Court

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An appeal was filed concerning a consolidated judgment from five suits in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana. The appeal was initiated by a single notice, which was lodged on the same day that the opposing parties in one of the consolidated cases filed a motion to amend the judgment. According to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4), this motion suspended the effectiveness of the notice of appeal until an order was entered disposing of that motion. The Supreme Court ruling in Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Company established that a premature notice of appeal, filed before the resolution of a related motion, is considered a "nullity," and consequently, the appellate court lacks jurisdiction to proceed if no subsequent notice of appeal is filed after the amended judgment. In this case, since the motion to amend pertained only to one of the five cases, the court acknowledged the complexity but ultimately concluded that the rigid application of Rule 4(a)(4) dictated the dismissal of the appeal, as no valid notice of appeal was filed after the amended judgment. The court emphasized that all parties treated the five actions as a single entity, necessitating only one judgment and one notice of appeal.

Under Rule 4(a)(4), a motion to amend a judgment suspends the timeline for filing an appeal until the order resolving that motion is entered, necessitating a new notice of appeal to establish appellate jurisdiction. The date of 'entry' of judgment is critical for determining the timeliness of an appeal or post-judgment motion, which is based on the docket entry in the district court's records. In this case, while the judgment was filed on December 8, 1982, it was not officially entered on the docket until December 14, 1982. Consequently, the timely filed motion to amend (served on December 15 and filed on December 21) nullified the previously filed notice of appeal, thus requiring a new notice for jurisdiction. The excerpt clarifies the procedural nuances of timeliness regarding appeals and post-judgment motions, referencing Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (FRAP) 4 and Civil Procedure (FRCP) 79. Specifically, FRAP Rule 4(a)(1) mandates that a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of the judgment's entry, while FRCP Rule 59(b)(e) stipulates that motions for new trials or to amend must be served within 10 days of the judgment's entry. The clerk's maintenance of a civil docket ensures that all relevant filings and orders are chronologically recorded, with the date of entry explicitly noted.

Clerks of the district courts in the Fifth Circuit follow a uniform practice for documenting the entry of orders or judgments under Rule 79(a). The entry date is noted on the docket sheet, with the date of filing in the left column and a description of the order or judgment in the right column. If the judgment is entered after the filing date, the date of entry is included in the description with a notation such as "Dkt'd." 

In a specific case, a single judgment was filed on December 8, 1982, and entered on the docket on December 14, 1982, resolving claims from five consolidated suits. Southern Pacific, a party to all suits, filed a timely notice of appeal on December 21, 1982, challenging the judgment. On the same day, the defendants in one suit filed a motion to amend the judgment, which was granted, resulting in an amended judgment entered on January 31, 1983. No additional notice of appeal was filed post-amendment. 

The defendants moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that without a new notice after the amended judgment, the original appeal was invalid under Fed. R. App. 4(a)(4) and Griggs, leading to a lack of appellate jurisdiction if the single judgment is viewed as the only subject of the appeal. Conversely, if the consolidated suits are viewed separately despite a single document, the motion to amend would affect only that particular suit's appellate deadlines. Southern Pacific argues this position, which is the central issue of the appeal.

The litigation stems from four ship collisions with a railroad bridge in Louisiana, resulting in five suits: four by Southern Pacific against the vessels involved and one by Harcon Barge against Southern Pacific, alleging negligence in bridge design and maintenance. This appeal concerns the judgment awarding damages from four of the suits that had been consolidated for trial.

On March 30, 1981, Southern Pacific, involved in multiple lawsuits, sought to have five cases consolidated with case No. 79-1592 (Harcon Barge). Despite some opposition, the district court granted this motion on April 21, 1981, framing it as consolidation "for purposes of trial," though the motion itself did not specify this. Post-consolidation, all related cases were treated as one proceeding for trial and judgment. The docket for 79-1592 became the primary record for all consolidated cases, with each case's docket reflecting the consolidation. Final entries for the cases on appeal indicated a judgment closing them, yet they did not document the judgment date or related motions as seen in 79-1592. All parties submitted pleadings under all case titles and numbers, and the district court issued a single judgment on December 8, 1982, addressing claims from all parties without differentiating by original docket number. This judgment was recorded only in 79-1592, with other cases noting the judgment but lacking further entries. Subsequent filings were logged solely under 79-1592, encompassing motions to amend, notices of appeal, and other relevant court actions.

On December 8, 1982, a judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff, summarized in an appendix. On December 21, 1982, defendants Tidewater Venice and M/V Iberville filed a motion to amend the judgment, specifically addressing the requirement for them to bear costs. They argued that under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68, their pre-judgment offer exceeded the awarded amount, entitling them to exoneration from subsequent costs. The district court subsequently issued an amended judgment on January 25, 1983, maintaining initial awards but exempting these defendants from costs after December 29, 1981, and imposing those costs on Southern Pacific Transportation Company instead.

Southern Pacific filed a notice of appeal on December 21, 1982, encompassing all consolidated suits related to the final judgment entered on December 8, 1982, paying a single filing fee. The defendants in two suits also cross-appealed. After the amended judgment on January 31, 1983, no further appeals or cross-appeals were filed. The five cases were treated as consolidated for trial and judgment, allowing any aggrieved party to appeal via one notice and fee. Southern Pacific did not challenge this consolidation in its initial motions or briefs, framing its appeal as addressing the entire trial court judgment. It was only after oral arguments that Southern Pacific claimed the motion to amend rendered its notice of appeal premature under Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4).

No statutory basis supports the contention regarding case consolidation. The district court consolidated the cases upon Southern Pacific's request, per Fed. R.Civ. P. 42(a), which allows consolidation when actions involve common questions of law or fact to reduce unnecessary costs or delays. The district court's consolidation order permitted the clerk to make docket entries solely for the principal case, with appropriate notations in the other cases, thus ensuring that docket entries in the lead case governed all consolidated cases. Rule 42(a) facilitates either joint hearings or full consolidation, reflecting prior practices to efficiently manage multiple actions while maintaining their separate identities. Parties retain their rights, and pleadings in one case do not automatically transfer to another. The Supreme Court case Alfred Dunhill of London v. Republic of China emphasized that consolidation does not merge cases, but serves to economize trial processes. The key issue is whether a single judgment, resulting from the consolidation, disposes of all claims in the consolidated suits, allowing for a single appeal by any aggrieved party, regardless of the initial number of suits.

The district court did not violate any legal principles by consolidating five cases for trial and a single judgment, as no party experienced substantive or procedural disadvantages from this approach. The court could have maintained separate judgments and docket entries, which would have required each party to file individual notices of appeal and pay separate fees, but chose not to do so. The consolidation was within the broad discretionary powers granted by Fed. R.Civ. P. 42(a) to avoid unnecessary costs and delays. Southern Pacific's argument that a consolidated judgment should be treated as five separate judgments would complicate appeals and potentially require multiple notices of appeal for cases that were originally filed separately.

Southern Pacific filed only one notice of appeal for the principal suit, 79-1592, which was sufficient under the consolidation framework utilized. The court found no prejudice to Southern Pacific from the consolidation itself, noting that any issues arose from its failure to recognize the consequences of a motion to amend filed by the defendants. This motion, which aimed to relieve the defendants of costs due to a prior offer of judgment, effectively nullified Southern Pacific's original notice of appeal under Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(4) and reset the timeline for appeals. Southern Pacific was aware of the motion and did not contest its timeliness or the amendment, making its predicament a result of procedural requirements rather than the consolidation process.

Southern Pacific argued against the characterization of a motion to amend its judgment as a substantive change, contending that the relief sought was permissible under Rule 68 and could be addressed via Rule 60, referencing the case Glick v. White Motor Co. In Glick, a motion for pre-judgment interest was deemed untimely under Rule 59(e) but was allowed under Rule 60(a) for clerical corrections. Southern Pacific claimed that a motion resembling a Rule 59(e) motion could be treated as something else to avoid the implications of Rule 4(a)(4), which requires timely notice of appeal upon the filing of specific motions, including Rule 59(e) motions. Initially, all parties mistakenly believed that the judgment entered on December 8, 1982, marked the start of the appeal timeline. However, the analysis established that a Rule 59(e) motion to amend, filed on December 21, 1982, was effectively served on December 15, 1982, when it was mailed to all counsel, thus rendering it timely under applicable rules. Consequently, this timely filing nullified Southern Pacific's prior notice of appeal.

The date of service for a motion to amend a judgment under Rule 59(e) is established as the date the moving party certifies that the motion was mailed to opposing counsel, provided there is no contest from non-moving parties. The motion to amend served on December 15 is deemed timely, as it was filed on December 21, within a reasonable timeframe. The entry date of the judgment, December 14, is the critical date, confirming that the motion was filed within the allowed ten-day period following the judgment entry. The court lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal or cross-appeals due to the absence of a notice of appeal after the amended judgment entered on January 31, 1983. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed at the appellant's expense.

The consolidated case judgment, filed on December 8, 1982, includes various actions against Southern Pacific Transportation Company and various defendants, with specific amounts awarded and costs assigned. The judgments detail the amounts owed, interest rates, and dismissals of certain claims, reflecting the decisions made during the trial presided over by District Judge John M. Shaw.

A copy of the legal document was sent on December 8 to multiple parties regarding an appeal by Southern Pacific. The appellant, Southern Pacific, raised concerns about not understanding the abbreviation for "docketed" but did not claim to have been misled or prejudiced by it. Following the lodging of the appeal, opposing parties filed a motion to dismiss in May 1983, which was summarily denied without explanation by a motions panel on June 22, 1983. A subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied on October 14, 1983. Southern Pacific argued that reexamining the issues seemed unnecessary due to these prior rulings, but the court emphasized that the requirement for a timely notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional, referencing Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Company. The court noted that an interlocutory denial of a motion to dismiss can be reconsidered if later deemed meritorious, citing relevant jurisprudence. A list of related civil-action cases from the Western District of Louisiana was provided, including several actions involving Southern Pacific. Additionally, details regarding the timing of motions under Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure were clarified, indicating that the timeline for appeal is determined by the service date of a motion, not the filing date.

Defendants filed a motion to amend the judgment that resolved all matters in five consolidated lawsuits. Southern Pacific contested the damages awarded in four cases where it was the plaintiff and faced a ruling of partial negligence in the fifth suit (Harcon Barge, No. 79-1592), where it was held liable for ten percent of Harcon's total damages. The defendants in cases No. 80-0514 (Southern Pacific v. M/V Marian Hagestad) and No. 80-0513 (Southern Pacific v. M/V Charles D.) cross-appealed against the damages awarded to them. However, these cross-appeals are deemed invalid as they were filed prior to the entry of the amended judgment that conclusively addressed the consolidated lawsuits, similar to Southern Pacific's ineffective notice of appeal. The discussion will focus later on Southern Pacific's primary contention. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a), when actions share common legal or factual questions, the court may order joint hearings or trials and consolidate actions to reduce unnecessary costs or delays.