Brandy Nicole Williams v. State of Mississippi

Citation: Not availableDocket: 2016-KA-00552-SCT

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court; September 21, 2017; Mississippi; State Supreme Court

Original Court Document: View Document

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Brandy Nicole Williams was convicted of the capital murder of Sheriff Garry Welford by a George County jury on March 18, 2016, and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. Williams appealed, claiming reversible errors including the failure to quash her indictment, improper jury instructions, and the admission of her prior criminal history. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed her conviction on September 21, 2017.

Williams had a history of criminal involvement, including prior indictments for grand larceny and a pretrial diversion agreement that mandated she avoid individuals of "disreputable or harmful character." Her boyfriend, Christopher Baxter, had pleaded guilty to methamphetamine manufacture just days before Sheriff Welford's death.

On the day of Baxter's scheduled sentencing, Williams claimed he left to go to court but did not appear, leading to a bench warrant for his arrest. Witnesses testified that Williams was aware of Baxter’s fugitive status and had communicated her intention to end their relationship. On the day of the murder, Williams admitted to knowing the police were searching for Baxter when she drove him into town, despite his legal troubles.

Williams drove Baxter to Walmart but entered the store alone to purchase screws. She called Howell, informing her of a heavy police presence at Walmart and suggesting they meet at a fire station in Twin Creek, where Howell eventually met them. Williams was driving a Z71 with Baxter as a passenger. Deputy Daffin observed the Z71 waiting to turn onto Scott Road, noticing the passenger seat was reclined and suspected Baxter was trying to hide. Daffin attempted to initiate a traffic stop, but the Z71 accelerated away, leading to a chase that lasted approximately 16.8 miles at speeds between 75 to 100 mph.

Sheriff Welford and Deputy Keel were alerted to the pursuit and set up a checkpoint on Howard Road and Bexley Road South, leaving two escape routes open. When Deputy Bowlin arrived at the checkpoint, he heard the Z71 approaching and witnessed it strike Sheriff Welford. Bowlin observed what he believed was Baxter's face in the passenger seat at the moment of impact, though he could not definitively identify the passenger. Following the incident, Daffin arrived to assist Welford, who later succumbed to his injuries on July 21, 2010. Both Baxter and Williams were arrested the following day, and Baxter's interview with law enforcement was recorded and presented at Williams's trial after he invoked his Fifth Amendment right not to testify.

Williams was indicted for capital murder on January 18, 2011, under Mississippi Code Section 97-3-19(2)(a) and was convicted after a jury trial. Upon appeal, the Mississippi Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and ordered a retrial, where Williams was again found guilty of capital murder. She subsequently filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied, and on March 31, 2016, she filed a notice of appeal, raising three combined issues for review.

The first issue argued that the trial court erred in denying her motion to quash the indictment, claiming that the indictment was improperly based on depraved-heart capital murder rather than murder with deliberate design, as required for killing a peace officer. The indictment specifically charged her with the murder of Sheriff Garry Welford while he was acting in his official capacity, asserting that the act was imminently dangerous and demonstrated a depraved heart.

The legal framework for capital murder in Mississippi indicates that killing a law enforcement officer while performing official duties is classified as capital murder, regardless of whether there is intent to kill a specific individual. The court applied a de novo review standard for assessing the sufficiency of the indictment and concluded that it adequately described the charges against Williams, aligning with the statutory language, thus affirming the trial court's denial of her motion to quash the indictment.

Williams's indictment for capital murder under Section 97-3-19(2)(a) was found to be free of error, as deliberate design is not a required element for this charge against a peace officer. The court referenced its previous ruling in Fitzpatrick v. State, which clarified that malice aforethought is also not necessary for such a conviction. The Fitzpatrick case addressed similar arguments, concluding that depraved-heart murder encompasses deliberate-design murder, and thus a showing of deliberate design is unnecessary if depraved heart suffices for conviction. Williams's case was stronger than Fitzpatrick's since her indictment was solely based on a depraved-heart theory, fulfilling statutory requirements. The trial court correctly denied her motion to quash the indictment.

Regarding jury instructions, the court applies an abuse-of-discretion standard, emphasizing that instructions should be considered collectively. A defendant has the right to present their case theory, but this is limited by the court's authority to reject instructions that misstate the law or are redundant. Williams contended that her right to present her defense was compromised when the court refused to instruct the jury on duress, asserting she acted under duress during the flight from police.

In Mississippi, a person may be excused from criminal conduct if they reasonably believe they are in danger of physical harm, as established in *Davis v. State*. The state applies a four-part test for duress, requiring: an imminent threat of serious harm, that the defendant did not recklessly place themselves in the situation, no reasonable legal alternative to the unlawful act, and a direct causal relationship between the criminal act and avoidance of harm, as outlined in *Banyard v. State*. 

In the case at hand, the facts did not support the duress defense for Williams, as she had opportunities to stop or yield during the 16.8-mile chase and was aware that Baxter was a felon sought by police. Despite being aware of the potential consequences, she chose to assist Baxter rather than report him to law enforcement when she could have. Consequently, the trial court's decision to refuse a jury instruction on duress was upheld.

Williams also contended that the trial court erred by denying her proposed jury instruction D-7 concerning eyewitness identification, which incorrectly suggested she could only be found guilty if she was driving at the moment of impact. This misstatement of law failed to account for her potential liability as an aider and abettor, a point previously recognized in her initial appeal. Despite being aware of this error, Williams requested the same instruction again, leading to the conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

Furthermore, Williams argued for the first time on appeal that the jury instructions on two legal theories of murder were erroneous, claiming they relieved the State of its burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. However, she did not object to these instructions at trial and even introduced part of them herself. Therefore, the failure to object barred her from raising this issue on appeal, as established in precedent cases.

The jury received instructions on aiding and abetting liability through three specific directives: S-3, S-4A, and D-3A. Instruction S-3 outlined that an individual could be held liable for a crime committed through another's actions if they voluntarily participated with the intent to violate the law. Instruction S-4A emphasized that anyone who willfully assists in the commission of a crime is equally guilty as if they committed it themselves. Instruction D-3A specified that if Brandy Williams was present during the act of murder committed by Christopher Baxter and aided him, she could be found guilty as an aider and abettor, requiring proof of her shared criminal intent.

Brandy Williams, at trial, did not object to S-3 or S-4A and requested D-3A, leading to a waiver of her right to challenge these instructions on appeal. Even if not waived, her arguments were deemed meritless as the jury instructions correctly reflected the law. Mississippi law establishes that an aider and abettor is as liable as the principal offender. Additionally, the trial court's admission of evidence regarding Williams’s prior bad acts was upheld under an abuse-of-discretion standard, confirming the trial judge’s significant discretion in determining evidence relevance and admissibility. Errors in evidence admission will only prompt reversal if they substantially affect a party's rights.

Evidence of a crime is generally inadmissible to establish a person's character, per M.R.E. 404(b)(1), but may be admissible for other purposes, such as proving motive (M.R.E. 404(b)(2)). Evidence of previous crimes may also be used to provide a complete narrative to the jury, as established in Simmons v. State. However, such evidence can be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by risks such as unfair prejudice or confusion (M.R.E. 403).

In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the admission of Williams’s indictments for grand larceny and her pretrial diversion agreement. This evidence was relevant to prove her motive to flee from law enforcement, specifically because she had entered into a diversion agreement that prohibited her from associating with individuals of questionable character, which included her boyfriend, Christopher Baxter, a convicted felon. Williams was aware that the police were searching for Baxter prior to her flight, thus implying that surrendering to the police could lead to a violation of her agreement.

Although Williams contended that her community knowledge of her relationship with Baxter would diminish her motive to flee, the trial evidence indicated otherwise. Williams had only recently entered the diversion agreement, and she testified that she had cited this agreement as a reason for wanting to end her relationship with Baxter.

The trial court weighed the potential prejudicial impact of this evidence against its relevance and determined that it did not substantially outweigh the evidentiary value. Consequently, the court found no error in admitting the evidence, affirming Williams's conviction for capital murder and her life sentence without the possibility of parole. The decision was unanimously affirmed by the judges present, with one judge not participating.