Com. v. Broody, J.

Citation: Not availableDocket: Com. v. Broody, J. No. 1921 MDA 2016

Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania; August 17, 2017; Pennsylvania; State Appellate Court

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Jeremy James Broody appeals the judgment of sentence from the Wyoming County Court of Common Pleas, where he received an aggregate sentence of 48 to 108 months imprisonment following his expulsion from the state intermediate punishment (SIP) program. Broody argues he was not given full credit for time served and challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence. The court found he was entitled to additional time credit and has reversed and remanded for recalculation of his credit while affirming the sentence otherwise.

Broody's convictions included one count of criminal conspiracy and possession with intent to deliver controlled substances across three separate cases. Initially sentenced on February 19, 2015, to concurrent terms in the SIP program, he faced various transfers between correctional facilities and community centers due to positive drug tests. His expulsion from the SIP program occurred on June 29, 2016, leading to a resentencing on July 20, 2016, where he was sentenced to a longer term of imprisonment.

The sentencing court initially credited him with 343 days of time served but acknowledged he might be entitled to more prior to his plea. After a post-sentence relief motion, the court confirmed an additional 224 days of credit, totaling 567 days. However, Broody sought further credit for time spent in various facilities, which the court denied in its October 25, 2016 order, prompting Broody's appeal.

Broody argues that the trial court did not grant him full credit for time-served, which raises a legal challenge to the sentence's validity. The review standard is whether the trial court made a legal error, with a plenary scope of review. Under sentencing law, defendants should receive credit for all time spent in custody related to their criminal charges. The court has clarified that credit is typically awarded for time spent in prison or during appeals, but there is ambiguity regarding 'time spent in custody' when the defendant is in non-prison settings. Definitions of 'custody' can include time spent in institutional environments, such as inpatient rehabilitation programs, but voluntary admissions to such programs allow the trial court discretion over credit award decisions.

A precedent case established that defendants in community service programs with 24-hour supervision are eligible for credit, while those under electronic monitoring do not qualify as being 'in custody' for credit purposes. The Supreme Court ruled that time spent on bail with electronic monitoring is not eligible for time-served credit, a position upheld in subsequent cases involving intermediate punishment sentences.

Broody seeks time-served credit for three periods: 124 days at Camp Quehanna (claimed to be a secure facility), 63 days at a rehabilitation center (asserted to be under constant lockdown), and 212 days in community correctional centers (where he was allowed limited leave but required to return). He argues that the trial court erred by not granting him credit for these durations.

The trial court denied Broody’s post-sentence motion, stating that his participation in the SIP program included time spent in facilities where he had substantial leisure hours, which did not constitute a restriction on his liberty. Consequently, the court did not credit him for the 212 days spent at community correctional centers. It noted that while Broody had to report nightly, he could leave the facility unaccompanied for up to eight hours daily, making his situation comparable to electronic monitoring, rather than a fully supervised program.

However, the trial court overlooked Broody’s time at Camp Quehanna, a secure state prison, where he spent 124 days, and the Reading rehabilitation center, which was also a locked facility where he received intensive treatment for 63 days. The Commonwealth conceded that if Broody was indeed at Camp Quehanna, he should receive credit for that time, and it did not dispute his claims about the Reading facility. As both locations involved constant supervision and were part of his SIP sentence, the court's failure to grant credit for these periods was an error. The court is directed to amend Broody’s sentence to include an additional 187 days of credit for time served.

Broody also challenged the discretionary aspects of his sentence, arguing that the trial court did not adequately consider the small amount of heroin involved, the nature of his offenses, and the duration of his time in the SIP program. He contended that the sentences should run concurrently. His challenge requires a petition for permission to appeal, which necessitates an assessment of the timeliness of the appeal, preservation of the issue, a concise statement of reasons for the appeal, and whether this statement raises a substantial question regarding the appropriateness of the sentence under the sentencing code.

Broody fulfilled the procedural requirements for his appeal by submitting a timely post-sentence motion for modification, a notice of appeal, and a detailed appellate brief. The court must evaluate whether he has raised a substantial question for review, defined as a colorable argument that the imposed sentence is inconsistent with the Sentencing Code or contrary to fundamental sentencing norms. Claims of a sentencing court's failure to consider mitigating factors typically do not constitute a substantial question unless accompanied by an excessive sentence claim, which Broody did present. 

While challenges regarding consecutive versus concurrent sentences usually do not raise substantial questions, they may be addressed if the defendant argues that the aggregate sentence is excessively harsh relative to the crimes committed. The court noted that Broody's claims nominally raised a substantial question warranting further examination. 

The trial court sentenced Broody within the standard range of the Sentencing Guidelines for each conviction but imposed consecutive terms due to the pattern of his drug trafficking. The court justified this by stating that a lesser sentence would undermine the seriousness of his offenses. The appellate review found no abuse of discretion in the individual sentences or the court's rationale, especially considering Broody's guilty plea to three distinct crimes over 17 months. 

Despite initially offering Broody the chance to avoid incarceration through the SIP program, he failed to complete it. Consequently, the appellate court determined that the sentences were not an abuse of discretion. However, it identified an error regarding the lack of an additional 187 days of credit for time served, leading to a reversal on that point and a remand for correction. The judgment of sentence was affirmed in part and vacated in part, with jurisdiction relinquished.