United States v. Ronnie Vigil

Citation: 743 F.2d 751Docket: 83-2035

Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; December 10, 1984; Federal Appellate Court

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Ronnie Alfredo Vigil appeals his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm after having four felony convictions, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Appendix Sec. 1202(a)(1), and his enhanced sentence as a dangerous special offender under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3575. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals emphasizes that the evidence must be viewed favorably for the government, indicating that the jury's resolution of conflicting evidence is paramount. Vigil was indicted on February 16, 1983, convicted on May 17, 1983, and subsequently, a hearing on his status as a dangerous special offender was held on July 26, 1983. On August 12, 1983, the court determined Vigil qualified as a dangerous special offender, enhancing his sentence by three years beyond the two-year maximum for the firearm charge, resulting in a total sentence of five years. The trial court provided detailed findings and conclusions regarding its decision.

Vigil has a substantial criminal history beginning at age 18, including a felony burglary conviction in May 1971, followed by a period of parole that was revoked due to further crimes. He was sentenced in 1976 to one to five years for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. After a brief period of probation, he was indicted in New Mexico for multiple charges including harboring a fugitive and possession of heroin, and subsequently convicted in Arizona for possession of heroin, resulting in a consecutive four-year sentence. 

After serving time, Vigil shot and killed Sandoval in Santa Fe on July 4, 1980, leading to a first-degree murder charge and a federal parole violation warrant. Following the shooting, he fled to Mexico for about 11 months before returning to Santa Fe in July 1981. Prior to his return, Vigil learned of extensive police efforts to apprehend him, including threats and warrantless searches affecting his family. Vigil attempted to turn himself in but faced obstacles, such as failed attempts to contact his parole officer and warnings from family and an attorney about threats to his life by specific police officers. He expressed fear for his safety, especially after hearing about the suspicious death of a close friend in custody.

Vigil, after determining that a safe surrender was impossible, decided to leave Santa Fe following the securing of housing for his wife and her children. On July 21, 1981, he retrieved a .38 caliber pistol he had buried and, instead of surrendering to law enforcement, drove his wife to Banana Hill in Santa Fe to find an apartment. On July 22, while in possession of the pistol, Vigil encountered two plainclothes police officers who attempted to block his vehicle. A confrontation ensued in which Vigil shot both officers and subsequently fled with his wife, hiding overnight before surrendering the next day. He was acquitted of first-degree murder in the shooting death of Sandoval and later acquitted of assault with intent to kill regarding the officers, successfully arguing self-defense.

Vigil was later indicted and convicted on a separate charge, leading to two appeals. He raises three main issues on appeal: 

1. Alleged violations of his rights concerning the exclusion of evidence supporting his necessity defense, including the denial of evidence showing witness bias, the complete statement of his confession, prior acquittals, and evidence regarding the officers' violent character.
2. Claims that his designation as a dangerous special offender under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3575 violated his rights, including questions of vindictive prosecution, the constitutionality of non-disclosure provisions, vagueness of terms in the statute, and due process concerns regarding evidence considered during the hearing.
3. A claim that the prosecution violated his protection against double jeopardy.

Vigil asserts that the trial court's exclusion of specific evidence was erroneous and detrimental to his defense.

Counsel for Vigil indicated that he would use a "defense of necessity" based on the criteria established in United States v. Gant for the charge of possession of a firearm by a felon. To successfully present this defense, Vigil needed to demonstrate four elements: (1) a present and imminent threat inducing a reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury; (2) he did not recklessly or negligently place himself in a situation leading to the criminal conduct; (3) he had no reasonable legal alternative to violating the law; and (4) a direct causal relationship existed between the criminal act and the avoidance of the threatened harm. The trial court accepted that Vigil had a well-grounded apprehension of harm but ruled that he failed to prove the other three elements. Specifically, it found that Vigil recklessly placed himself in a situation likely to compel criminal conduct, did not demonstrate a lack of reasonable alternatives, and failed to establish a direct causal link between his actions and the avoidance of harm. The court's analysis was upheld.

Congress enacted a statute prohibiting felons from receiving, possessing, or transporting firearms, citing four primary concerns: it burdens commerce, threatens the safety of the President and Vice President, impedes First Amendment rights, and poses threats to the effective operation of government. This context complicates the defense of necessity in related charges. In Vigil's case, the trial court excluded evidence of his acquittal in a shooting incident involving police officers, which Vigil sought to present as a defense and to challenge the credibility of a prosecution witness, Joe Shattuck. The prosecution's evidence focused solely on Vigil's possession of a .38 caliber pistol at the time of his arrest, avoiding references to other conduct or admissions. Vigil’s various requests for evidence to support his necessity defense were denied based on the four-prong test established in United States v. Gant. Consequently, Vigil's conviction for firearm possession following four felony convictions was affirmed. Additionally, Vigil contends that his designation as a Dangerous Special Offender (DSO) under 18 U.S.C. § 3575 and the resulting enhanced sentence violated his rights.

Vigil claims that the enhanced sentence he received resulted from vindictive, selective prosecution, arguing that the government delayed filing the Sec. 1202(a)(1) firearm charge for nearly nineteen months following his arrest and only pursued it after his acquittals in state murder and assault trials. He cites United States v. Goodwin, which recognizes a presumption of vindictive prosecution when charges are changed in retaliation for a defendant exercising their rights. However, the court distinguishes this case from Goodwin, noting that Goodwin involved pretrial charge alterations, while Vigil's situation did not raise a similar presumption, especially since the state charges were significantly more severe than the firearm charge. Additionally, the delay in filing the firearm charge was not seen as vindictive; rather, it was attributed to the timing of the state trials. The court reinforces that preindictment delay does not violate due process unless actual prejudice or intentional tactical advantage by the government is demonstrated. Vigil failed to provide evidence of substantial prejudice or tactical motivations. The court concludes that the federal government's decision to delay prosecution pending state trial outcomes does not constitute selective prosecution, which is not inherently unconstitutional.

Vigil challenges the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3575(a), which restricts the disclosure of a defendant's designation as a dangerous special offender (DSO) to the trial judge before a jury verdict, unless both parties consent. He claims this provision constitutes congressional interference with judicial power, violating the separation of powers stipulated in Article 3 of the Constitution. The government counters that only the judge, not Vigil, can contest the statute's constitutionality, as the notice was timely served to Vigil’s counsel but withheld from the judge until after the verdict. The government also emphasizes that no legal injury has been demonstrated by Vigil. 

Furthermore, the government defends the statute as protecting a defendant's fair trial rights by preventing premature disclosure of potentially prejudicial information. The nondisclosure requirement is intended to ensure the prosecutor has carefully considered the implications of dangerous and special offender status before invoking the statute, thereby informing the defendant of the grounds for such designation. Vigil fails to show a basis for disclosing the DSO notice prior to trial outcomes, as it mainly pertains to sentencing rather than trial processes, thus not infringing on separation of powers.

Additionally, Vigil argues that the term "dangerous" in Sec. 3575(f) is vague, referencing a prior case that deemed it unconstitutional. However, subsequent appellate courts have upheld the statute, asserting that the term is understandable to individuals of ordinary intelligence and is commonly considered in judicial decisions regarding bail and sentencing. The definition of "dangerous" is deemed clear enough for effective judicial application.

Lastly, Vigil asserts that the terms "appropriate" and "not disproportionate" in Sec. 3575(b) are similarly vague, but this claim is also rejected.

18 U.S.C. Sec. 3575(b) mandates that if a defendant is designated as a dangerous special offender, the court must impose a sentence of imprisonment not exceeding twenty-five years, ensuring that the sentence is not disproportionately severe compared to the maximum term for the underlying felony. The statute guides judges to consider both the severity of the felony and the defendant's prior offenses when determining an appropriate sentence. The proportionality requirement was added by Congress to ensure the sentence relates to the underlying crime, countering an earlier proposal that allowed longer sentences without regard to the felony's nature. The court supports the statute against vagueness challenges as long as the nature of the offense and the defendant’s history justifies the enhanced sentence. In this case, the trial court’s decision to impose a three-year enhanced sentence on Vigil was deemed appropriate given his prior record. Terms like "dangerous," "appropriate," and "not disproportionate" are recognized in criminal law, and while they afford judges discretion, appellate review acts as a check on that discretion. The district court's findings were thorough, and the U.S. Supreme Court has implicitly endorsed enhancement statutes. Vigil's argument against the "preponderance of the information" standard, claiming it violates due process, has been previously rejected by this court and aligns with decisions from multiple circuits.

Vigil claims that hearsay evidence and the judge's consideration of past arrests and convictions during his sentencing hearing violated his due process rights. This argument has been previously addressed and rejected in United States v. Schell. According to 18 U.S.C. § 3575(b), the trial court may rely on a preponderance of information from the trial, sentencing hearing, and presentence report. This is supported by 18 U.S.C. § 3577 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(2) and (3). Most evidence presented at the July 26, 1983, DSO hearing came from eyewitnesses, along with certified conviction records and department of corrections records. Vigil's probation officer also testified, and Vigil's counsel did not challenge the presentence report at any stage. Additionally, Vigil argues that his prosecution violated his double jeopardy rights following his state court acquittal for shooting two police officers. This claim is unfounded since the state and federal charges are distinct, each requiring different proof elements. The principle of double jeopardy does not apply to prosecutions by separate sovereigns. The court affirms the decision.