John Stephenson v. Ron Neal

Citations: 865 F.3d 956; 2017 WL 3319296; 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 14363Docket: 16-1312

Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; August 4, 2017; Federal Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, John M. Stephenson appealed his murder conviction and death sentence stemming from a 1996 incident in southern Indiana where three individuals were killed. He was charged with multiple crimes, including theft of ammunition linked to the assault rifle used in the murders, which he committed with accomplice Dale Funk. After an eight-month trial, a jury convicted Stephenson and recommended the death penalty, which was imposed by the judge.

The Indiana Supreme Court upheld the conviction and the denial of postconviction relief. Stephenson subsequently sought federal habeas corpus relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, particularly regarding his visible wearing of a stun belt during the trial. The district court agreed and vacated the conviction and sentence, leading to an appeal by the prison superintendent. The Seventh Circuit reversed this decision, indicating that Stephenson may not have suffered prejudice from the stun belt in the guilt phase, but required further review regarding its impact during the penalty phase.

Upon remand, the district court concluded that the stun belt's visibility did not prejudice Stephenson's defense in the penalty phase, as the jury had already deemed him dangerous during the guilt phase due to the nature of the crimes. Although Stephenson's lawyer challenged the conviction vigorously, the appeal regarding the murder conviction was unsuccessful. A witness, Chad Adams, later implicated another individual, Brian Mossberger, in the murders, but this testimony contradicted earlier evidence from Funk, who had testified that he witnessed Stephenson commit the murders.

Mossberger testified that Stephenson, after returning with Funk, displayed a bloodied knife and stated that 'Jay, Kathy, and Brandy are no more.' However, the evidence presented is problematic: Adams's testimony was contradicted by Donald Goodman, and both Mossberger and Funk have credibility issues as potential suspects. Forensic tests confirmed that bullet wounds came from Stephenson's assault rifle, which was in Mossberger's possession post-crime. Despite the inconsistencies in the evidence, it does not support Stephenson's claim of innocence under Herrera v. Collins.

Stephenson's claim of being denied an impartial jury also lacks merit. He cited two instances of juror misconduct: the jury foreman's acquaintance with a victim's sister and jurors discussing his prior bar fight. The Indiana Supreme Court acknowledged these issues but concluded they did not prejudice Stephenson during the guilt phase, a finding we have no basis to overturn given the extensive evidence presented.

While the district judge correctly denied a new trial, we disagree with the handling of the penalty phase. Concerns were raised about the impact of Stephenson wearing a visible stun belt, which may have led jurors to perceive him as violent or guilty, potentially influencing their sentencing decision. The Indiana Supreme Court previously ruled that stun belts can impair a defendant's trial participation due to the fear they instill. The government contends that the crime's nature was the primary factor in sentencing; however, the brief duration of the penalty phase may have heightened the negative impact of the stun belt on the jury's perception of Stephenson's character, potentially influencing their decision to impose the death penalty.

The absence of evidence indicating that the defendant would exhibit disruptive behavior during the penalty phase of his trial is highlighted, noting his twenty years of non-violent conduct in prison and during court appearances. The presence of a stun belt, which suggested ongoing danger despite his age and lack of violent history, was known to four jurors, raising concerns about its potential influence on their decision to impose the death penalty. The stun belt's design prevents concealment, creating an unavoidable impression of threat. Responsibility for this situation lies with the defense attorney, who failed to object to the imposition of the stun belt without justification. The potential prejudicial impact of the stun belt on the trial leads to the decision to reverse the district court's denial of the defendant's habeas corpus petition and to vacate his sentence. Indiana is permitted to either pursue the death penalty again or seek a lesser punishment in a new hearing without the stun belt. However, the court affirms the conviction itself remains intact.