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Jesse Andrews v. Kevin Chappell
Citation: 866 F.3d 994Docket: 09-99012
Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; August 1, 2017; Federal Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Jesse James Andrews appealed the denial of his habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254, while the state cross-appealed the district court's grant of relief on Andrews's ineffective assistance of counsel claim during the penalty phase of his capital murder trial. The Ninth Circuit panel reversed the district court's decision, determining that the California Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent in concluding that Andrews was not prejudiced by his counsel's performance. The panel dismissed as unripe Andrews's claim regarding the constitutionality of California's lethal injection protocol, as no new protocol was in effect at the time of the district court's ruling. Additionally, the panel denied Andrews's request to certify several uncertified claims and upheld the district court's discretion in denying his motion for an evidentiary hearing. Judge Murguia dissented, advocating for the affirmation of the district court's relief grant based on ineffective assistance of counsel. The earlier opinion from August 5, 2015, was withdrawn, making Andrews's petitions for rehearing moot. On December 9, 1979, police discovered the bodies of three murder victims in a Los Angeles apartment: Preston Wheeler, Patrice Brandon, and Ronald Chism. Wheeler had been stabbed multiple times and shot in the neck; his body showed signs of severe beating. Brandon and Chism were found strangled with wire coat hangers, with Brandon displaying signs of sexual assault, including severe anal injuries and the presence of semen. All victims were bound. In December 1980, Charles Sanders was arrested and later entered a plea agreement for three counts of second-degree murder, receiving a sentence of 17 years to life. During police interrogation, Sanders provided a tape-recorded and written confession and later testified against his accomplice, Andrews, at trial. Sanders recounted that he and Andrews planned to rob Wheeler, who was a drug dealer, and that they had armed themselves before visiting Wheeler’s apartment. After gaining entry, they tied up Wheeler and Brandon and searched for drugs. During the incident, Andrews assaulted Brandon and later shot Wheeler, claiming he acted in self-defense. After killing Wheeler, Andrews also murdered Brandon and subsequently killed Chism when he arrived at the apartment. Sanders confirmed that Andrews had discussed their plan with a friend, Carol Brooks, prior to the murders. The testimony and details provided by Sanders played a pivotal role in the prosecution's case against Andrews. Sanders revealed his involvement in the murders to a witness one week after the incident, while Andrews confessed weeks later to shooting Wheeler, engaging in sexual acts with Brandon, and stealing $300 during a robbery. The prosecution presented fingerprint evidence, with three prints from Andrews among 50 collected from the crime scene. Notably, one print was found on a coffee table in Wheeler's living room, and two palm prints were located near Brandon's body. The defense aimed to discredit Sanders, presenting testimony from two inmates who claimed Sanders intended to falsely implicate Andrews. The jury deliberated for three days, ultimately convicting Andrews of murder and confirming three special circumstances: multiple murder and robbery-murder for the killings of Wheeler, Brandon, and Chism; rape-murder for Brandon; and a prior murder conviction from 1967. During the penalty phase, the prosecution highlighted Andrews's criminal history, including previous murder and robbery convictions, while the defense sought to portray Andrews's actions as less culpable due to his youth and the circumstances surrounding the crimes. The jury deliberated for one day before imposing the death penalty for all three murder counts. Andrews was sentenced to death on June 8, 1984, with the California Supreme Court affirming the conviction and sentence on August 3, 1989. Andrews later sought state post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase, which the California Supreme Court addressed, denying most claims but acknowledging the ineffective assistance claim. The California Supreme Court appointed a referee to investigate and provide findings on six specific questions related to Andrews's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase of his trial. This appointment aligns with California law, which favors the use of referees for evidentiary hearings due to appellate courts' limitations in this area. While the referee's findings are not binding, they carry significant weight if backed by substantial evidence. The six questions addressed by the referee included inquiries about mitigating evidence that trial counsel failed to present, the investigative steps that could have uncovered such evidence, any constraints faced by counsel, potential rebuttal evidence from the prosecution, and whether Andrews requested limitations on the investigation or presentation of mitigating evidence. The referee reviewed testimony from over 50 witnesses over a period of six years, noting two critical factors affecting the evaluation of the evidence: the artificial nature of the lengthy hearing compared to a trial context and the inability to fully assess the lead counsel's efforts due to his death prior to the hearing. In her report, the referee summarized findings for each question, particularly noting three categories of mitigating evidence that were not presented: Andrews's family background, his confinement conditions, and his mental health. The report highlighted Andrews's early life, including the separation of his alcoholic parents and the relatively stable upbringing he experienced with his grandparents and siblings, which provided a context for understanding his background. Andrews experienced significant personal turmoil during childhood, marked by jealousy after his mother brought home children from another marriage and the death of his grandfather, a key figure in his life. This led to withdrawal from school and delinquency, including a car theft at age 14, which resulted in his confinement at Mt. Meigs, a reform school described as having "appalling conditions" akin to a penal colony. Witnesses reported severe abuse, inadequate food, and the presence of sexual predators, with Andrews being particularly vulnerable due to his small size and passiveness. After his release, he became associated with Freddie Square, a criminal influence. In September 1966, they attempted a robbery that resulted in the fatal shooting of a store clerk by Square, with Andrews actively participating in a subsequent armed robbery of a taxi driver, during which he threatened the driver and fired shots at him. Andrews was convicted of murder in 1967 and armed robbery in 1968, leading to his commitment to Alabama state prison. He escaped in 1969, was convicted for the escape, and remained incarcerated until 1976. During his imprisonment, the conditions were described as "abysmal," with severe overcrowding, violence, and sexual threats prevalent. Although he was often targeted for violence, he did engage in violent acts, including stabbings in self-defense. After his release in 1976, Andrews attempted another robbery in 1977, during which he held two women hostage at gunpoint, eventually surrendering to police. Following a failed escape from jail, he successfully escaped on his second attempt and fled to California. Andrews entered a stable relationship with Debra Pickett in California, resulting in the birth of a child. However, by December 1979, he resumed cocaine use, left his job and family, and subsequently committed three murders. Mental health experts evaluated Andrews, diagnosing him with several disorders, including attention deficit disorder, PTSD, and mild to moderate organic brain impairment, attributing these to drug use and a possible head injury sustained in prison. The experts argued that his mental impairments and harsh childhood experiences contributed to his criminal behavior, suggesting that circumstances made his actions more understandable and less morally culpable. A specific instance highlighted included Andrews's overreaction to being called a derogatory name by one of the murder victims, which the defense psychiatrist linked to his PTSD. The California Supreme Court reviewed the referee's findings concerning the investigative efforts of Andrews's trial counsel in gathering mitigating evidence. The defense team undertook two investigative trips to Mobile, Alabama, to gather court records and interview potential witnesses, including Andrews's mother in Florida. During these interactions, they learned about Andrews's learning difficulties and troubled upbringing. However, the investigation into his background was limited by Andrews's refusal to allow family testimony at trial, with counsel citing tactical constraints rather than financial ones. Andrews threatened to disrupt proceedings if his wishes were not honored, leading counsel to refrain from fully exploring his family background or utilizing prisoner witnesses. Miller expressed skepticism regarding the impact of prisoner witnesses on jurors, fearing that their testimony might reveal Andrews’s misconduct while incarcerated. The referee noted Andrews's history of two inmate stabbings and two escapes from custody, along with the violent criminal records of the inmates who testified at the hearing, which included multiple escapes. Miller and Lenoir chose not to highlight Andrews's upbringing in their defense, believing it mirrored Miller’s own background and lacked persuasive value. The California Supreme Court summarized the referee’s assessment of potential investigative steps that counsel could have pursued. It was suggested that gathering details about Andrews's upbringing, experiences in Alabama's correctional facilities, and psychiatric history did not require extraordinary efforts. Andrews's mother, along with other family members, could have provided relevant information, and counsel could have utilized public documents or informal networks to locate additional witnesses. There were numerous avenues to investigate Andrews's experiences within the correctional system, including obtaining prison records and contacting mentioned inmates. The referee recognized that while Andrews's willingness to cooperate was an issue, counsel could have sought information from external sources regardless of his cooperation. Additionally, although there was limited historical evidence regarding mental health in Andrews's family, the referee indicated that psychiatric experts could have been appointed, although it was uncertain if this would yield beneficial evidence regarding potential diagnoses like organic brain impairment or PTSD. In addressing potential rebuttal evidence that might have been damaging to Andrews but not presented by the prosecution, the referee identified two significant prior convictions. The prosecutor could have called the taxi driver from the 1968 robbery, who would testify to Andrews's threatening remarks before he fired shots, and could have detailed Andrews's attempt to rob a laundry in 1976, where he held two women hostage. Although the jury was aware of the convictions, they lacked knowledge of the underlying facts, which could have been used as aggravating evidence to underscore Andrews's moral culpability in the case. The referee determined that the prosecution had the opportunity to present mental health experts to counter Andrews’s claims of PTSD, suggesting instead that he suffered from antisocial personality disorder, had a normal IQ of 93, and displayed no signs of brain damage based on his job stability and relationship history. The prosecution could have argued that Andrews's behavior during the murders indicated planning and was unlikely influenced by PCP. Andrews vehemently opposed having his family testify, particularly his mother, despite the trial court's advice on the potential value of her testimony. He explicitly communicated to the court that this choice was his own, and lead counsel Lenoir noted Andrews's refusal to involve his mother, citing undisclosed personal reasons. Andrews even threatened to disrupt proceedings if his mother was called. This refusal was corroborated by his sister and was uncontradicted by his mother. The California Supreme Court concluded that Andrews received constitutionally adequate representation, determining that any alleged inadequacies did not result in prejudice. The court referenced the standards established in Strickland v. Washington, requiring proof that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and resulted in prejudice. Although Andrews disputed the findings regarding his family's involvement, the court credited the referee's findings, emphasizing the need for deference to counsel's strategic decisions. The court clarified that effective assistance does not equate to exhaustive investigation, and valid strategic choices can exist even without extensive efforts. The California Supreme Court concluded that the actions of Andrews's counsel in not conducting an extensive investigation into his background for mitigating circumstances were reasonable and based on informed strategic choices, influenced by Andrews's own restrictions. The court noted that Andrews had insisted on limiting the investigation, which counsel complied with, as California law does not require attorneys to present mitigating evidence against a defendant's wishes. Despite being able to discover mitigating evidence through persistence, counsel's decision was justified since Andrews’s family background was relatively stable and did not indicate severe privation or abuse. Testimonies from family members revealed a background that might not elicit sympathy from a jury, and counsel deemed the information obtained from Andrews's family as not significantly mitigating. The court found that the preliminary investigation showed no compelling mitigating factors, leading counsel to favor alternative arguments for clemency. The court also determined that counsel's choice not to pursue evidence regarding Andrews's confinement conditions was reasonable. The dissenting opinion criticized counsel's efforts but acknowledged the actions taken, thus framing the only legal question under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) as whether the California Supreme Court's application of the Strickland standard was objectively unreasonable. The dissent argues that Andrews's attorneys provided ineffective assistance by not inquiring about his prison conditions. However, under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), a de novo review of Strickland claims is not applicable. The California Supreme Court acknowledged the degrading conditions Andrews faced but noted that presenting evidence from former inmates could negatively impact the jury's perception of him. Testimonial evidence from inmates, including those with serious criminal backgrounds, could lead to unfavorable comparisons and reinforce negative impressions of Andrews rather than generate sympathy. Such witnesses would also be subject to impeachment due to their histories. Additionally, revealing prison conditions could prompt the jury to question Andrews's criminal behavior after escaping such conditions, further complicating his defense. The dissent's contention that expert testimony could replace prisoner accounts overlooks the California Supreme Court's findings regarding the credibility of inmate testimony. Moreover, the dissent's assertion regarding the connection between Andrews's family involvement and the discovery of mitigating evidence misinterprets the state court's ruling. Overall, the dissent fails to demonstrate that the California Supreme Court's conclusions were objectively unreasonable under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). The court determined that Andrews's restrictions on family involvement hindered counsel's ability to explore his background and childhood. The California Supreme Court noted that counsel may have reasonably chosen not to present expert mental health testimony, as the prosecutor could exploit this to Andrews’s detriment. An expert indicated that convicts often respond with rage to perceived insults, which could lead the jury to view Andrews as unable to control violent impulses. Additionally, there would have been conflicting expert opinions regarding any brain damage Andrews may have suffered. The reference hearing highlighted risks of emphasizing mental health, as it would allow the prosecution to reiterate the crime's circumstances and Andrews's past criminal behavior, potentially framing him as possessing an antisocial personality rather than showing mental impairment. The court concluded that counsel's strategy to limit Andrews’s culpability and present him as a follower rather than violently antisocial was reasonable. Counsel urged the jury to consider mitigating factors, such as the more lenient sentences given to others who committed heinous crimes. This approach effectively minimized the introduction of aggravating evidence that could portray Andrews as aggressive and desensitized to violence. However, dissenting opinions criticized the notion that Andrews was merely a follower, arguing that evidence suggested he was the instigator in the crimes. The dissent's independent fact-finding conflicts with the California Supreme Court's reasonable conclusion that the jury was presented with a stipulation characterizing Andrews as a follower in the 1966 grocery store robbery. The Supreme Court rejected the dissent's argument that the prosecutor would not have introduced additional rebuttal evidence if mitigating evidence had been presented. It reasoned that such evidence would have altered the prosecutor’s strategy, prompting additional witnesses and cross-examination that could undermine Andrews’s case. The court deemed that the defense counsel's decision to limit their investigation and presentation of mitigating evidence fell within the reasonable range of professional assistance, as extensive witness testimony about Andrews's background would have been atypical for a penalty phase at that time. Furthermore, the California Supreme Court affirmed that its conclusions were consistent with established factual findings, noting that harmful testimony regarding Andrews's violent conduct could have emerged during cross-examination. This included evidence from a taxi driver and a police officer that would have contradicted the portrayal of Andrews as a follower and demonstrated his willingness to use violence. The court concluded that substantial evidence supported the finding that presenting mitigating evidence would have opened the door to damaging rebuttal. The dissent's assertion that the prosecutor would not have introduced rebuttal witnesses was seen as an error, as it failed to defer to the state court's factual findings. The court referenced precedent which established that defense counsel is not ineffective for avoiding the introduction of potentially harmful background evidence, as it could risk introducing aggravating information and distract from minimizing the client's culpability. The California Supreme Court found that Andrews's counsel had stronger justifications for not presenting background evidence than the counsel in Burger, as Andrews's circumstances were less severe. The court referenced Bell v. Cone, where the Supreme Court deemed a similar tactical decision reasonable because revealing the defendant's normal upbringing could have negatively influenced the jury. The California Supreme Court compared this strategy to that of Andrews’s counsel, noting it aimed to minimize potentially damaging rebuttal evidence. In contrast, the court distinguished Andrews's case from Williams v. Taylor, where ineffective assistance was due to counsel's failure to investigate rather than strategic choice. The California Supreme Court ultimately concluded that Andrews's counsel provided constitutionally adequate representation and that any perceived deficiencies did not result in prejudice, considering the ambiguous mitigating evidence and the risk of damaging rebuttal. The dissent critiqued this conclusion, arguing that the California Supreme Court misapplied precedent, but the majority noted that such a critique improperly employed de novo review instead of adhering to the required deference under AEDPA. The California Supreme Court denied Andrews's state habeas petition. Following this, Andrews filed a federal habeas petition in district court, raising 32 claims. The district court denied 31 claims but granted relief on the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase due to inadequate investigation and presentation of mitigating evidence. The court did not apply the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) standard, failing to assess whether the state court's decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of the Strickland standard. Instead, it reviewed the evidence de novo and determined that counsel's deficiencies established prejudice under Strickland. The district court also granted a certificate of appealability on Andrews's Eighth Amendment claim regarding California's lethal injection protocol. Andrews appealed the denial of his other claims, while the state cross-appealed the grant of relief on the ineffective assistance claim. After completing briefing, Andrews sought to add an uncertified claim related to the Eighth Amendment concerning execution after a lengthy delay, which was granted. The review of the district court's decisions occurs de novo, with AEDPA applying to Andrews’s petition due to its filing date after April 24, 1996. Under AEDPA, a court may not grant a habeas petition for claims adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court's decision was contrary to established federal law or based on an unreasonable factual determination. The claims in this case were adjudicated on the merits by the California Supreme Court, which is recognized as the last reasoned decision regarding those claims. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), relevant Supreme Court precedent is limited to decisions existing at the time the state court issued its ruling, meaning that any Supreme Court cases decided later cannot serve as the basis for evaluating the reasonableness of the state court's application of the law. A Supreme Court decision must squarely address the issue at hand or extend a clear legal principle to be considered clearly established law under § 2254(d)(1). If a state court differentiates its case from existing Supreme Court rulings, that law is not deemed clearly established. Moreover, if a habeas court has to extend a rationale to apply it to a case, then that rationale was not clearly established when the state court made its decision. A principle is only clearly established if it is so evident that no fair-minded disagreement could arise regarding its application to the facts. A state court decision is "contrary to" Supreme Court precedent if it applies a contradictory rule, while an "unreasonable application" does not merely refer to incorrectness but to an unreasonable application of relevant precedent. The habeas court must evaluate the arguments supporting the state court's decision, and if reasonable jurists could disagree on its correctness, the decision is not considered unreasonable. The Supreme Court emphasizes that § 2254(d) establishes a highly deferential standard, allowing state-court decisions to receive the benefit of the doubt and not completely barring federal-court relitigation of claims already rejected in state proceedings. Authority to issue a writ is limited to situations where no fair-minded jurists could disagree that a state court's decision conflicts with Supreme Court precedents. Even a strong case for relief does not imply that the state court's conclusion was unreasonable, as established in Richter, 562 U.S. at 102. The standard for obtaining relief is intentionally high. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are governed by the clearly established federal law set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), which affirms the right to effective counsel under the Sixth Amendment during trial and capital sentencing. A petitioner must demonstrate that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) this deficiency prejudiced the defense. When evaluating whether a state court's adjudication of such a claim was an unreasonable application of Strickland, federal courts may refer to how the Supreme Court has applied Strickland in different contexts, though this should not lead to the creation of strict rules. The Supreme Court has emphasized the necessity of a case-by-case analysis under Strickland and cautioned against using decisions made under de novo review as guidance for assessing state court determinations of deficiency or prejudice. A state court's application of Strickland can be reasonable based on precedent at the time of its decision, even if later Supreme Court applications suggest otherwise. Deficient performance is defined as falling below an objective standard of reasonableness and is measured against prevailing professional norms at the time of the trial. In Pinholster, the Supreme Court dismissed the dissent's claim of ineffective counsel due to a lack of evidence showing that the counsel's mitigation strategy deviated from the standard of professional competence in 1984 Los Angeles. The Court emphasized that courts must not assess counsel's performance against later professional norms, as seen in Bobby v. Van Hook, which criticized reliance on 2003 ABA Guidelines for a trial that occurred 18 years earlier. To determine if counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defense during the penalty phase of a capital case, the Court outlined a three-step process: 1. Evaluate the totality of available mitigation evidence, including both what was presented at sentencing and what a competent attorney might have introduced. 2. Assess the aggravating evidence and any rebuttal evidence that could have been presented by the prosecution. 3. Reweigh the aggravating evidence against the totality of the mitigating evidence to ascertain if there’s a reasonable probability that, without the errors, the outcome would have led to a different sentencing decision. Mitigation evidence is broad, encompassing all relevant factors that affect the jury's assessment of the defendant's moral culpability. The Court pointed out that evidence of a defendant’s disadvantaged background can influence perceptions of culpability, as exemplified by cases where a history of abuse and neglect was presented to show a defendant's lesser moral culpability. Mitigating evidence in capital cases can include a defendant's difficult upbringing, such as severe abuse, neglect, or homelessness, as seen in cases like Wiggins and Rompilla. Mental health issues, such as PTSD or cognitive impairments, may also reduce perceived culpability, as illustrated in Penry and Porter. Positive behavior, including remorse and good conduct in prison, can further serve as mitigating factors, as noted in Williams and Belmontes. Courts must evaluate the strength of mitigating evidence and its potential impact on juries, considering whether such evidence could be perceived as aggravating instead. The Supreme Court acknowledges that the interpretation of mitigation can vary, leading to differing jury reactions. For instance, a tragic childhood may evoke sympathy or suggest a propensity for violence. Mental health issues could imply future danger, complicating their mitigating value. The assessment of counsel's performance in penalty phases involves weighing both mitigating and aggravating evidence, including the specifics of the crime, to determine the potential influence on the jury. In Strickland, the Court deemed the aggravating evidence overwhelming when the defendant fatally stabbed three victims during a robbery. Similarly, in Belmontes, the Court upheld the state court's view that the defendant’s brutal act of bludgeoning a woman to death with a dumbbell was overwhelming aggravating evidence, leading to the conclusion that the failure to present mitigating evidence did not result in prejudice. The Supreme Court in Van Hook emphasized the importance of the weight of aggravating factors over their number, particularly in the context of crimes committed to rob vulnerable victims. Evidence of a defendant’s prior severe criminal history is also considered aggravating and can be introduced in rebuttal, as seen in Woodford v. Visciotti, where a history of violent crimes significantly impacted the assessment of aggravation. Furthermore, prior murder convictions are viewed as powerful aggravating evidence. Rebuttal evidence can undermine mitigation claims, illustrated in Pinholster, where the introduction of a bipolar disorder diagnosis could be countered by a state expert suggesting an antisocial personality disorder instead. The process to evaluate whether a lawyer's deficient performance prejudiced the defendant requires a reweighing of aggravating versus mitigating evidence to assess if there was a reasonable probability that the outcome would have changed, as articulated in Wiggins. A "reasonable probability" undermines confidence in the verdict, but the mere inability to rule out the possibility of a life sentence over the death penalty is insufficient for establishing prejudice. The key consideration is whether a substantial likelihood of a different outcome exists, rather than mere conjecture. The excerpt outlines the nuanced distinction between Strickland’s prejudice standard and the more-probable-than-not standard, indicating that the difference is minimal and relevant only in exceptional circumstances. The Court has recognized a reasonable probability of a different outcome when weak aggravating evidence could have been countered by strong mitigating evidence, as illustrated in Wiggins, where powerful evidence of the defendant's troubled childhood could have influenced the jury's sentencing decision. Conversely, it found no prejudice in cases like Visciotti, where overwhelming aggravating evidence overshadowed even strong mitigating evidence, such as the defendant's family background and health issues. The Court also evaluates whether mitigating evidence would be cumulative or significantly impactful, referencing Strickland's conclusion that additional information must materially alter the sentencing perspective to establish prejudice. In Belmontes, cumulative evidence regarding the defendant’s difficult upbringing was deemed unlikely to outweigh the severity of the crime or prior offenses. The summary indicates that cumulative mitigating evidence alone does not suffice to demonstrate reasonable probability of a different outcome; only sufficiently strong new evidence, coupled with manageable aggravating evidence, can achieve this. The California Supreme Court’s rejection of Andrews’s claim of prejudice from his counsel's failure to present additional mitigating evidence is evaluated against Strickland’s criteria, confirming that even if counsel’s performance was deficient, it did not impact the outcome as a different result was not reasonably probable. The California Supreme Court evaluated the prejudice in Andrews's case under the Strickland standard by analyzing the totality of mitigating evidence presented at trial, including Andrews's family background and his experiences during incarceration. Andrews claimed that the court misapplied the legal standards from Tennard v. Dretke and Smith v. Texas, arguing that mitigating evidence does not need to be uniquely severe or directly linked to the crime. However, the court considered the mitigating evidence and determined that counsel's decision not to present certain evidence was strategic rather than an outright dismissal of its mitigating value. Furthermore, the court found that Andrews's claims regarding his treatment at Mt. Meigs were adequately addressed in the record, highlighting the appalling conditions he faced there. The court also assessed whether the mitigating evidence could be perceived as aggravating by a jury and concluded that much of it was not definitively mitigating, as it could be rebutted or misinterpreted. Specifically, the court noted that Andrews’s stable family background might not mitigate his moral culpability. The individual’s small size and passiveness made him vulnerable to bullying by older boys, with no protective measures taken by Mt. Meigs. The facility also failed to provide adequate rehabilitation or educational opportunities. Expert testimony regarding his drug use while at Mt. Meigs was noted as significant. The state court referred to "prison conditions" in a manner consistent with both prison and Mt. Meigs environments. The California Supreme Court assessed evidence of prison conditions as having a dual impact: while it highlighted the degrading circumstances endured by the individual, it also risked portraying him negatively due to the backgrounds of former inmates who could testify, some of whom had committed violence and frequently escaped. This evidence might reinforce perceptions of the individual as desensitized to violence and disrespect for the law. The dissent argued the court’s conclusion about the double-edged nature of the evidence was unreasonable, claiming the jury was already aware of the individual’s violent history. However, the court found that the jury did not hear specific details of his previous violent crimes, thus supporting its assessment of the prison conditions as potentially aggravating. The California Supreme Court applied the prejudice standard established by Strickland, evaluating both mitigating and aggravating evidence, as well as potential rebuttal evidence, in line with Supreme Court precedent. The California Supreme Court characterized Andrews's crimes as demonstrating a "callous disregard for human life," noting that he calmly interacted with victims before torturing and killing them. Andrews committed additional heinous acts, including the rape and sodomization of one victim, and he murdered others with significant violence. The court acknowledged that the prosecution could have introduced Andrews's criminal history as rebuttal evidence, suggesting he was "aggressive and desensitized to violence," which could imply a danger to others if sentenced to life imprisonment. Although references to Andrews’s prison escapes might be deemed inflammatory, the court concluded that the prosecution could have presented mental health experts to counter Andrews’s claims, highlighting that Andrews exhibited normal intelligence but had antisocial personality traits. Andrews contended that the court's inference of his future dangerousness was unreasonable, arguing that incidents like prison stabbings were defensive rather than indicative of violent tendencies. However, the state court reasonably interpreted these incidents as aggravating factors, and concluded that evidence of his violent conditioning in prison could negatively influence a jury's perception. The state court also found that the testimony from Andrews’s experts could potentially backfire, particularly if it implied he could not control violent impulses. Overall, the court's determinations regarding the evidence and its implications for future dangerousness aligned with established Supreme Court precedent. The presentation of mental health evidence could have provided the prosecutor with opportunities to emphasize the circumstances of the crimes and Andrews's criminal history. The California Supreme Court re-evaluated the mitigating and aggravating evidence to determine if the absence of any deficiency in counsel's performance would have led the jury to a different conclusion regarding the death sentence. The court examined the implications of Andrews's antisocial personality disorder, concluding it may have made him less sympathetic to the jury, and found that counsel's decision to focus on Andrews's upbringing and prison conditions was reasonable despite the potential for damaging rebuttal. The court noted a lack of evidence indicating that the jury would have been inclined to impose a life sentence had additional mitigation evidence been presented. Consequently, it found that Andrews was not prejudiced by any perceived deficiencies in counsel's performance, aligning with the Strickland standard. Andrews's reliance on the Supreme Court cases Williams and Porter was deemed inappropriate, as those cases did not directly apply to his situation, leading to the conclusion that the California Supreme Court's decision was not an unreasonable application of Strickland. The defendant had a traumatic childhood marked by severe abuse and neglect, including parental imprisonment for neglect, physical abuse from his father, and time spent in an abusive foster home. After his parents were released, he was returned to their custody despite the unsanitary and dangerous conditions in their home, where alcohol abuse was prevalent. The evidence indicated that the children lived in filth, lacking proper clothing, and at times were under the influence of alcohol. Although the defendant was borderline mentally retarded and had a record of positive behavior in prison, including commendations for helping to combat drug trafficking, this mitigating evidence was not presented by his counsel. Counsel also neglected to contact a character witness who could have testified about the defendant's positive adaptation in a structured environment and his pride in earning a carpentry degree while incarcerated. During sentencing, the defense attorney's closing argument focused on the difficulty of seeking mercy for the defendant, undermining the case for leniency. The Supreme Court later determined that the state court had misapplied the legal standard regarding the assessment of prejudice, requiring an inappropriate separate inquiry into fundamental fairness. The Court examined the application of Strickland v. Washington in the context of Andrews’s case, finding that the state court reasonably distinguished it from the precedent set in Williams due to significant factual differences. In Williams, the defense had strong character evidence available, and the defendant's troubled background was more severe than Andrews’s relatively stable upbringing. Additionally, Williams involved a defendant with mental retardation, whereas Andrews was characterized by antisocial personality traits. The Court noted that Andrews's violent criminal history and the brutal nature of his offenses were more egregious than those in Williams. Consequently, the Supreme Court's determination of ineffective assistance in Williams did not render the state court’s conclusion in Andrews unreasonable. Andrews also referenced Porter to argue against the California Supreme Court's decision, but the Court found Porter unhelpful as it was decided after the state court’s opinion and did not alter the analysis of prejudice under AEDPA. The dissenting opinion failed to recognize these distinctions, improperly conducting a de novo review rather than assessing the reasonableness of the state court’s application of Williams under the appropriate legal standard. For a state court's ruling to qualify as an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, it must be objectively unreasonable, not simply incorrect. Evidence indicated the murders were committed in a "crime of passion," with the defendant having consumed substantial alcohol shortly before the events. The defendant was convicted of both murders, and the jury recommended the death penalty. The state supreme court affirmed the conviction but removed the "heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating factor, determining the crime aligned more with passion than deliberate cruelty. The defendant represented himself during the guilt phase, and his legal counsel had minimal engagement regarding the penalty phase, failing to interview witnesses or gather records. Consequently, key mitigating evidence was not presented, including the defendant's distinguished military service in the Korean War, struggles with reintegration and excessive drinking, history of childhood abuse, and cognitive difficulties. The Supreme Court found that the state court unreasonably applied the Strickland standard, asserting that the mitigating evidence was significant and the aggravating evidence less compelling. The Court criticized the state court's dismissal of the defendant's military service and abusive childhood as irrelevant, emphasizing the importance of these factors in understanding the defendant's behavior. The Court concluded that the California Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply Strickland, as it considered all mitigating evidence, which was less substantial than that in previous cases like Porter. Andrews did not experience an abusive home environment, and there is no indication that his murders were crimes of passion influenced by childhood abuse, which would be significant for jury evaluation. The aggravating circumstances in the case of Porter differ from those in Andrews's case, with Porter’s case being described as a crime of passion, while Andrews’s actions—brutal rape, strangulation, and shootings—showed a "callous disregard for human life" and involved considerable violence. The California Supreme Court’s findings on Andrews’s conduct provide a stark contrast to the Porter decision, which stated that the sentencing judge underestimated the significance of aggravating evidence. Andrews also references Doe v. Ayers to argue that deficient legal counsel led to prejudice; however, this case does not apply as it predates AEDPA and does not assess the reasonableness of the state court's conclusion. The Supreme Court case Woodford v. Visciotti, which examined a state court's rejection of a Strickland claim, is noted for its relevance to determining whether the state court's application of Strickland was unreasonable, despite being decided after the California Supreme Court's decision in Andrews's case. Supreme Court opinions regarding the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) are pertinent for circuit courts' analyses, irrespective of whether those opinions were issued before or after the last reasoned state court decision. The dissent references the case of Visciotti, which was decided post the California Supreme Court's decision in this matter, but its significance remains ambiguous despite acknowledgment of the appropriateness of considering such opinions. The Supreme Court clarified that under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), it is insufficient for a federal habeas court to merely find that a state court misapplied Strickland; intervention is warranted only when a state court's decision is objectively unreasonable. The Court determined that although a federal court might reach a different conclusion from the California Supreme Court, the latter’s decision was not deemed unreasonable. In this case, similar to Visciotti, the state court weighed Andrews's mitigating evidence against the severity of the crime and his criminal history, concluding that there was no reasonable probability the outcome would differ with additional evidence presented. This decision was not objectively unreasonable, affirming that the California Supreme Court's application of Strickland was reasonable. The initial unanimous decision underscores the notion that fair-minded jurists could agree with the state court's determination. Although the dissent acknowledges the high level of deference owed to state court decisions in federal habeas reviews, it fails to articulate why the California Supreme Court's conclusions were objectively unreasonable, particularly in relation to existing Supreme Court precedent. The dissent lacks engagement with the relevant distinctions and facts necessary to contest the state court's ruling, missing the critical question of whether the state court's determination was unreasonable, which is a significantly higher standard than merely being incorrect. The dissenting opinion incorrectly relies on Wiggins and Rompilla for its Strickland analysis since both cases were decided after the California Supreme Court's ruling. While the Supreme Court's reasoning can be considered under AEDPA, these cases do not inform whether the state court's finding on counsel's deficiency and lack of prejudice was an unreasonable application of established precedent. The dissent asserts that the California Supreme Court's ruling was erroneous, claiming that “at least one juror” might have been swayed by additional evidence of abuse if presented. However, this viewpoint neglects the comprehensive evaluation of both mitigating and aggravating evidence required by Strickland. The dissent’s notion that a single juror's inclination could change the outcome only represents a speculative possibility, not the substantial likelihood of a different result mandated by the Supreme Court. Under AEDPA review, it is insufficient for a federal habeas court to simply believe the state court was wrong; the state court's decision must be deemed objectively unreasonable. The dissent improperly applies a de novo standard, disregarding the totality of evidence and making its own factual findings contrary to the California Supreme Court’s determinations. By not adhering to the AEDPA standard, the dissent fails to address whether the state court’s application of Supreme Court precedent was unreasonable. Consequently, the rejection of Andrews's claim regarding ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase stands, and the district court's opposing conclusion is reversed. Since the decision is based on the issue of prejudice, the question of counsel's performance deficiency need not be considered. The dissent also neglects to properly analyze the California Supreme Court's finding that Andrews's attorney was not deficient under Strickland. The dissent engages in de novo review of the facts and law, relying on cases not established at the time of the California Supreme Court’s ruling, particularly critiquing the dissent’s reliance on the Porter case, which was decided after the relevant ruling. It contends that the dissent's conclusion, asserting that any competent attorney would have presented certain evidence, overlooks the "doubly deferential judicial review" applicable under the Strickland standard. The dissent fails to present substantial questions regarding the California Supreme Court’s deficiency analysis. Addressing Andrews’s appeal regarding the lethal injection protocol, the district court dismissed his Eighth Amendment claim, reasoning that California's protocol mirrored the one upheld in Baze v. Rees, making Andrews’s challenge untenable. At the time of the district court's ruling in July 2009, California lacked a lethal injection protocol. The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) is responsible for developing such procedures. Previous court rulings had found CDCR's execution procedures violated the Eighth Amendment, and although a revised protocol was developed in 2007, it was invalidated for violating the state’s administrative procedure act. Consequently, Andrews’s claim was deemed unripe, leading to the district court's error in considering it. Following further legal challenges, the CDCR proposed a single-drug lethal injection protocol in 2015, which underwent public commentary but was ultimately rejected by the California Office of Administrative Law in December 2016, allowing for potential revisions within 120 days. In 2016, California passed Proposition 66, which amended state law to exclude lethal injection protocols from the state's Administrative Procedure Act (APA). However, the California Supreme Court has stayed the implementation of Proposition 66 while litigation regarding its application is ongoing (Briggs v. Brown, 387 P.3d 1254, 1255 (Cal. 2017)). Andrews may challenge this once California finalizes its protocol. He raises several uncertified legal claims: 1) unconstitutional delay in execution based on Lackey v. Texas, 2) ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland, 3) failure to disclose exculpatory evidence and false testimony under Brady v. Maryland and Napue v. Illinois, and 4) destruction of evidence violating due process under California v. Trombetta. He also asserts claims of cumulative error and factual innocence. The document addresses whether Andrews needs to obtain a Certificate of Appealability (COA) under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) for these claims. Citing Jennings v. Stephens, it clarifies that a habeas petitioner who has secured relief in district court does not need a COA to defend that judgment on alternate grounds, provided they do not seek to expand their rights beyond what the court granted. The analysis emphasizes that § 2253(c) applies only when an appeal to the court of appeals is taken. Thus, Andrews does not require a COA for his defense, unlike a petitioner seeking a new trial after a resentencing, who must take a cross-appeal for rejected claims. A habeas applicant who has successfully obtained a retrial must file a cross-appeal and secure a certificate of appealability (COA) to assert claims regarding the constitutionality of state punishment. In Andrews's case, the district court granted him relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase of his trial, ordering the State of California to either conduct a new penalty phase trial or vacate his death sentence within 120 days. Andrews is entitled to argue any claim from the record that could justify a new penalty phase or resentencing without needing a cross-appeal or COA, yet none of his uncertified claims support the district court's order. His five uncertified claims seek a new guilt phase trial, relating to ineffective assistance of counsel and factual innocence, but these claims require a cross-appeal and a COA as they potentially undermine the state's rights granted by the district court's judgment. The jurisdiction to consider uncertified claims hinges on whether Andrews can demonstrate a substantial showing of a constitutional right's denial, as outlined in 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) and Ninth Circuit Rule 22-1(e). Uncertified claims in a petitioner's brief are treated as a motion to expand the COA, requiring the petitioner to show that reasonable jurists could debate the resolution of the petition. The threshold for this determination does not involve a detailed examination of factual or legal arguments but focuses on whether the district court's constitutional claim assessments could be considered debatable or erroneous. Additionally, Andrews's argument that his execution would breach the Eighth Amendment due to excessive delay is under consideration. Andrews did not initially include his claim regarding California’s death penalty system in his opening brief on appeal but later sought to file a supplemental brief after the district court's decision, which cited Furman v. Georgia and Gregg v. Georgia to assert that the state's death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment due to dysfunctional administration leading to unpredictable delays in executions. He referred to this claim as Claim 26, arguing that executing him after 22 years on death row would constitute cruel and unusual punishment and serve no retributive or deterrent purpose. Andrews contended that he was not responsible for the delays, asserting that he was merely seeking to vindicate his constitutional rights within a flawed system. The California Supreme Court summarily denied this claim, and the district court dismissed it on the merits, stating that there is no constitutional basis for a claim of unconstitutional delay after a defendant has utilized the appellate process. Andrews countered on appeal that the delay renders the death penalty unconstitutional in both theory and application, emphasizing his prolonged confinement and external factors causing the delays. He referenced Supreme Court justices' statements questioning the constitutionality of delays in capital cases, including dissenting opinions that acknowledged the validity of such claims. However, procedural hurdles exist, as Andrews did not raise this issue in his opening brief, which typically results in waiver of the claim unless exceptions apply. An exception allows the court to address the issue without prejudice to the state, which has presented a thorough briefing. The state contends that Andrews's claim was neither fairly presented to the California Supreme Court nor to the district court, rendering it unexhausted and waived. Federal habeas relief for state prisoners requires proper exhaustion of state court remedies, necessitating that claims must be "fairly presented" to allow state courts to address them. A claim is considered fairly presented only if it includes a factual basis for relief and citations to relevant case law. New factual allegations that change the legal claim or strengthen the evidentiary posture are not fairly presented. Distinct claims based on the same facts but different constitutional theories must be separately exhausted. General references to broad constitutional principles do not suffice for exhaustion. However, related claims that are sufficiently intertwined may be exhausted together if there was no strategic reason to omit one. The state distinguishes between Andrews's Lackey claim and the Jones claim he raises, arguing that they present different challenges. The Lackey claim critiques the execution of a prisoner after prolonged death row incarceration, while the Jones claim questions the constitutionality of the California death penalty system due to excessive delays. The court disagrees with the state's interpretation, asserting that Andrews's claims are fundamentally the same: they both argue that his prolonged incarceration constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Andrews has not provided new facts or evidence since presenting his argument to the state court. His supplemental brief references Jones’s findings on systemic delays in California's death penalty system to support his Lackey claim, asserting that inherent delays render executions unconstitutional. However, these references do not fundamentally alter the legal claim previously assessed by the state courts. The court concludes that Andrews's uncertified claim is sufficiently related to Claim 26, indicating that exhausting Claim 26 also exhausts the current challenge. Moreover, Andrews raised this delay claim in the district court, therefore exhausting it and not waiving it. The district court denied Claim 26, stating that the state court’s rejection was not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, and that no reasonable jurist would find this ruling debatable. The excerpt emphasizes that there is no established Supreme Court precedent indicating that excessive delay in executing a capital defendant constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Andrews’s references to Furman and Gregg do not specifically address his delay claim and would require extending their rationale significantly to apply in this context. The court previously determined in Jones v. Davis that neither case establishes a rule against delays in post-conviction proceedings. Consequently, Andrews's Lackey claim and systemic challenges to California’s death penalty system are not cognizable in federal habeas proceedings due to Teague restrictions. As such, the state court’s rejection of Andrews's delay claim is upheld, and no substantial showing of Eighth Amendment rights violation has been made, leading to a denial of a Certificate of Appealability (COA) for this claim. The document then shifts to consider Andrews's four uncertified claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel under Strickland for failing to investigate and present specific evidence. The first claim centers on the police investigation prior to Sanders's arrest and his subsequent testimony under a plea agreement. Police gathered statements from at least nine witnesses regarding activities at Wheeler's apartment, where drug customers were frequent, disturbances were common, and shootings had occurred. No physical or testimonial evidence linked these customers to the murders. While police found fingerprints of individuals present at Wheeler’s apartment during the murders, these did not connect anyone to the crime. A drug dealer associated with Wheeler was arrested but released after denying involvement and claiming a Mexican Mafia member had confessed to the murder, though he provided no corroborative evidence. Andrews argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for not investigating or presenting evidence that Wheeler's associates had motive and opportunity for the murders. The state court rejected this claim, and the district court upheld the rejection, concluding that reasonable jurists would not dispute the finding that this claim failed under Strickland and AEDPA standards. The trial evidence was substantial, including eyewitness testimony from Sanders, a confession from Brooks, and Andrews's palm prints near the victim's body, leading to the conclusion that further investigation would not have prejudiced Andrews’s defense. The second claim alleges ineffective assistance of counsel for not investigating or presenting evidence regarding semen found on Brandon’s body that could not be linked to Andrews. The district court found that the state court's rejection of this claim was reasonable. The evidence indicated that the semen contained biological markers that some individuals have, and while Andrews does not secrete these markers, it remains unclear if Brandon was a secretor. Andrews presented statistical evidence suggesting Brandon was likely not a secretor, but it was inconclusive, and even expert testimony acknowledged the challenges to this evidence. Given the strong eyewitness accounts and Andrews’s palm prints at the crime scene, the state court's conclusion that any shortcomings by defense counsel were non-prejudicial is deemed reasonable by jurists. Andrews also raises two additional claims concerning the fingerprint evidence from Wheeler’s apartment. Two fingerprint experts, Howard Sanshuck and Donald Keir, testified at Andrews's trial, comparing 50 fingerprints from Wheeler’s apartment to Andrews’s prints. They concluded that palm prints found on the kitchen floor near Brandon’s body belonged to Andrews. Initially, these prints were misidentified as belonging to Wheeler by Sanshuck’s supervisor, Jimmy Cassel, who later acknowledged this error and confirmed that there was no similarity between Wheeler’s prints and those found at the crime scene. All three experts testified that the palm prints matched Andrews’s. Andrews did not present evidence to challenge this finding. On appeal, Andrews argued that his counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate two defenses: (1) that his fingerprints could be explained by prior visits to Wheeler’s apartment, and (2) the original misidentification of his palm prints. He referenced reports suggesting that misidentifications occurred with other analysts, but the district court found no merit in this claim, noting that the evidence of Andrews’s palm prints was unchallenged and that reasonable jurists would not dispute the state court's conclusion regarding counsel's performance. Additionally, Andrews claimed ineffective assistance for not investigating his alibi on the night of the murder. He provided a defense investigator with names of two potential alibi witnesses but did not submit affidavits or detailed information about their expected testimony. Both the state court and district court dismissed this claim, emphasizing the strong evidence against Andrews and the lack of supporting evidence from the alibi witnesses. Andrews cited United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, asserting he could prove ineffective assistance without showing how his alibi witnesses would testify, but the district court rejected this argument, agreeing with the state court's application of Strickland standards. Valenzuela-Bernal established that a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process is not violated when the government deports potential alibi witnesses unless the defendant demonstrates how their testimony would have been materially favorable. This ruling does not directly address whether a failure to pursue such witnesses constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel, and the state court's rejection of Andrews's claim was a reasonable application of this precedent. The state court found that Andrews failed to show a substantial likelihood of a different outcome due to the overwhelming evidence against him. Andrews also argued that the state violated his Brady rights by not disclosing evidence favorable to his defense. To prove a Brady violation, a defendant must show that the evidence is favorable, suppressed, and that its disclosure would likely have changed the case outcome. Andrews claimed the prosecution withheld a "murder book" from the Los Angeles Police Department that contained evidence of third-party culpability and fingerprint evidence. However, the state court reasonably concluded that this evidence was not suppressed, as the defense had access to a police investigation chronology that referenced much of the allegedly withheld material. The district court affirmed the state court's conclusion, citing that no reasonable jurist could disagree with the determination that the evidence was not suppressed under Brady. The state court reasonably concluded that the outcome of the proceeding would not have changed had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, thus supporting the district court's rejection of Andrews's second Brady claim regarding the prosecution's alleged withholding of welfare fraud charges against Brooks. Defense counsel was aware of the investigation and questioned Brooks about it during the trial. Andrews raised claims under Napue, asserting that the state knowingly presented false testimony from fingerprint experts Keir and Sanshuck. He argued that Keir's report contradicted his trial testimony about palm prints and that Sanshuck provided false information regarding police procedures for photographing prints, which allegedly conflicted with the Los Angeles Police Department Homicide Manual. The state contended that no false testimony was provided, as Keir's report pertained to fingerprints, not palm prints, and the manual's language was permissive. The district court dismissed Andrews's Napue claims, with no reasonable jurist likely to disagree with the state court's factual determinations. Furthermore, Andrews claimed that the destruction of biological evidence between 1993 and 1995 violated his due process rights under Trombetta and Arizona v. Youngblood, but such a claim requires proof of government bad faith, which he did not establish. The Supreme Court has established that pre-conviction access to evidence cases, such as Trombetta and Youngblood, do not apply to post-conviction scenarios. In Andrews v. Davis, the California Supreme Court's application of these precedents was deemed reasonable. Andrews argues that the destruction of evidence violated his due process and Eighth Amendment rights, citing Osborne; however, since Osborne was decided after the California Supreme Court’s ruling, it does not qualify as clearly established precedent under 2254(d)(1). Andrews failed to present any established precedent supporting his claim at the time of the state court's decision, leading the district court to reject his claim without debate among reasonable jurists. Additionally, Andrews claims the destruction of evidence hindered his access to the courts to prove his factual innocence. The district court found no Supreme Court precedent supporting this assertion, particularly distinguishing it from Christopher v. Harbury, which did not establish a constitutional access claim. The court concluded that no reasonable jurist could dispute its decision to reject this claim. Regarding Andrews’s cumulative error claim, the fundamental issue is whether the errors had a substantial impact on the jury's verdict. The district court determined that the California Supreme Court reasonably found that any errors did not significantly weaken Andrews’s defense, which primarily attacked witness credibility and evidence integrity. Consequently, the court ruled that the cumulative errors did not warrant a certificate of appealability (COA). Moreover, Andrews’s claim of factual innocence was also deemed insufficient, as the evidence presented did not meet the extraordinarily high standard required for such claims. Thus, this claim also did not merit a COA. Andrews's request for a Certificate of Appealability (COA) is denied because the district court's conclusions are not debatable among reasonable jurists, failing to show a substantial constitutional rights denial. He asserts the district court wrongfully denied an evidentiary hearing on 16 claims, which include all but one of the claims on appeal. The denial of such hearings is reviewed for abuse of discretion, and the district court's decision may be affirmed on any supported ground. The Supreme Court’s ruling in Pinholster limits review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) to the state court record, making evidentiary hearings unnecessary if habeas relief is precluded. Since Andrews did not prove that the state court's adjudication was contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law, his petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied. The district court's denial of the evidentiary hearing is upheld, leading to a partial reversal of the lower court's relief grant, dismissal of the Eighth Amendment lethal injection claim as unripe, and denial of the COA for uncertified claims. In dissent, Circuit Judge Murguia argues that the district court should have granted relief due to ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase of Andrews's trial, highlighting severe mitigating evidence of past abuse that was not presented. This lack of consideration for such significant evidence, which could have influenced a juror to show mercy, raises concerns about the fairness of the proceedings, pointing to the importance of the Strickland standard in assessing counsel effectiveness under AEDPA. The California Supreme Court's conclusion regarding counsel's performance as neither deficient nor prejudicial is asserted to be unreasonable under the established legal standards set forth in Strickland. Consequently, the text argues for conditional sentencing relief under the AEDPA. I. Andrews, who was sent to the Alabama Industrial School for Negro Children (Mt. Meigs) in the mid-1960s for car theft at the age of 14, had no prior violent criminal history. The conditions at Mt. Meigs were described as horrific by the presiding California judge, who noted that Andrews suffered beatings, brutality, and abuse from older boys due to his small stature and passive demeanor. The California Supreme Court acknowledged the "appalling" conditions Andrews experienced at Mt. Meigs. Testimonies during the state court evidentiary hearing corroborated claims of abuse, with a federal judge characterizing Mt. Meigs as a "penal colony" denying basic human rights to African-American children. A former state probation officer likened it to a "slave camp," reporting that children faced severe beatings for minor infractions and that violence and sexual assault were rampant. The probation officer stated that children left the facility in a worse state than when they arrived and described Mt. Meigs as the worst juvenile facility he had encountered. Despite its designation as a school, Mt. Meigs provided minimal education or rehabilitation programs. In 1971, an Alabama district court mandated reforms after identifying rampant corporal punishment, highlighting the institution's disregard for children's safety, which constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. The state court record contains detailed accounts of the abuse Andrews endured, including severe beatings for failing to meet work expectations. Andrews and other wards at Mt. Meigs were subjected to severe abuse, including being forced to expose themselves and endure whipping while in degrading positions. During state court proceedings, the judge found the evidence of such abuse compelling, yet this information was not presented to the jury that sentenced Andrews to death. The California Supreme Court ruled that Andrews's counsel was not ineffective and that even if counsel had been, the outcome would not have changed. This ruling was deemed fundamentally unreasonable, as it disregarded the necessity of considering a defendant's life history as part of the death penalty process, citing Eddings v. Oklahoma and Woodson v. North Carolina. The Mt. Meigs evidence was significant and non-cumulative, readily available, and essential for understanding Andrews's moral culpability, which the jury could not accurately assess without it. The failure of counsel to present mitigating evidence undermined confidence in the sentencing outcome. Although federal courts typically defer to state court decisions under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), relief is warranted if a state court identifies the correct legal principles but applies them unreasonably. The California Supreme Court unreasonably concluded that Andrews's counsel provided adequate performance during sentencing. Counsel failed to conduct a thorough investigation into Andrews's background, did not present any witnesses, and made no serious effort to uncover mitigating evidence, which cannot be justified as a tactical decision. The lawyers' penalty phase investigation for Andrews consisted of three main activities: 1. **Record Retrieval**: They spent one day at the Mobile courthouse obtaining records of Andrews's prior convictions. Initially claiming a three-day investigation in Alabama, one lawyer retracted this after evidence showed they were mostly in New Orleans, coinciding with Mardi Gras celebrations, which had no relevance to the case. 2. **Limited Interviews**: After a hung jury in Andrews's first trial, they interviewed his mother during a layover at Pensacola airport. This interview lacked depth as they failed to gather detailed background information or contact details of other relatives or acquaintances who could provide insights into Andrews’s history. 3. **Ineffective Evidence Search**: The lawyers claimed to have sought evidence of Andrews’s character during their trips to Mobile but did not interview anyone, nor did they investigate Andrews’s institutional background. Additionally, the defense investigators focused solely on the guilt phase and were not tasked with exploring Andrews's background for the penalty phase. The California Supreme Court's referee described the lawyers' efforts to gather mitigating evidence as “limited,” a characterization deemed understated given the circumstances. The court later excused the inadequate investigation based on several flawed rationales, including Andrews's refusal to involve his family, the assertion that he did not disclose mistreatment at Mt. Meigs, concerns about potential negative implications of the evidence, and the claim that their limited investigation was part of a reasonable strategy. However, none of these justifications convincingly defended the failure to conduct a basic investigation into Andrews’s life history. The court recognized that while Andrews chose not to involve his family, attorneys are not obliged to disregard potentially mitigating evidence at a defendant’s request. Counsel's failure to present evidence related to Mt. Meigs cannot be justified by Andrews’s reluctance to involve his family, as such evidence could have been introduced through public records and expert testimony. The state court's reasoning is deemed unreasonable because Andrews's trial attorney testified that Andrews did not impose restrictions on the investigation, except for family involvement. The state court judge found no barriers to calling non-family witnesses. Furthermore, the California Supreme Court incorrectly attributed to Andrews a failure to inform his counsel about the harsh conditions he experienced at Mt. Meigs. While Andrews had been incarcerated in Alabama, there is no evidence that his attorneys inquired about his experiences there, nor is there evidence that he would have refused to discuss them had he been asked. Consequently, it was unreasonable for the California Supreme Court to place the onus on Andrews to provide mitigation information for his penalty phase. Established Supreme Court law emphasizes that legal strategy is the responsibility of counsel, who should investigate a defendant's background thoroughly. The dissent argues that while the majority claims it is not conducting a de novo review, it is still essential to assess the reasonableness of the state court's findings based on the record. Engaging in federal habeas review allows consideration of state court dissenting opinions to assess the reasonableness of a state court majority's findings based on the entire record. Under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(2), federal habeas relief is warranted if a state court's decision is based on an unreasonable factual determination. The California Supreme Court deemed it reasonable for counsel not to present evidence from Mt. Meigs, suggesting it would rely on testimonies from prisoners with serious criminal backgrounds. However, the Mt. Meigs evidence included testimonies from credible witnesses such as a federal district judge, a priest, and a clinical psychologist, contradicting the court's rationale. The dissenting opinion from the California Supreme Court accurately detailed additional mitigating evidence related to both childhood and adult abuse, emphasizing that counsel's failure to investigate the Mt. Meigs evidence constituted deficient performance. The California Supreme Court acknowledged that counsel could have performed a more thorough background investigation but concluded that the strategy employed was adequate, despite lacking meaningful preliminary investigation into Andrews’s social history. Counsel for Andrews argued for a life sentence by portraying him as a follower and highlighting that others who committed more severe crimes received lesser sentences. However, the California Supreme Court found this strategy unreasonable, stating it was unsupported by trial evidence, which indicated Andrews was the instigator of the crimes, not a follower. The court criticized counsel for failing to conduct a reasonable investigation into Andrews's background, which would have revealed mitigating evidence. Citing Strickland v. Washington, the court emphasized that a failure to investigate precludes the justification of tactical decisions. The court also found the reliance on Burger v. Kemp as precedent unreasonable, noting that in Burger, defense counsel had conducted a thorough mitigation investigation, unlike Andrews's attorneys, who did not perform any meaningful inquiry into Andrews's history. This lack of investigation hindered their ability to make informed strategic decisions regarding the penalty phase of the trial. Counsel's portrayal of Burger as a follower was justified by trial evidence, which indicated that co-defendant Stevens was primarily responsible for the kidnapping and murder plan. In contrast, Andrews was the main actor in his case, making the California Supreme Court's comparison to Burger flawed. The court unreasonably applied legal standards by referencing Bell v. Cone to justify the lack of background evidence presented by Andrews's counsel, who dismissed Andrews's upbringing as unimpressive. However, Andrews's experience at Mt. Meigs was far from typical, and neglecting this context was a misapplication of Supreme Court law. Additionally, the California Supreme Court claimed that not presenting the Mt. Meigs evidence was strategic to avoid introducing Andrews's prior violent acts. This reasoning is contested, as the prosecutor indicated that such evidence would likely not have prompted rebuttal witnesses, and California courts typically do not allow prior offense evidence to counter childhood abuse claims. The jury was already aware of Andrews's violent nature due to his current convictions and prior stipulated convictions, including murder and robbery, which were presented as aggravating factors. Additional evidence of Andrews's past violent crimes would not have significantly changed the jury's perception, as they already viewed him as aggressive and desensitized to violence. The California Supreme Court's ruling was deemed unreasonable under Strickland, which suggests that it is reasonable for counsel to avoid presenting mitigating evidence that could have adverse effects, such as introducing prior convictions that had been excluded. The former prosecutor indicated he likely would not have introduced rebuttal evidence, contradicting the referee and the California Supreme Court's speculation on the matter. The discussion compares this case to precedents like Darden v. Wainwright and Rompilla v. Beard, highlighting that when a jury is aware of prior convictions, failing to present mitigating evidence is considered ineffective counsel. There was an obligation for counsel to investigate Andrews's background to uncover available mitigating evidence. Ultimately, there were no valid tactical reasons for counsel's failure to investigate or present the significant mitigating evidence related to Andrews’s background. Competent legal counsel would have recognized that the Mt. Meigs evidence was the only significant evidence that could have led to a different sentence for Andrews. This evidence was crucial as it could have prompted the jury to show mercy despite Andrews's serious crimes. A competent attorney would have presented this evidence, highlighted Andrews's abusive upbringing, and urged jurors to consider sparing his life based on these mitigating factors. The California Supreme Court acknowledged the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in *Williams*, which granted habeas relief due to counsel's failure to present critical mitigating evidence during the penalty phase. However, the California Supreme Court distinguished *Williams* by asserting that in that case, counsel's inadequate investigation stemmed from a misunderstanding of the law. Moreover, the California Supreme Court suggested there was "no compelling connection" between the unpresented mitigating evidence and Andrews's crimes, a stance that contradicts Supreme Court precedent, which allows for any relevant mitigating evidence to be considered. In *Wiggins*, the Supreme Court emphasized that failing to uncover and present significant mitigating evidence at sentencing cannot be justified as a tactical decision, as thorough investigation into a defendant's background is essential. The California Supreme Court's determination that Andrews's counsel performed adequately was therefore an unreasonable application of established federal law. Under the second prong of the Strickland test, the California Supreme Court ruled that even if Andrews's counsel was deficient, Andrews did not suffer prejudice from the omission of the Mt. Meigs evidence. This conclusion was also found to be an unreasonable application of Strickland, which states that a capital defendant suffers prejudice if there is a reasonable probability that, absent counsel's errors, at least one juror would have opted for a life sentence instead of death. The standard for determining prejudice is whether there is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome, rather than a likelihood that the result would have been different. In reviewing a habeas petition under AEDPA, a federal court must determine if a state court's conclusion regarding a petitioner’s lack of prejudice was not only erroneous but also contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law established by the Supreme Court, as outlined in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The California Supreme Court found no reasonable probability that a life sentence would have been given even if mitigating evidence about Andrews's background had been presented. This analysis challenges the conclusion, arguing it represents an unreasonable application of established federal law, which mandates that a defendant's life history is crucial when determining the death penalty (Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112). The abuse Andrews experienced at Mt. Meigs exemplifies the significant background factors relevant to moral culpability, as noted in Supreme Court precedents (Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510). The absence of this evidence at sentencing prevented a fair assessment of Andrews’s moral culpability, failing to meet the benchmark established in Strickland v. Washington regarding ineffective assistance of counsel. Consequently, the counsel’s failure to present evidence of Andrews’s severe abuse compromised the integrity of the sentencing process, making the death sentence unreliable. The California Supreme Court's assertion that no reasonable juror would have opted for life over death had the Mt. Meigs evidence been available is deemed unreasonable. Additionally, while the majority references precedent suggesting weak aggravating evidence in the presence of strong mitigating evidence can lead to a different verdict, it is noted that no prior Supreme Court decision has justified the omission of available compelling mitigation evidence. Thus, the cases of Williams and Porter are highlighted as particularly relevant to this evaluation. The Supreme Court in Williams determined that a reasonable probability existed for a different sentencing outcome if the defendant's "nightmarish childhood" or diminished intellectual capacity had been presented as mitigating evidence. In contrast to Andrews's case, Williams's counsel did provide some mitigating evidence, including testimonies from neighbors and family, and a psychiatrist’s statement. The aggravating factors against Williams were severe, including testimony from expert witnesses predicting a high risk of continued violence, and evidence of subsequent violent crimes he committed after the murder. Despite these aggravating circumstances, the Court found that Williams was prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to introduce undiscovered mitigating evidence, emphasizing that the nature of his childhood could have significantly influenced the jury's view of his moral culpability. The ruling underscores that the California Supreme Court erred in concluding Andrews was not prejudiced by similar omissions regarding his traumatic upbringing, which involved severe abuse corroborated by credible sources. The comparison of the total evidence in aggravation in both cases suggests that Andrews’s situation presented comparable levels of mitigating factors that were overlooked, further supported by the precedent set in Porter. The Supreme Court's decision in Porter is significant for evaluating prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), particularly in relation to the ineffective assistance claim denied by the California Supreme Court in Andrews's case. While the Porter ruling came after the California court's decision, it remains pertinent as it addresses the unreasonable determination of prejudice under the Strickland standard. The Court emphasized that in cases like Williams, where omitted mitigating evidence could potentially alter a jury's perception of a defendant’s moral culpability, such evidence is critical. Porter highlighted that counsel's failure to investigate the defendant's background—specifically, his childhood abuse and military service—was prejudicial, undermining confidence in the sentencing outcome. The Court found the Florida Supreme Court's conclusion that Porter was not prejudiced by this omission to be unreasonable. The analysis in Porter provides guidance on what constitutes an unreasonable application of the prejudice prong of Strickland under AEDPA, indicating that the relevant inquiry is whether the jury could have returned a different verdict had they been presented with the omitted evidence. The majority opinion acknowledges the relevance of Porter in this context, despite arguments that other cases, such as Rompilla, do not directly inform the specific issue at hand regarding counsel's deficiency and its prejudicial impact. Rompilla establishes that the Strickland test for determining prejudice does not hinge on whether a jury could still impose a death sentence if mitigating evidence had been presented. A defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that, absent counsel's deficiencies, the outcome would have been different. The Supreme Court's decision in Porter illustrates that even with significant aggravating evidence, it can be unreasonable for a state court to find no prejudice from the lack of mitigating evidence, as seen in Porter’s case involving two murders. Similarly, in Andrews's situation, although strong aggravating factors exist, the powerful evidence of childhood abuse suggests a reasonable probability that the sentencing outcome would differ had this evidence been presented. The majority opinion, which cites Woodford v. Visciotti, incorrectly asserts that Andrews suffered no prejudice, as the mitigating evidence in Andrews's case, particularly regarding severe abuse, is much more compelling than the psychological abuse evidence in Visciotti. The majority’s view that the Mt. Meigs evidence only suggests a "mere possibility" of a different outcome fails to recognize its substantial mitigating impact. Additionally, the California Supreme Court’s reasoning that the Mt. Meigs evidence might be "double-edged" does not adequately address the strong mitigating nature of Andrews's experiences compared to other cases. Evidence regarding Andrews's past, specifically the severe abuse he endured at Mt. Meigs, was not presented during his sentencing. This omission is critical because the jury was unaware of the factors that could explain his violent behavior and potentially elicit mercy. The California Supreme Court acknowledged the horrific conditions Andrews faced, noting that had the jury been informed of these circumstances, it is likely that at least one juror would have been persuaded to spare his life. The defense's failure to present any sympathetic mitigating evidence, including eyewitness accounts or expert testimony, compounded the prejudice against Andrews. As established in Strickland, the lack of adequate representation can have a significant impact on the case's outcome. The dissent argues that it is unreasonable to conclude that the absence of this mitigating evidence did not influence the jury's decision, and therefore, the district court's decision to grant sentencing relief should be upheld.