Rey Garza v. Roxana Regalado Harrison and Joseph Santellana, Individually and as Respresentative of the Estate of Jonathen Anthony Santellana

Citation: 531 S.W.3d 852Docket: 14-16-00615-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; July 25, 2017; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order on July 25, 2017, denying Rey Garza's motion to dismiss an interlocutory appeal. Garza, a police officer employed by the City of Navasota, was involved in a shooting incident while off duty in Harris County. The key issue was whether Garza was acting within the scope of his employment when he fatally shot suspect Jonathen Santellana during an attempted arrest.

Garza had entered into a private agreement to serve as a 'courtesy officer' at an apartment complex in Harris County, which included signing a policy explicitly stating that courtesy officers do not have the same duties or powers as police officers and should not pursue suspects. The policy required such officers to call local law enforcement instead of intervening directly. Garza acknowledged that while acting in this role, he was not acting as an active police officer.

On November 13, 2013, while off duty, Garza observed Santellana behaving suspiciously outside the apartment complex and suspected drug activity. After arming himself, Garza confronted Santellana, who ignored Garza's commands and attempted to start his vehicle. Garza's actions did not align with his responsibilities as a courtesy officer, leading the court to conclude that he was not performing a duty lawfully assigned to him by his employer at the time of the incident.

Santellana reversed his car, inadvertently trapping Garza between his vehicle and an open door. As Santellana's car scraped Garza's vehicle, Garza, fearing for his life, fired seven shots into Santellana’s car, resulting in Santellana’s death. Subsequently, Santellana’s parents sued Garza for wrongful death. Garza filed a motion to dismiss under section 101.106(f) of the Texas Tort Claims Act, claiming his actions were within the scope of his employment as a police officer and that the City of Navasota should be the defendant. The trial court denied his motion, stating there was a factual question regarding whether Garza was acting in his official capacity. Garza appealed this interlocutory order, arguing that the trial court erred by not dismissing the case, asserting that the election-of-remedies provision should apply since the suit could have been brought against his employer. The Texas Tort Claims Act's election-of-remedies provision requires plaintiffs to choose whether to sue an employee individually or the governmental entity, and if the latter is possible, the employee's suit must be dismissed unless amended pleadings are filed.

An individual defendant can secure dismissal of a lawsuit if it is shown that the plaintiff's claims arise from actions taken within the defendant's employment scope with a governmental unit and could have been pursued against that unit under the Texas Tort Claims Act. In this case, there is agreement that the City of Navasota is a governmental unit that employed Garza, and the claims could have been brought against it. The primary dispute is whether Garza acted within the scope of his employment when he fatally shot Santellana during an attempted arrest.

The Texas Tort Claims Act defines 'scope of employment' as actions performed in fulfilling an employee's official duties, including tasks lawfully assigned by competent authority. The Texas Supreme Court clarifies that an act falls outside the scope of employment if it results from an independent course of conduct not intended to serve the employer's interests. Assessing whether an employee was acting within this scope is an objective inquiry focused on the connection between the employee's job duties and the alleged misconduct, irrespective of the employee's intent or mental state.

Although Garza was off-duty at the time of the shooting, he argues that his investigation and arrest attempts relate to his customary duties as a police officer. Conversely, the appellees assert that he was acting solely as a courtesy patrol officer, thus outside the scope of his employment. The court determined that the trial court properly denied Garza's dismissal motion, focusing on whether Garza was executing a duty of his employment or a task he was authorized to perform. The distinction between authority to act and duty to act is critical, as having the authority does not automatically impose a duty. As previously established, a peace officer's authority is limited to their jurisdiction, and they cannot perform official duties outside that jurisdiction.

A peace officer's jurisdiction is defined by common law unless specified by statute, typically limited to city limits for city police officers. However, statutes have expanded their authority for warrantless arrests outside their jurisdiction under certain conditions, such as witnessing a felony or specific offenses. Notably, article 14.03(d) allows arrests for felonies and breaches of the peace, while article 14.03(g)(2) permits arrests for any offense if witnessed, with limitations for traffic violations to the officer's municipality. These statutes grant authority but do not create a duty to act. The determination of whether an officer's actions are within the scope of employment hinges on the assigned duties by their governmental employer, not merely on statutory authority. In the case of Garza, while he had statutory authority to investigate and attempt an arrest outside his jurisdiction, he was not performing a duty assigned by the City of Navasota. His actions, including the attempted arrest and subsequent shooting in another county, were beyond his assigned duties, indicating they fell outside the scope of his employment with the City of Navasota.

Garza asserts that his actions were within the scope of his employment as a police officer for the City of Navasota, arguing that an off-duty officer can act in an official capacity upon witnessing a crime and that engaging in an arrest is part of an officer’s duties. However, the court distinguishes this case due to Garza’s actions occurring outside his jurisdiction and the lack of a duty to arrest Santellana. While generally, an officer's actions to enforce the law fall within their employment scope, Garza's situation deviates because he was off-duty as a 'courtesy officer' and had not observed any crime initially. His decision to retrieve a firearm and confront Santellana, who was later found with marijuana, was deemed outside the scope of his employment, leading to the conclusion that he does not have immunity under section 101.106(f). The court affirmed the trial court's denial of Garza's motion to dismiss, emphasizing that immunity depends on specific circumstances and the officer's duty to act, which was not established in this case.