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Commonwealth v. Muniz, J., Aplt.
Citations: 164 A.3d 1189; 2017 WL 3166928; 2017 Pa. LEXIS 1682Docket: Commonwealth v. Muniz, J., Aplt. - No. 47 MAP 2016
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania; July 19, 2017; Pennsylvania; State Supreme Court
Original Court Document: View Document
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case of Jose M. Muniz, who challenged the retroactive application of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) following his conviction for indecent assault in 2007. The appeal stemmed from the Superior Court's ruling that SORNA's registration provisions were not punitive, thus not violating the ex post facto clauses of the U.S. and Pennsylvania Constitutions. The Supreme Court reversed this decision, concluding that SORNA’s registration requirements do constitute punishment, even though the General Assembly labeled them as nonpunitive. Consequently, the court held that applying SORNA retroactively to Muniz violated both the federal and Pennsylvania ex post facto clauses. Muniz, originally facing a ten-year registration requirement under the now-expired Megan’s Law III, was instead subjected to a lifetime registration obligation under SORNA after his sentencing in 2014, following his apprehension after absconding. His post-sentence motion to apply the original ten-year requirement was denied, leading to this appeal. The court's decision was announced by Justice Dougherty, with Justices Baer and Donohue fully joining the opinion, while Justices Todd and Wecht concurred in part. Chief Justice Saylor dissented. In Commonwealth v. Muniz, the Pennsylvania Superior Court referenced its decision in Commonwealth v. Perez, affirming that the new registration requirements under SORNA do not violate the Federal and State Ex Post Facto Clauses. The court noted that the appellant waived his claim regarding the reputation clause by not including it in his post-sentence motion. The appellant appealed, questioning the retroactive application of SORNA’s provisions under 42 Pa.C.S. 9799.14, asserting that it unconstitutionally extends registration and notification requirements for sex offenders, which he argues constitutes punishment despite the General Assembly’s declaration to the contrary. He contends that this retroactive application violates both federal and state constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws, claiming greater protections under the Pennsylvania Constitution. In response, the Commonwealth cited the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Smith v. Doe and the factors from Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez to argue that SORNA is not punitive, emphasizing its purpose of addressing recidivism among sex offenders. The Defender Association of Philadelphia and other organizations filed amicus curiae briefs supporting the appellant, challenging the efficacy of sex offender registration. Conversely, the Pennsylvania District Attorneys Association supported the Commonwealth. The court acknowledged the waiver of the reputation clause argument, as it was not presented in the appellant’s post-sentence motion, in accordance with procedural rules. Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be introduced for the first time on appeal. The appellant does, however, address reputation-based concerns in relation to Pennsylvania’s ex post facto clause and asserts that it may offer greater protections than the federal version. Similar arguments regarding reputation were previously presented in the appellant's Edmunds analysis before the Superior Court. Reputation-based concerns are considered solely in the context of the appellant's claim that the provisions of SORNA constitute punishment, thereby violating Pennsylvania’s ex post facto clause. The case involves questions of law, allowing for a plenary review of the lower courts’ legal determinations. The general purpose of ex post facto prohibitions is to prevent arbitrary or vindictive legislation, a principle established post-American Revolution. Ex post facto clauses also ensure individuals receive fair warning about criminal conduct and associated punishments. The U.S. Supreme Court has emphasized that the Ex Post Facto Clause protects against a lack of fair notice when punishment is increased after the fact. Chief Justice Chase identified four categories of laws that violate ex post facto prohibitions: (1) laws criminalizing actions that were innocent when committed; (2) laws that aggravate crimes; (3) laws that increase punishment beyond what was applicable at the time of the offense; and (4) laws altering evidentiary rules to convict offenders differently. To classify a criminal law as ex post facto, it must be retrospective, applying to events before its enactment, and disadvantage the offender. Only laws that meet these criteria and fall within the established categories are considered ex post facto and therefore unconstitutional. In this case, if SORNA's registration requirements are deemed punitive, it would fall under the third category of Calder, indicating that its application would impose greater punishment on the appellant than was applicable at the time of his offenses. In Commonwealth v. Williams, 832 A.2d 962 (Pa. 2003), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court detailed the evolution of the state's sex offender registration laws, beginning with the 1995 enactment of Megan’s Law I, which established the "Registration of Sexual Offenders" and included a process for designating certain offenders as "sexually violent predators." This law mandated a pre-sentence assessment and a trial court hearing, wherein the offender was presumed to be a sexually violent predator and had the burden of proof to rebut this presumption. An adjudication as such resulted in an enhanced maximum sentence of life imprisonment and more stringent registration and community notification requirements. In the earlier case, Commonwealth v. Williams, 733 A.2d 593 (Pa. 1999), the court invalidated the sexually violent predator provisions of Megan’s Law I, ruling that the designation constituted a separate factual determination that effectively increased the offender's punishment beyond the statutory maximum. Following this ruling, the General Assembly enacted Megan’s Law II on May 10, 2000, which modified the adjudication process for sexually violent predators by eliminating the presumption of predator status and the automatic increase in maximum imprisonment. Instead, Megan’s Law II established lifetime registration, notification, and counseling for offenders, with penalties for non-compliance including probation or imprisonment. Offenders must register their residence with state police upon release or changes in status and notify police of any changes within ten days. Police then disseminate this information to local law enforcement, neighbors, day care operators, and school officials. Data pertaining to sexually violent predators is disseminated to specified recipients, including the offender's name, address, offense, photograph (if available), and court determination status regarding their classification as a sexually violent predator. This information is also shared with the victim until they request cessation of notifications. Upon release and any address changes, sexually violent predators are required to periodically verify their address with state police, who send a verification form quarterly. Offenders must submit the completed form and have their photograph taken at a police station within ten days of receipt. Additionally, they must attend monthly counseling sessions in an approved program and bear the costs unless they are unable to pay, in which case fees are covered by the parole office. Compliance is monitored by the Board and must be verified with the state police. Megan's Law II underwent modifications with the enactment of Act 152 of 2004, known as Megan’s Law III, which included several significant changes: a two-year limitation for asbestos actions, new criminal offenses for non-compliance with registration, amendments to the Sexual Offenders Registration provisions, inclusion of additional offenses requiring registration, establishment of a searchable database of registered offenders, adjustments to the Sexual Offenders Assessment Board's duties, conditions for exempting certain registrants from the database after 20 years, mandatory registration and community notification for sexually violent predators, and local notification requirements for common interest communities. It also granted immunity to associations for sharing information from the database, required the publication of registration site information, and mandated annual performance audits by the Attorney General on agencies involved in Megan’s Law administration. Megan’s Law III was ultimately superseded by SORNA. In Smith v. Doe, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the registration requirements of Alaska’s Sex Offender Registration Act (the Act) do not constitute retroactive punishment under the federal ex post facto clause, even for individuals convicted and released before the Act's enactment. The Act mandates that sex offenders register with authorities upon release or entry into Alaska, detailing personal information, including name, address, and conviction history. Offenders must verify their information annually for 15 years if convicted of a non-aggravated offense, or quarterly for life if convicted of aggravated offenses or multiple offenses. Non-compliance leads to criminal prosecution. The Act includes a public registry with certain confidential information, while most non-confidential details are accessible online. The Court highlighted the need to determine if the statute is intended as a civil regulatory measure rather than punitive, referencing established criteria for such assessments. Legislative intent is typically upheld unless there is clear evidence to classify a civil remedy as a criminal penalty. In evaluating Alaska's statute concerning sex offenders, the Court identified that the legislature aimed to establish a civil, nonpunitive framework, primarily focused on public protection from high-risk offenders. The statute’s notification provisions were located within the health, safety, and housing code, while registration provisions were in the criminal procedure code, though neither alone determined the statute's classification. The Court determined that the Act lacked criminal procedural safeguards, indicating a civil and administrative implementation. The analysis utilized the Mendoza-Martinez factors to assess whether the statute was punitive in effect, comparing it to historical punishments and considering aspects like affirmative disabilities, promotion of traditional punishment aims, and the nature of the behaviors it addresses. The notification provisions were distinguished from colonial shaming punishments, as they involved only the dissemination of public information without physical restraint or community shaming. The Act did not hinder employment opportunities beyond existing criminal record checks, and offenders retained freedom of movement and lifestyle comparable to other citizens, leading the Court to conclude that the Alaska statute intended civil rather than criminal sanctions. Offenders are required to inform authorities of changes to their registration information but do not need prior permission for such changes. The State of Alaska acknowledged that its registration statute could deter future crimes, yet the Smith Court ruled that this deterrent purpose alone does not classify the law as punitive, as it would hinder effective governmental regulation. The registration provisions were determined not to be retributive since the reporting duration is based on the crime committed, not the offender's risk level. The Court found the broad registration categories and reporting requirements to be reasonably related to recidivism risks, aligning with the law's regulatory goals. The Act’s connection to a nonpunitive purpose was deemed significant, with both the lower court and Doe recognizing public safety as a valid rationale. The Court noted that while the Act may not perfectly fit its public safety aim, this does not inherently make it punitive. The registration requirements were seen as minor and provided the public with access to accurate offender information. The Court deemed the online dissemination of this information not excessive, noting that it required individuals to actively seek it out and included warnings against misuse. It found two factors—scienter and whether the behavior was already a crime—of little significance since the Act addressed past criminal conduct, essential for targeting recidivism. The Smith Court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the Alaska statute's effects negated the legislature's intent for a civil scheme, affirming that the Act is nonpunitive and its retroactive application does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. In Williams II, the court evaluated whether the requirements of Megan’s Law II for sexually violent predators constituted criminal punishment that would violate due process rights. Analyzing the statute under a two-pronged inquiry similar to Smith, the Williams II Court found that the statute's purpose was clearly non-punitive, aimed at identifying and preventing recidivism to enhance public safety through a civil regulatory framework. The Court further examined Mendoza-Martinez factors to assess if the statute's sanctions were excessively punitive, thereby transforming a civil remedy into a criminal penalty. The Court determined that the registration requirements of Megan’s Law II do not impose a direct deprivation on sexually violent predators, as they maintain freedom to choose their residence, movement, and employment. It was held that the requirements are not excessively burdensome to constitute an affirmative disability or restraint. The notification provisions of Megan’s Law II were found not to equate to public shaming but rather serve a protective purpose by informing the public about potentially dangerous individuals. The Court noted that the applicability of the law does not solely hinge on the defendant’s knowledge of their criminal conduct, particularly in cases like child sexual abuse, where a conviction can occur despite a good faith misunderstanding regarding the victim's age. The Court also established that the registration and notification measures do not act as a deterrent due to the significant incarceration periods associated with the underlying offenses, and these measures are not retributive since they do not impose penalties such as fines or confinement. The classification of sexually violent predators under the law is based on a finding of mental abnormality, rather than solely on the nature of the criminal act. The potential for recidivism was acknowledged as a critical concern, particularly since most notification provisions are directed at the predator’s community, including neighbors and local institutions. Concerns about information dissemination on the internet were deemed unfounded, as Megan’s Law II information is only available upon request, contrasting it with New Jersey’s law that allows for online publication. The Court concluded that the information dissemination to the public serves a legitimate government interest in public safety and that the registration, verification, and counseling requirements are not excessively burdensome enough to be classified as punitive. The Court acknowledged concerns regarding the lifelong requirements imposed on sexually violent predators, noting that the legislature could mitigate claims of excessiveness by allowing for judicial review to prove reduced risk. However, the Court pointed out a lack of evidence regarding successful treatment for these predators. Consequently, the Williams II Court ruled that the registration, notification, and counseling obligations under Megan’s Law II were not punitive and did not infringe on due process rights. The General Assembly enacted SORNA in response to the federal Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, which mandates tiered registration and notification for sex offenders to avoid losing federal funding. Pennsylvania’s compliance included the expiration of previous registration requirements, effective as of December 20, 2012. SORNA's purposes are to ensure compliance with federal law, require registration for individuals convicted of specific sexual offenses residing or working in Pennsylvania, mandate registration for homeless individuals found within the state, and enforce registration for those involved in the state’s criminal justice system. The subchapter aims to align with the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 while maintaining existing procedures for the registration of sexual offenders in the Commonwealth. It establishes a public Internet platform where individuals can search for sexual offenders based on zip code or geographic radius. Law enforcement agencies within and outside the Commonwealth, including federal entities, will have access to current information about these offenders. The General Assembly highlights that Megan’s Law was enacted in 1995 to comply with federal registration requirements, which have since evolved under the Adam Walsh Act. This legislation seeks to enhance the registration process for sexual offenders in a nonpunitive manner, prioritizing public safety. The community's awareness and education regarding sexual offenders are emphasized as essential for developing preventative measures. The legislation acknowledges the high risk of recidivism among sexual offenders and supports the public's right to information to safeguard themselves and their families. It also notes that modern technology enables easier access to this information, promoting community safety and informed decision-making. The General Assembly aims to comply with the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 by enhancing regulations on sexual offenders, focusing on their registration and community notification. The Commonwealth mandates the sharing of relevant information about sexual offenders among public agencies and allows the public access to this information for safety purposes, clarifying that this is not punitive. Amendments will address the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s ruling in Commonwealth v. Neiman. Under the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), registration applies to various individuals, including those convicted of sexually violent offenses after SORNA's effective date who live, work, study, or are temporarily present in Pennsylvania, as well as certain inmates and those previously registered under Megan’s Law. Offenders are classified into three tiers, with Tier I offenders facing a 15-year registration requirement, annual verification, and in-person photography at registration sites. Specific offenses categorized as Tier I are detailed, including unlawful restraint, false imprisonment, and various sexual offenses against minors. 18 U.S.C. Sections 2423(b) and 2423(c) address the transportation of minors and engaging in illicit sexual conduct in foreign countries, respectively. Section 2424 mandates filing factual statements about alien individuals, while Section 2425 pertains to using interstate facilities to transmit information about minors. Convictions for these offenses, attempts, conspiracies, or solicitations, as well as comparable military or foreign offenses, require registration under sexual offender statutes. Under Pennsylvania's Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), individuals convicted of Tier III offenses, such as indecent assault of a victim under thirteen, must register for twenty-five years with semi-annual in-person verification. Tier III offenses include serious crimes like kidnapping, rape, and statutory sexual assault. Those convicted of Tier II offenses, which include trafficking, institutional sexual assault, and indecent assault of victims over thirteen, must register for a minimum of twenty-five years with verification every six months. Additionally, Tier II offenses include various sexual crimes outlined in 18 Pa.C.S., such as unlawful contact with minors and sexual exploitation of children. Registration periods differ between tiers, with Tier III offenders facing lifetime registration and quarterly verification. This statutory framework encompasses a broad range of sexual offenses requiring registration and monitoring under Pennsylvania law and federal statutes. 18 U.S.C. Section 2242 and Section 2244 address offenses related to sexual abuse, particularly when the victim is under 13 years of age. Offenses comparable to these under military law, other jurisdictions, or previous laws of Pennsylvania are also included. Attempts, conspiracies, or solicitations to commit any of the listed offenses are similarly addressed. There are provisions for individuals with two or more convictions of Tier I or Tier II sexual offenses. The Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) mandates the creation and maintenance of a statewide sexual offender registry by the state police. This registry collects comprehensive information from offenders, including personal identifiers, contact details, employment information, and physical descriptions, alongside data from law enforcement, such as criminal history and biometric data (photographs, fingerprints, DNA). SORNA also requires the establishment of a public internet registry, allowing users to search for offenders by geographic criteria and sign up for electronic notifications regarding any updates or changes in offender information. The Pennsylvania registry must coordinate with the national sex offender public website and be updated promptly. Offenders are obligated to register in person at designated intervals based on their offense tier and must notify authorities within three business days of any changes to their registration information, including name or address changes. They are also required to report travel plans outside of the U.S. within a specific timeframe. Homeless individuals must register monthly until they obtain a permanent residence. Non-compliance with registration and verification requirements can lead to prosecution under Pennsylvania law. The legal analysis centers on the appellant's federal ex post facto claim concerning the application of SORNA (Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act). The inquiry hinges on whether SORNA's retroactive implementation constitutes punishment under the U.S. Constitution's prohibition of ex post facto laws. The court will utilize a two-part analysis as outlined in the Supreme Court's decisions in Smith and Williams II. Initially, the focus is on the General Assembly's intent—specifically, whether it intended to impose punishment. The appellant argues that SORNA's stated purpose of public protection masks a punitive intent, as it categorizes offenders based solely on their criminal records rather than individualized assessments, as required under previous laws. Additionally, SORNA's placement within the sentencing section of Pennsylvania’s Crimes Code and its administration by the Pennsylvania State Police suggest a punitive framework, especially since noncompliance can lead to arrest. Conversely, the Commonwealth acknowledges SORNA's broader scope but asserts that its purpose remains non-punitive. It cites the explicit statutory language that states registration requirements are not punitive and argues for a straightforward interpretation of legislative intent. The court emphasizes that determining the General Assembly's intent requires careful statutory construction, considering the statute’s text and structure, while giving deference to the legislature's stated objectives. SORNA is characterized as a regulatory mechanism aimed at enhancing public safety without punitive implications. The Commonwealth aims to achieve compliance with the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 through the enactment of SORNA. The legislative intent behind SORNA is primarily to establish a civil regulatory scheme for public safety, rather than punishment, although its implementation raises concerns. Notably, SORNA applies to a wider range of offenders compared to Megan’s Law II and includes less severe offenses. It is incorporated into the sentencing section of the Crimes Code and grants regulatory authority to the state police. The General Assembly's dual intent appears to be aligning with federal regulations for funding and enhancing public safety. A key aspect of the analysis involves the Mendoza-Martinez factors to assess if SORNA's effects are punitive. The appellant argues that SORNA's requirements for frequent in-person appearances constitute punitive measures, unlike the Alaska statute referenced in Smith, which did not impose such obligations. The appellant points out the extensive reporting requirements, suggesting that even without changes in personal circumstances, he would still have to report numerous times over his lifetime. The PACDL supports this view, highlighting the direct and secondary disabilities SORNA imposes in areas like housing, employment, and social interactions, which could lead to adverse outcomes for offenders. In contrast, the Commonwealth contends that the absence of such reporting requirements in the Alaska statute was significant in Smith's ruling, arguing that SORNA's quarterly reporting should not be viewed as punitive. They cite a previous case, Commonwealth v. Woodruff, where monthly counseling was deemed nonpunitive despite being more burdensome than SORNA’s requirements. While acknowledging the Woodruff ruling, the Commonwealth posits that the Court should find SORNA's provisions nonpunitive, despite the appellant's arguments. The current analysis aligns more closely with the appellant's position regarding the punitive nature of SORNA's requirements. The distinction from the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) is significant. The appellant, classified as a Tier III offender under SORNA, is mandated to register in person at least four times a year, totaling a minimum of 100 appearances over a 25-year period, extending for life. This requirement does not include additional appearances for personal changes, such as moving or altering personal appearance. Additionally, homeless offenders must register monthly, amounting to at least 300 appearances over the same period. The argument that in-person registration is less burdensome than counseling for sexually violent predators, as established in Williams II, is dismissed since SORNA does not categorize registrants as such and does not provide counseling. Historically, the in-person reporting requirements are likened to probation and parole conditions, reflecting a reduced expectation of privacy for offenders. This contrasts with the Alaska statute in Smith, which lacked mandatory conditions akin to probation. The Pennsylvania Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (PACDL) suggests that both probation and SORNA aim to enhance public safety, necessitate supervision, and impose conditions that require regular in-person appearances, with non-compliance resulting in sanctions. PACDL also argues that SORNA aligns with shaming punishments recognized in other jurisdictions. PACDL asserts that historical shaming punishments involved public disclosure of offenders' information, paralleling SORNA's labeling of all registrants as “sex offenders” and “high risk,” which lacks a dispute mechanism. The Commonwealth counters that while SORNA registration resembles some probation terms, probation can be more burdensome than SORNA. It argues that if SORNA is deemed punitive, this should be considered minimally significant since probation is viewed as a less severe and more recent punishment form. Furthermore, the Commonwealth maintains that SORNA’s registration is not intended for public shaming, but rather for public safety awareness. PACDL references other jurisdictions labeling sex offender registration laws akin to probation. It highlights the U.S. Supreme Court's distinction between colonial public shaming and sex offender registration, noting that the latter does not involve direct public ridicule but merely disseminates information. The Smith Court acknowledged that while the publicity from registration may cause embarrassment, it is not central to the regulatory scheme's purpose. The Court also indicated that the internet's role in disseminating this information doesn't change its intent, as it is meant for public safety rather than shaming. However, it is noted that technological advancements since the Smith decision have altered the landscape, with internet access widespread and enabling prolonged exposure of registrants' information, potentially leading to ostracism and harassment without a means to demonstrate rehabilitation. A concurring opinion emphasizes that the significant dissemination of registrants' information under SORNA may outweigh governmental safety interests, suggesting that SORNA might not solely be regulatory. Additionally, while the Smith Court dismissed the similarity between Alaska’s registration and probation due to the absence of mandatory conditions, the argument gains weight concerning SORNA, which does impose such conditions, indicating a material difference between the two statutes. Analysis of the similarities between SORNA and probation highlights key points regarding the punitive nature of SORNA's requirements. The mandatory in-person verification for Tier III offenders compels frequent appearances at designated facilities, akin to probationers’ periodic meetings with probation officers. Historical context is provided, noting that probation is recognized as a traditional form of punishment, with specific imposed conditions such as psychiatric treatment and travel limitations. Similar to probation, SORNA registrants must notify authorities of any changes in residency or employment and face incarceration for noncompliance. The statute also mandates that individuals without a fixed workplace provide general travel routes, emphasizing the extensive monitoring involved. The Supreme Court's decision in Smith clarified that noncompliance with SORNA could lead to criminal prosecution, separate from the original offense, yet both probation and SORNA violations require factual determinations to establish noncompliance. The conclusion drawn from these parallels suggests that SORNA’s registration requirements are punitive, particularly when considering modern public shaming implications in the digital age. The analysis indicates that SORNA's provisions are materially different from those of the Alaska statute examined in Smith, suggesting a stronger resemblance to probation. Ultimately, the assessment of SORNA's punitive nature is reinforced, while the appellant did not contest the relevance of the scienter factor, which was deemed insignificant in previous analyses. PACDL argues that the question of scienter supports the view that SORNA is punitive, as registration follows a conviction that entails a certain mental state. They assert that, while SORNA aims to protect the public from recidivism, the necessity of considering past criminal conduct is minimal in determining the punitive nature of the statute. The appellant claims SORNA promotes traditional punitive aims of retribution and deterrence, similar to incarceration and probation, highlighting that the stigma and public disclosure of being labeled a sex offender serve as deterrents. The appellant also contends that additional penalties for failing to register are retributive and that the extent of personal information shared under SORNA could endanger offenders by facilitating harassment, going beyond mere conviction data. PACDL emphasizes that the deterrent effects of SORNA are crucial, particularly since many offenses are misdemeanors where incarceration is unlikely. They argue that registration is automatically imposed post-conviction, regardless of individual risk factors, thereby serving as retribution without consideration of public safety. The Commonwealth acknowledges SORNA's deterrent intent but argues against labeling it punitive, as this would hinder the regulation of offenders and fail to address significant concerns about recidivism. They reference studies suggesting that recidivism rates are challenging to measure, reinforcing the need for legislative action to manage the risk effectively. The Commonwealth asserts that variations in recidivism study results are due to the complexity of the area, emphasizing that courts and legislatures acknowledge recidivism as a significant issue for adult offenders. The Commonwealth urges caution regarding PACDL's opposing conclusions, particularly given the varied studies and real concerns about recidivism. There is agreement that SORNA is intended to deter, as being labeled a sex offender comes with registration and the public exposure of personal information, which serves a deterrent purpose. However, the mere presence of such a purpose does not classify the sanctions as criminal. Unlike Megan’s Law II, many offenses requiring registration under SORNA are misdemeanors or carry short maximum incarceration terms, such as interference with custody of children, which has no sexual element but still mandates 15 years of registration. The analysis recognizes that while the Supreme Court in Smith and this Court in Williams II found that sex offender laws lack a retributive purpose, the examination must consider the entire statutory scheme. Each predicate offense is relevant to determining whether SORNA is civil or punitive, underscoring that SORNA's application follows a conviction for a predicate offense. The dissemination of public records does not change the conclusion that SORNA does not impose a punitive effect. SORNA permits the release of extensive personal information about registered individuals, including names, birth years, residential addresses, educational and work locations, photographs, physical descriptions, and vehicle details, which surpasses what is typically available from public conviction data. The Williams II Court noted that while public notification and electronic dissemination of registration information were deemed necessary for public protection, it did not endorse the public display of such information online. SORNA has extended registration durations, imposed mandatory in-person reporting, and allowed for more private information to be publicly displayed, indicating a more retributive stance compared to Megan’s Law II and the Alaska statute examined in Smith. The appellant acknowledges that the classification of the statute as punitive is minimally influenced by whether the behavior it addresses is already criminal, yet suggests it supports a punitive interpretation due to the inability to waive registration for low-risk offenders. The Commonwealth argues that the precedent set by Smith minimizes the significance of this factor. Regarding the statute's purpose, the appellant concedes that SORNA has a rational connection to public safety; however, PACDL argues that SORNA is not effectively related to nonpunitive objectives, asserting that most offenders do not reoffend and that the law fosters a false sense of security while misdirecting law enforcement resources. The Commonwealth defends that SORNA aligns with public safety goals, emphasizing recidivism concerns. Amicus PDAA counters that legislative judgment should not be questioned and cites studies indicating a significant rate of recidivism among sexual offenders, while also noting that many sexual offenses go unreported. PDAA argues for legislative deference by the General Assembly concerning complex social policy issues, specifically in relation to sexual offender registration laws. Despite studies indicating that many sexual offenders do not re-offend and questioning the effectiveness of registration laws, PDAA emphasizes that the General Assembly's conclusions are persuasive and grounded in public safety interests. Legislative findings state that sexual offenders pose a high risk of re-offending, which is framed as a significant government concern. Although conflicting studies exist, PDAA notes the lack of consensus and upholds the Assembly's authority to legislate in this area, particularly in light of federal mandates aimed at public protection from sexual offenders. The discussion also contrasts SORNA's requirements with those of Megan's Law II, highlighting that SORNA imposes uniform reporting obligations on all Tier III offenders, without necessitating judicial determinations of being a sexually violent predator. This raises concerns from the appellant regarding the excessive nature of SORNA's provisions, which he claims perpetuate a presumption of high risk for re-offense. Additionally, PACDL critiques SORNA for being overly broad, encompassing minor and non-sexual offenses, and for lacking a requirement for risk assessments, which undermines its effectiveness in accurately determining risk levels among offenders. The Commonwealth argues that the appellant's claim of excessive registration requirements is unfounded, asserting that these requirements are less severe than those imposed on sexually violent predators under SORNA, who must undergo monthly counseling and are closely monitored. The Commonwealth indicates that sexually violent predators also face additional public notification and the online publication of personal details. The Williams II Court expressed concerns regarding the process of classifying individuals as sexually violent predators rather than the specific reporting conditions. The court highlighted the potential for the imprecise classification to label individuals as sexually violent predators when they do not pose the intended risk, suggesting that such over-inclusiveness could render the Act excessive. The review indicates that SORNA encompasses a wide array of offenses, including non-sexual crimes, leading to the conclusion that SORNA's requirements are excessive and over-inclusive in relation to its intended purpose of public protection. The evaluation using Mendoza-Martinez factors reveals that SORNA functions more as a punitive measure than a civil remedy, given its affirmative disabilities, historical perception as punishment, deterrent aims, and excessive registration requirements. Therefore, the retroactive application of SORNA to the appellant is found to violate the ex post facto clause of the U.S. Constitution. A state ex post facto claim is also acknowledged, with the finding that the federal violation suffices for the analysis. Standards for determining ex post facto violations under both state and federal clauses are similar, with a law violating the federal clause also deemed to breach the state clause, thus eliminating the need for separate consideration. Acknowledging a state constitutional challenge, the court granted review, allowing for extensive arguments from parties and amici. The text notes the complexities arising when decisions based solely on federal grounds are later appealed and remanded by the U.S. Supreme Court, potentially leading to state claims and subsequent uncertainty. Historical cases illustrate this, particularly concerning a nude dancing ordinance where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court initially based its decision on federal protections before later addressing state constitutional issues. The court also references a decision regarding Alaska’s sex offender registration law, which was held unconstitutional under the state ex post facto clause after a U.S. Supreme Court remand. The court indicates that its conclusion that SORNA violates the federal ex post facto clause differs from federal case law that has upheld the Adam Walsh Act. Emphasizing the importance of addressing the appellant’s state constitutional challenge, the court states that its analysis under the Pennsylvania Constitution is independent of the federal analysis. It aims to determine whether the Pennsylvania Constitution offers greater ex post facto protections, using four factors: the text of the provision, its historical context, related case law from other states, and state-specific policy considerations. Additionally, the Adam Walsh Act acknowledges potential conflicts with state constitutions, allowing for noncompliance penalties in such cases. The Attorney General must assess whether a jurisdiction has substantially implemented the relevant subchapter by considering its ability to comply without violating its constitution, as determined by the highest court's rulings. The analysis avoids the "consultation" process aimed at evaluating potential constitutional conflicts with federal legislation. Compliance with the subchapter's requirements will involve discussions with the jurisdiction’s chief executive and legal officer regarding constitutional interpretations. If compliance risks violating the state constitution, the federal statute permits the implementation of "reasonable alternative procedures or accommodations" to avoid reduced federal funding. The statute does not mandate retroactivity but allows the Attorney General to determine its applicability, including to sex offenders convicted before the statute's enactment. National guidelines require states to retroactively apply federal SORNA requirements, impacting noncompliance provisions. A jurisdiction is considered to have substantially implemented SORNA if it registers sex offenders from specific classes in line with SORNA standards, even if their convictions predate SORNA's enactment. The Pennsylvania Constitution prohibits ex post facto laws, and while its language closely mirrors the federal constitution, interpretations may differ due to their distinct placements within their respective documents. The Pennsylvania clause's location within the Declaration of Rights may suggest it offers greater protections than its federal counterpart, as these rights are regarded as inviolate against governmental infringement. The article asserts that delegated governmental powers are limited, with specific protections remaining in effect indefinitely. The appellant contends that Pennsylvania's ex post facto clause offers broader protections than its federal counterpart, referencing case law that distinguishes this state law from federal interpretations. In Gaffney, the court decided that Megan’s Law I's retroactive application did not violate either ex post facto clause, but the appellant argues that the lack of public dissemination of offender registration in Gaffney is a critical distinction, as reputation interests were not considered. The appellant cites other state cases recognizing reputation as a protected interest and argues that sex offender registration laws infringe on juvenile offenders' reputation rights under the Pennsylvania Constitution. Additionally, the Pennsylvania ex post facto clause predates the federal one and reflects a historical divergence in penal approaches. The Pennsylvania Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (PACDL) argues that state and federal ex post facto laws are grounded in separate legal foundations, further noting that factors such as excessiveness may indicate a punitive nature of laws under Pennsylvania law. The Commonwealth counters that historical context does not differentiate the two clauses and emphasizes that no single Mendoza-Martinez factor is definitive in determining punitive effects, referencing U.S. Supreme Court precedent. The Commonwealth dismisses the appellant's reputation-based argument, asserting that reputation concerns specific to juvenile offenders, as discussed in J.B., do not extend to adults who are more likely to reoffend. The Court recognizes historical similarities between state and federal ex post facto clauses, but highlights past divergences, particularly regarding punishment definitions and excessiveness. There is tension between the Hudson decision, which states that no Mendoza-Martinez factor is decisive, and the Court's prior indication in Williams II that significant excessiveness in Megan’s Law II's provisions could be deemed punitive. The Pennsylvania Constitution’s protection of reputation as a fundamental right suggests it is more protective than the federal version. The appellant cites cases from Maryland, Indiana, and Alaska, where courts deemed statutes unconstitutional due to public perception and treatment of sex offenders, even without a reputation clause. However, the Commonwealth argues that most states have followed the Supreme Court's reasoning in Smith, which upholds the retroactivity of registration laws, with only seven states finding such retroactive applications unconstitutional. The Pennsylvania Constitution uniquely emphasizes the right to reputation, recognized as fundamental. The Court notes that even jurisdictions without a reputation clause have acknowledged the reputational harm as part of their constitutional analysis regarding sex offender laws. Overall, this analysis indicates that Pennsylvania’s ex post facto clause offers greater protections than its federal counterpart. Appellant argues for heightened protections under the Pennsylvania Constitution based on the interests in the finality of sentencing and the understanding of regulatory outcomes from guilty pleas and convictions. Citing a low recidivism rate of 13% among adult sex offenders, Appellant advocates for the 87% who are unlikely to reoffend and argues against new penalties post-conviction. The Pennsylvania Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (PACDL) supports this view, emphasizing the importance of reputation under Pennsylvania’s ex post facto clause. The Commonwealth counters that Appellant's reliance on low recidivism rates is flawed and that reputation, while protected, can be limited by criminal convictions. The court acknowledges conflicting evidence on recidivism but notes the shared interest in sentencing finality and the significance of reputation in Pennsylvania law, suggesting a need for greater protections under the state constitution. The court summarizes key points in the Edmunds analysis, highlighting that the right against ex post facto laws is fundamental under Pennsylvania law, acknowledging divergences from federal standards, and noting the unique burdens imposed by SORNA's provisions on reputation. Ultimately, the court concludes that Pennsylvania’s ex post facto clause offers greater protections than the federal counterpart and finds SORNA's registration requirements unconstitutional under state law. The Superior Court's decision is reversed, and the mandate for Appellant to comply with SORNA is vacated. Justices Baer and Donohue concur with the opinion, while Justices Todd and Wecht agree with parts of it, and Chief Justice Saylor dissents. Justice Mundy did not participate in the case.