State v. Mark Dunbar (077839) (Monmouth and Statewide

Citations: 229 N.J. 521; 163 A.3d 875; 2017 WL 2962256; 2017 N.J. LEXIS 747Docket: A-94-15

Court: Supreme Court of New Jersey; July 10, 2017; New Jersey; State Supreme Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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The syllabus outlines the case of State v. Mark Dunbar, focusing on the legal standards required for police to conduct a canine sniff for narcotics detection during a motor vehicle stop. The incident began on May 3, 2013, when Officer Michael Tardio noticed Dunbar's vehicle illegally parked in a handicapped space without proper designation. Prior to the stop, the police received a tip linking Dunbar to drug distribution using that vehicle. Upon approaching Dunbar, Officer Tardio requested backup, which included Officer Major and a narcotics canine. After confirming Dunbar's and two other individuals' connections to the vehicle, Tardio requested a warrant search due to an outstanding warrant for one of the individuals.

While waiting for a female officer to assist with the arrest, Officer Tardio informed Dunbar of the drug allegations and proceeded to conduct a canine sniff, which indicated the presence of narcotics. Despite Dunbar's initial refusal, he consented to a vehicle search after a tow truck arrived. The search revealed controlled substances, leading to Dunbar's arrest and indictment on multiple drug charges. Dunbar moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion for the canine sniff and that his consent was not voluntary due to the circumstances. The trial court granted this motion. Subsequently, the State sought reconsideration based on the Supreme Court's ruling in Rodriguez v. United States, which addressed the limitations on prolonging traffic stops to conduct dog sniffs.

The trial court denied the motion, stating that the State failed to prove that the duration of tasks related to Dunbar’s traffic violation included the time for a dog sniff. The court then denied a motion for reconsideration. The Appellate Division affirmed the suppression of drugs, ruling that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct the dog sniff and to suspect Dunbar or the Parker sisters of drug involvement. The panel also upheld the trial court’s ruling on consent and granted the State’s request for appeal.

The Court established that the federal standard prohibits unnecessary delays for canine sniffs, allowing officers to conduct such sniffs without reasonable suspicion of drug offenses as long as they do not extend the stop beyond its original purpose. The Fourth Amendment and New Jersey's Constitution protect individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures, necessitating reasonable suspicion for lawful traffic stops. Officers may inquire about unrelated matters during a stop but cannot prolong it without reasonable suspicion.

The Court referenced prior Supreme Court rulings indicating that canine sniffs are not considered searches under the Fourth Amendment, being less intrusive than typical searches. It emphasized that while officers may conduct unrelated checks during lawful stops, they cannot extend the stop's duration without reasonable suspicion. The Court ultimately aligned New Jersey's approach with the federal standard, allowing canine sniffs during routine traffic stops without independent reasonable suspicion, provided they do not cause delays beyond what is necessary to fulfill the stop's mission.

In Dunbar's appeal, two primary issues were identified: whether the canine sniff extended Officer Tardio’s traffic stop beyond what was necessary for addressing Dunbar’s parking infraction, and whether any resulting delay was justified by reasonable suspicion of drug possession. The Court found insufficient information in the record to determine these issues, leaving them for the trial court to resolve on remand. The Appellate Division's judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. The opinion clarified the standard for conducting a canine sniff during a traffic stop, concluding that while reasonable suspicion of a drug offense is not required to conduct a sniff, the stop cannot be unduly prolonged. The background involved Dunbar being stopped for parking in a handicapped space, with subsequent canine deployment following the discovery of an outstanding warrant for a passenger. The canine indicated the presence of drugs, leading to Dunbar's consent to search, which uncovered narcotics. Dunbar's motion to suppress the evidence was initially granted by the trial court, which concluded that reasonable suspicion was absent. The State's motion for reconsideration, referencing Rodriguez v. United States, was denied. The Appellate Division’s affirmation of the trial court's decision was based on the need for reasonable suspicion, despite acknowledging ambiguity in the stop's timeline. The Supreme Court ultimately reversed the suppression order, indicating the need for more fact-finding on the matter.

The trial court is instructed to determine if the canine sniff extended the duration of the traffic stop and whether there was independent reasonable suspicion to justify that extension. On May 3, 2013, at approximately 10:20 p.m., Officer Michael Tardio observed Mark Dunbar's green Ford Focus parked in a handicapped spot without the required designation. Tardio had prior knowledge of Dunbar's history with law enforcement, including a narcotics arrest in 2012. A week before the stop, Tardio received reports from two informants about Dunbar’s alleged drug distribution activities. Just prior to the stop, Tardio had interacted with Dunbar regarding harassment linked to his drug dealings. On May 2, he received tips from the Manasquan Police about Dunbar’s drug sales and his use of the green Ford Focus for distribution.

During the stop, Tardio approached Dunbar and observed another individual, Lisa Parker, in the vehicle. Dunbar admitted to parking illegally due to a passenger's bad back. Officer Major, who arrived with a narcotics canine, was called to the scene. Tardio then confirmed the identities of all individuals associated with the vehicle and discovered an outstanding warrant for Deborah Parker, prompting him to request a female officer for her arrest. While waiting for assistance, which took around two minutes, Tardio questioned Dunbar about the drug allegations, to which Dunbar denied involvement. Tardio then informed Dunbar that a canine sniff would be conducted around the vehicle.

Officer Major's canine indicated narcotics near Dunbar's vehicle, but the timing of the canine sniff—whether it occurred while waiting for a female officer or after her arrival—remains unclear. Officer Tardio could not confirm if the sniff delayed the traffic stop. The State claimed the events were nearly simultaneous without providing a precise sequence. After the positive indication, Officer Tardio offered Dunbar the choice to consent to a search or have the vehicle impounded; initially, Dunbar refused but consented after about ten minutes when a tow truck arrived. Tardio informed Dunbar of his rights regarding consent, after which officers searched the trunk and found Xanax, oxycodone, and heroin, leading to Dunbar's arrest for parking in a handicapped space and possession of controlled substances. Dunbar was indicted on three counts of third-degree possession of CDSs. He moved to suppress the evidence before trial, arguing the canine sniff lacked reasonable suspicion and his consent was coerced. The State countered that there was reasonable suspicion and voluntary consent. The court found Tardio credible but determined there was insufficient reasonable suspicion for the canine sniff and that Dunbar's consent was not truly voluntary due to the presence of multiple officers and the threat of towing. The evidence was suppressed. The State's motion for reconsideration, referencing a recent Supreme Court decision, was denied because the State failed to demonstrate that the time for handling the parking violation included the canine sniff. The Appellate Division later affirmed the suppression order in an unpublished opinion.

Officer Tardio's stop of Dunbar for parking in a handicapped space was deemed appropriate, as was the subsequent order to exit the vehicle and the detention for a warrant check. However, the appellate panel agreed with the trial court's ruling that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion that Dunbar was involved in drug-related activities at the time of the stop. The court referenced New Jersey's requirement for reasonable suspicion to conduct canine sniffs, asserting that such a sniff can extend a traffic stop if reasonable suspicion of drug possession exists. Since the officers did not possess reasonable suspicion regarding Dunbar or his passengers, the canine sniff was deemed unwarranted. The appellate panel also upheld the trial court's decision on consent, stating that without the canine sniff, there was insufficient basis to seek Dunbar's consent for a search. While the appellate court disagreed with the trial court's assessment of the canine sniff causing unreasonable delay, it acknowledged ambiguity in the timing of events in the record. The State sought to appeal this judgment, arguing for a reversal based on federal standards that do not require reasonable suspicion for canine sniffs, asserting that such procedures are less intrusive than searches and crucial for law enforcement. The State contested the Appellate Division's interpretation of prior New Jersey cases, claiming it was misinformed and inconsistent with other jurisdictions. Additionally, the State contended that Officer Tardio had reasonable suspicion based on Dunbar's prior police encounters and recent tips regarding drug sales. Dunbar, in turn, argued that the New Jersey Constitution mandates reasonable suspicion for canine sniffs, distinct from the suspicion necessary for a traffic stop.

Dunbar argues for a departure from the inconsistent canine-sniff standard established by the Appellate Division, advocating instead for a requirement of reasonable suspicion in New Jersey that aligns with the state's tradition of providing greater protections than those offered by the federal constitution. He critiques the federal standard for allowing indiscriminate canine sniffs, which he claims infringe on citizens' constitutional rights and often result in unreliable false positives from narcotics dogs. Dunbar also contends that even if reasonable suspicion existed regarding his alleged drug sales, the State did not demonstrate that the canine sniff did not unreasonably extend the lawful traffic stop.

Both the Fourth Amendment and New Jersey's Article I, Paragraph 7 protect individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures, which includes lawful roadside stops by police. A police officer must have reasonable suspicion of a vehicle or occupant violating traffic or criminal laws to justify such a stop. While an officer can pursue inquiries unrelated to the traffic violation during a lawful stop, these inquiries must not unreasonably prolong the stop. If an officer's actions extend the duration of the stop beyond what is necessary to address the initial reason for the stop, it may constitute an unlawful detention. The justification for the stop must remain reasonable throughout its execution, particularly regarding the time taken to issue a warning or conduct inquiries.

The United States Supreme Court has consistently ruled that canine sniffs do not constitute a "search" under the Fourth Amendment. In United States v. Place, the Court determined that a canine sniff at an airport was less intrusive than a typical search and thus did not violate constitutional protections. This view was reaffirmed in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, where the Court held that using a drug-sniffing dog around a vehicle at a checkpoint did not change the lawful nature of the stop into an unlawful search.

In the case of Illinois v. Caballes, the Court clarified that a canine sniff conducted during a lawful traffic stop does not require reasonable suspicion of drug possession, as it does not infringe on privacy interests if the sniff occurs outside the vehicle while the officer is lawfully executing the traffic stop. The Court reversed Illinois Supreme Court's ruling that deemed the sniff unconstitutional.

Further, in Rodriguez, the Court addressed whether police could extend a completed traffic stop to conduct a canine sniff without reasonable suspicion. The Court ruled that, while officers may conduct unrelated checks during a lawful stop, they cannot prolong the stop for a canine sniff without reasonable suspicion, emphasizing that such a sniff is considered an unrelated check not tied to the traffic violation.

The Court in Rodriguez established that traffic stops must be limited to the time necessary for completing their mission, primarily traffic-related inquiries. A canine sniff conducted during a traffic stop is deemed unlawful if it prolongs the stop without independent reasonable suspicion. The federal standard does not necessitate particularized reasonable suspicion for a canine sniff during a routine stop, but any extension beyond the reasonable duration requires such suspicion. New Jersey's legal standard for canine sniffs has not been clearly defined, leading to inconsistent Appellate Division rulings. In State v. Cancel, the court upheld a canine sniff at an airport, asserting that such sniffs do not constitute searches, although it suggested that prolonged detention without reasonable suspicion could render the evidence obtained unlawful. In contrast, State v. Elders indicated that reasonable suspicion is necessary for a canine sniff during a traffic stop, aligning this standard with consent searches. The Elders case found that reasonable suspicion existed in that instance. Following this, State v. Baum reaffirmed the need for reasonable suspicion and determined that threats to deploy a narcotics canine were not coercive, concluding that reasonable suspicion was present based on the facts of the case.

The Appellate Division has established that canine sniffs during lawful traffic stops require reasonable and articulable suspicion, diverging from the federal standard. When appellate courts review suppression motions, they defer to a trial court's factual findings if supported by evidence but review legal interpretations de novo. The central legal issue is the criteria for conducting a canine sniff during a lawful traffic stop. The court adopts the federal standard, asserting that canine sniffs are unique procedures that do not constitute searches under the Fourth Amendment or New Jersey Constitution, as they reveal only the presence of illegal items without exposing noncontraband. The court agrees with the Appellate Division’s conclusion that a canine sniff does not transform a lawful stop into an unlawful search. Furthermore, the court emphasizes that a traffic stop may become unconstitutional if it is unnecessarily prolonged or broadened without independent reasonable suspicion. Therefore, they conclude that officers do not need reasonable suspicion beyond the traffic stop justification to conduct a canine sniff, aligning with federal jurisprudence.

An officer may not extend a traffic stop through a canine sniff beyond the necessary time to address the stop's purpose unless there is reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity. If an officer has such suspicion distinct from the reason for the stop, they may continue the detention for a canine sniff. In Dunbar’s appeal, two critical issues arise: whether the canine sniff extended Officer Tardio's traffic stop and whether any delay was justified by independent reasonable suspicion of drug possession. The existing record lacks sufficient details to determine if the stop was prolonged, as the trial court did not clarify the timeline of events, and the Appellate Division's findings were based on a rejected reasonable suspicion standard. Consequently, the judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings focusing on whether the canine sniff extended the stop and if justified suspicion existed. The Court refrains from expressing any conclusions on these issues, leaving them for the trial court to resolve.