Swank v. Valley Christian School

Citation: Not availableDocket: 93282-4

Court: Washington Supreme Court; July 6, 2017; Washington; State Supreme Court

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An opinion was filed in the Supreme Court of Washington regarding the case involving Donald R. Swank and Patricia A. Swank, who are the petitioners and representatives of the estate of Andrew F. Swank (Drew), against Valley Christian School (VCS), Coach Jim Puryear, and Dr. Timothy F. Burns. Drew died following complications from a concussion sustained during a high school football game. The trial court had granted summary judgment against the Swanks, which was upheld by the Court of Appeals.

The Supreme Court addressed whether Washington's Zackery Lystedt Law (RCW 28A.600.190) creates an implied cause of action. The Court concluded that it does, allowing the Swanks' claims against VCS and Coach Puryear to proceed. Additionally, the Court determined that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to potentially find liability against Coach Puryear, despite the protections offered by limited volunteer immunity. Consequently, the Swanks' common law negligence claims against the coach were reinstated. However, the Court found that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over Drew's doctor, leading to a partial reversal and affirmation of the lower court's decision.

Factual background indicates that VCS is a nonprofit religious school in Spokane Valley, Washington. Jim Puryear, a parent, initiated the school's football program in 2007 and coached without compensation while covering most operational costs. Drew played for the team in 2009. The Lystedt law, enacted in 2009, aims to prevent further injury to youth athletes suffering concussions by mandating schools to implement educational measures regarding concussions and requiring immediate removal of suspected athletes from play. VCS complied by creating a concussion information sheet (CIS) that outlined concussion risks, symptoms, and protocols for return to play, which was discussed in a meeting attended by Drew and his mother.

On September 18, 2009, Drew sustained a head injury during a football game, leading to neck pain and headaches. Three days later, Drew's mother consulted Dr. Timothy Burns, his long-time physician in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho. Dr. Burns advised Drew to refrain from contact sports for three days and prescribed ibuprofen, indicating that if headaches persisted, he would need to stay out for a week. Two days later, after Drew's headaches subsided, his mother requested a medical release for Drew to return to football, as required by a new Washington State law. Dr. Burns issued the release, which Drew's father provided to Coach Puryear.

Drew participated in a game the following day, where his performance diminished significantly, displaying confusion and sluggishness. Observations from family and teammates noted his unusual behavior and lack of responsiveness, raising concerns that the coaching staff failed to recognize his decline in performance. During the game, Coach Puryear aggressively confronted Drew on the sidelines. Drew later suffered additional head injuries from a hit during play and collapsed, ultimately dying two days later.

Three years post-incident, Drew's parents filed a negligence lawsuit against VCS, Coach Puryear, and Dr. Burns, citing violations of the Lystedt law. The defendants sought summary judgment, which the trial court granted. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, ruling that the Lystedt law did not establish a private cause of action, Coach Puryear was entitled to volunteer immunity, the battery claim against Puryear was time-barred, and the court lacked jurisdiction over Dr. Burns. The Swanks appealed, and the court granted their petition for review, while VCS did not seek review of the negligence claim remanded against it.

Summary of the legal document excerpt:

The standard of review for a trial court's grant of summary judgment is de novo, meaning the appellate court reviews the decision without deference to the trial court's conclusions. Summary judgment is granted only when there are no genuine disputes regarding material facts and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

In this case, the appellate court partially reverses and partially affirms the trial court's decisions. It holds that the Lystedt law encompasses an implied cause of action, resulting in the reinstatement of claims by the Swanks against VCS and Coach Puryear for violations of this law. Additionally, the court finds that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Coach Puryear, thereby reinstating the Swanks' common law negligence claims against him for further proceedings. Conversely, the appellate court affirms the trial court's grant of summary judgment regarding Dr. Burns, determining that it lacked personal jurisdiction over him.

The Lystedt law, enacted in 2009, is the first comprehensive concussion law in the U.S. aimed at protecting youth athletes from the risks of concussions. It mandates that school districts educate coaches, athletes, and parents about concussions through a signed information sheet, requires immediate removal of athletes from play if a concussion is suspected, and stipulates that athletes cannot return to play without written clearance from a licensed health care provider. The Swanks argue that noncompliance with these requirements gives rise to an implied cause of action, a position the court supports based on the Bennett test, which assesses whether such a cause exists within statutory provisions.

The statute in question prohibits age discrimination as an unfair employment practice but does not provide a remedy. Plaintiffs sought to recover from their employer through an implied cause of action. The court established a three-part test to assess whether the statute implies such a cause of action: (1) whether the plaintiff belongs to the class intended to benefit from the statute; (2) whether the legislative intent supports the creation of a remedy; and (3) whether implying a remedy aligns with the statute's purpose. The court reasoned that a remedial statute should allow the affected class to enforce their rights, as a lack of an implicit remedy renders the statute ineffective.

Subsequent cases have applied this three-part test to determine implied causes of action in various statutes. In applying this test to the Lystedt law, which protects youth athletes sustaining concussions, it was established that Drew, a youth athlete who suffered a concussion, falls within the protected class. The legislative intent behind the Lystedt law is evident, as it addresses the significant risks associated with concussions in youth sports. Therefore, both the first and second factors of the Bennett test support the implication of a cause of action under the Lystedt law.

The Washington legislature acknowledges that youth athletes may be returned to play prematurely after head injuries, posing risks of physical harm or death. While the Lystedt law addresses concussion standards, it lacks an enforcement mechanism to ensure compliance. The law provides limited immunity to volunteer health care providers who clear youth athletes for play, protecting them from liability except in cases of gross negligence or willful misconduct. This limited immunity suggests the legislature intended to imply a cause of action for violations of the Lystedt law. Previous court interpretations, particularly in Jane Doe and Beggs, support the notion that a grant of immunity indicates a legislative intent to create a remedy. However, the Court of Appeals, relying on Adams, concluded there was no implied cause of action in the Lystedt law, misinterpreting the precedent. Unlike in Adams, where the legislative history did not support an implied cause of action due to the lack of common law remedies, the Lystedt law's absence of such history does not negate the implied intent to create a remedy. Additionally, the purpose of tort law, which promotes public safety by encouraging reasonable care, aligns with the need to imply a cause of action under the Lystedt law.

Manufacturers are expected to ensure product safety, and the Lystedt law aims to protect youth athletes from concussions by preventing further injuries. It establishes an implied cause of action to promote accountability in managing concussions, providing youth athletes with recourse for injuries or deaths resulting from negligence. The Lystedt law imposes three key duties: school districts must distribute a concussion information sheet annually for signatures, youth athletes must be removed from play if suspected of a concussion, and they cannot return without written clearance from a healthcare provider. The law's mandatory provisions must be enforceable, which supports the conclusion of an implied cause of action.

The trial court's grant of summary judgment against the Swanks' claims related to VCS and Coach Puryear is reversed, allowing these claims to proceed. The Lystedt law's implied cause of action applies to coaches, including volunteer Coach Puryear, who can be liable for gross negligence or recklessness but not simple negligence. Evidence suggests Coach Puryear may have acted with gross negligence, creating genuine issues of material fact that prevent summary judgment. The Court of Appeals noted that the Lystedt law does not impose a specific return to play standard, aligning with legislative intent to address the risks of further injury to youth athletes.

The Lystedt law mandates the immediate removal of youth athletes suspected of having a concussion during practices or games. Coaches are responsible for monitoring players for concussion signs and must act if such signs are present. Coach Puryear acknowledged this requirement, emphasizing that any suspicion of a concussion necessitates removing the player from play. The Swanks allege that Coach Puryear failed to observe and remove Drew when he exhibited concussion symptoms, implicating the Lystedt law's implied cause of action.

Regarding liability, Coach Puryear claims immunity as a volunteer under RCW 4.24.670, which protects volunteers from liability for simple negligence but not for gross negligence or reckless misconduct. The statute specifies that harm caused by gross negligence or reckless behavior disqualifies a volunteer from immunity. The determination of whether Coach Puryear's actions were negligent, grossly negligent, or reckless is crucial, as the evidence presented by the Swanks suggests he may have acted with gross negligence or recklessness, creating a genuine issue of material fact.

The legal definitions of negligence, gross negligence, and reckless misconduct are discussed, with negligence defined as the failure to exercise ordinary care. Gross negligence is characterized as significantly greater than ordinary negligence, while reckless misconduct involves a conscious disregard for the safety of others. The nuances in these definitions highlight the complexity courts face in distinguishing between them, particularly in evaluating Coach Puryear's conduct.

Reckless misconduct is distinguished from negligence by the requirement that the actor must recognize a risk significantly greater than that which constitutes negligence. Unlike gross negligence, reckless misconduct necessitates a conscious decision to act with awareness of serious danger or the knowledge of facts that any reasonable person would recognize as dangerous. Due to the nuanced nature of these standards, issues of negligence and proximate cause typically cannot be resolved through summary judgment. In this case, the evidence presented by the Swanks regarding Coach Puryear's conduct could be interpreted as gross negligence or reckless misconduct, supporting their claims under the Lystedt law and common law negligence. Testimony indicated Coach Puryear's failure to monitor Drew for concussion symptoms during the game, despite observations from others that Drew exhibited unusual behavior consistent with concussion signs. Witnesses described Drew as dazed, confused, and uncharacteristically sluggish, with observable coordination issues. Additional evidence included Coach Puryear's aggressive behavior, such as yelling at Drew and shaking his face mask. An expert, Dr. Stanley Herring, concluded that Coach Puryear violated the standard of care, asserting that Drew should have been removed from play due to his symptoms. The Swanks also sought damages related to Coach Puryear’s actions, particularly the face mask incident, but the Court of Appeals ruled that this claim was barred by the two-year statute of limitations for battery, affirming that the face-mask-shaking incident alone could not support a damages claim.

Coach Puryear's conduct, including shaking Drew's face mask, is relevant to evaluating his overall behavior for recklessness or gross negligence. The court emphasizes that the trier of fact can consider all aspects of Puryear's actions in determining his degree of fault, particularly his failure to monitor Drew and ensure proper concussion protocols were followed. Evidence suggests that Puryear may not have met the standards of a reasonable and prudent person, warranting a conclusion of gross negligence or recklessness. Therefore, the court finds that summary judgment against Puryear is inappropriate and reverses that decision.

In contrast, the trial court correctly held that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Dr. Burns, affirming the summary judgment in his favor. Dr. Burns provided medical care in Idaho, which constitutes the location of the alleged tort, thus precluding jurisdiction under Washington's long-arm statute. The statute specifies that personal jurisdiction can only be exercised for acts committed within the state, and the court reiterates that professional malpractice occurring out of state does not qualify as a tortious act in Washington, regardless of any subsequent injuries incurred there.

Inspected cattle sent to Washington became sick, leading to infections in neighboring cattle. The court decided against exercising personal jurisdiction over an Idaho veterinarian, emphasizing that the nature of services rendered is more personal than the sale of goods, making the service location more relevant for jurisdiction than the product's purchase location. A public policy rationale was cited, indicating that if medical professionals feared defending malpractice suits in distant states, it could hinder the availability of medical services. This aligns with the ruling in Lewis, which established that a tort does not occur in Washington when medical malpractice happens out-of-state, even if injuries manifest in Washington. In the Lewis case, a Washington mother sued an Oregon doctor for malpractice after her baby suffered injuries upon returning home, but the court ruled against jurisdiction in Washington because the care was provided in Oregon. Similarly, the Swanks attempted to distinguish their case by claiming Dr. Burns released Drew to play football in Washington, but the court rejected this argument, affirming that all relevant medical care occurred in Idaho, thus precluding Washington from exercising personal jurisdiction over Dr. Burns.

Dr. Burns' relevant actions took place exclusively in Idaho, including examining Drew, authoring a release note for Drew’s participation in football, and leaving that note in his Idaho office for Drew's mother. Although Drew's injuries emerged in Washington, personal jurisdiction is deemed improper since the medical care occurred in Idaho, qualifying the tort as taking place there. Consequently, the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over Dr. Burns, leading to the affirmation of the summary judgment in his favor.

Additionally, the court noted that both the Swanks and Dr. Burns are Idaho residents. It reversed part of the trial court's ruling, holding that the Lystedt law encompasses an implied cause of action based on the plaintiff's protected status, the legislature's intent to allow recovery for statutory violations, and alignment with legislative purpose. This reinstates the Swanks' claims against Valley Christian School (VCS) and Coach Puryear regarding violations of the Lystedt law for further proceedings.

Moreover, the court reversed the summary judgment concerning Coach Puryear due to unresolved factual issues regarding his alleged gross negligence or recklessness, thereby reinstating the Swanks' common law negligence claims against him. The court remanded the case for further proceedings aligned with these findings.