Swanson Towing & Recovery, LLC v. Wrecker 1, Inc.

Citations: 342 Ga. App. 6; 802 S.E.2d 300; 2017 WL 2687699; 2017 Ga. App. LEXIS 305Docket: A17A0389

Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia; June 22, 2017; Georgia; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Motions for reconsideration must be received in the clerk's office within ten days of a decision to be considered timely. In the case A17A0389, Wrecker 1, Inc. and owner Stacy Richardson sued Swanson Towing, Recovery, LLC, and others for tortious interference, libel, and slander. The trial court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, prompting an interlocutory appeal. The appellate court ultimately reversed the trial court's decision, granting summary judgment to the defendants concerning Richardson’s individual claim for tortious interference, which was not contested in this appeal.

The court conducted a de novo review, focusing on whether there was a genuine issue of material fact. The undisputed facts revealed that Steve Richardson previously operated a towing company, Silent Night Recovery, which had its permit revoked by the Public Service Commission (PSC) in 2007 for violations, including false business practices. Stacy Richardson then established Wrecker 1 in January 2007, initially providing consensual towing services. In 2011, Wrecker 1 was added to Henry County's list of approved non-consensual towing services, which financially impacted Swanson, the only other company on the list. Swanson’s owner and employees communicated complaints about Wrecker 1’s business practices to county officials, alleging unethical behavior and overcharging, and asserting that Wrecker 1 was essentially a rebranded version of the discredited Silent Night.

Swanson communicated complaints to the County and advised Smith to reach out directly, leading to Smith's meeting with the city manager. In February 2012, the County held a due cause hearing concerning these complaints, which the defendants did not attend, and it was conceded that they had no involvement in the evidence presented. In April 2012, based on the hearing's evidence, Wrecker 1 was suspended from towing for 90 days due to overcharging customers on 24 occasions. Separately, Lee Hamlin filed a complaint regarding Wrecker 1's overcharging, stemming from an incident where Wrecker 1 towed Hamlin’s truck against his wishes and charged $11,647.75. On August 28, 2012, a hearing on Hamlin’s complaint resulted in a ruling that Wrecker 1 overcharged him by $7,822.75. The Committee also found Wrecker 1 had overcharged Penske by $13,055. Consequently, Wrecker 1 was permanently removed from the list of authorized towing companies due to the findings of overcharges and falsified invoices. On the same day, Wrecker 1 and Stacy Richardson sued the Swanson defendants for tortious interference, claiming Swanson was responsible for their removal. The complaint was later amended to include libel and slander claims based on comments by Cha and McCallister. Swanson's motion for summary judgment on all claims was denied, leading to an appeal. The court found that the plaintiffs did not prove the defendants' conduct caused Wrecker 1's removal, as the County's decision was based on independent hearings and evidence from Hamlin and Smith, which the defendants did not contest. Therefore, the tortious interference claim failed as a matter of law.

The trial court's denial of the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ defamation claims, specifically libel and slander, was found to be erroneous. The plaintiffs' complaint lacked specificity regarding the alleged defamatory statements made by defendants Cha and McCallister. The claims centered on statements that Wrecker 1 was associated with the defunct company Silent Night, which Wrecker 1 argued damaged its reputation. 

Under OCGA § 51-5-1, libel is defined as a false and malicious defamation that injures one's reputation, while slander pertains to damaging statements about a person's trade or profession. A successful defamation claim generally requires proving four elements: (1) a false and defamatory statement about the plaintiff; (2) an unprivileged communication to a third party; (3) fault by the defendant, at least amounting to negligence; and (4) special harm or actionable statements irrespective of special harm.

The court determined that McCallister's statements about Wrecker 1 lacking morals and labeling the Richardsons as crooks were non-actionable opinions rather than statements of fact. Furthermore, the statements equating Wrecker 1 with Silent Night did not assert that they were the same legal entity and were based on the true fact that Silent Night's towing permit was revoked. Thus, these statements were also deemed expressions of opinion.

Moreover, any allegations concerning Wrecker 1 overcharging customers were invalidated since an official county conclusion corroborated that Wrecker 1 had indeed overcharged truck owners. Therefore, the plaintiffs failed to prove the falsity of these statements. The appellate court reversed the trial court's decision, granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the defamation claims. Judges Miller and Reese concurred with the decision.