Freeman Crosby v. State

Citations: 222 So. 3d 629; 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 9121; 2017 WL 2729867Docket: 5D15-2935

Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida; June 19, 2017; Florida; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Freeman Edgar Crosby appeals his judgment and sentence for failing to register as a sexual offender and for not notifying the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DHSMV) of a change of address within the required forty-eight hours, violating section 943.0435, Florida Statutes (2013). He contends that the trial court erred by allowing the State to present evidence of a prior arrest and conviction related to similar offenses. The State indicated it would introduce this evidence during rebuttal, asserting that Crosby could not claim a lack of notice regarding his registration duty due to the statute's provision for repeat offenders.

At trial, it was established that Crosby was aware of his registration requirements, having registered twice yearly, and had acknowledged his duty to update his address. Despite this, Crosby failed to register in September 2014 and did not update his address between July 2014 and January 2015. He claimed that misinformation from a sheriff's officer led him to believe he was "good" for six months after his July registration. Although he recognized he should have registered in September and admitted responsibility for his oversight, he also argued that the officer's guidance affected his understanding of his obligations to the DHSMV. Crosby attempted to report his address change but was told he needed a new ID due to his previous ID being stolen, which he was in the process of obtaining when he was arrested. The court ultimately agreed with Crosby, leading to the reversal of his conviction.

Crosby and his girlfriend testified he did not inform a DHSMV employee of his sex offender status, although Crosby claimed the employee accessed this information independently. A DHSMV employee clarified that no ID was required for a sex offender to update their address. The State argued that Crosby's reliance on misinformation from a county officer and DHSMV employee was unreasonable, citing his 2006 conviction for failing to report a new address and a 2014 arrest for failure to register. The State contended Crosby's claims of misinformation allowed for the introduction of evidence regarding his prior failures to report. Defense counsel argued this evidence was irrelevant, as notice was not disputed, and any prior convictions were prejudicial rather than probative.

The trial court permitted the State to present evidence of Crosby's previous convictions and arrests, which the State emphasized during closing arguments. However, this was deemed erroneous as evidence of collateral crimes is only admissible when it pertains to a material fact in issue, such as knowledge of the law, and not merely to suggest bad character or propensity. The admission of such evidence is considered harmful error due to the risk of the jury inferring guilt from prior bad acts. Here, it was undisputed that Crosby was aware of his reporting obligations, which diminished the relevance of his past convictions. Evidence of his failures to report was unnecessary to support the argument that he relied on misinformation. Furthermore, even though Crosby acknowledged his reporting duties, the introduction of his prior charges was prejudicial and irrelevant, leading to the conclusion that the State did not prove the error was harmless. The convictions were reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.