Jeffrey Haksluoto v. Mt Clemens Regional Medical Center

Citation: Not availableDocket: 153723

Court: Michigan Supreme Court; June 27, 2017; Michigan; State Supreme Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Jeffrey and Carol Haksluoto filed a medical malpractice claim against Mt. Clemens Regional Medical Center and associated parties following Jeffrey's misdiagnosis on December 26, 2011. They mailed a notice of intent (NOI) on December 26, 2013, the last day of the two-year statute of limitations, and subsequently filed their complaint on June 27, 2014, which was 183 days after the NOI. Defendants sought summary disposition based on the claim being barred by the statute of limitations, but the trial court denied their motion. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, asserting that the NOI’s notice period began the day after it was served, effectively meaning the notice did not toll the statute of limitations since it was filed after the expiration of the limitations period.

The Michigan Supreme Court granted an appeal to determine if the NOI had tolled the statute of limitations and if the subsequent complaint was timely. In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court ruled that the limitations period for medical malpractice claims is tolled when an NOI is filed on the last day of the limitations period, preserving that day for use once the notice period ends. Under Michigan law, the applicable statutes and rules indicate that the limitations period for medical malpractice actions is two years, and an NOI must be served at least 182 days prior to filing suit. It was determined that the calculation of time must consider the exclusion of the first day and inclusion of the last, resulting in the legal principle that only a fraction of a day remained in the limitations period. This raised the issue of whether to round this fraction up or down, impacting the determination of whether any time was left to toll the statute.

Whole days are counted to determine the time provided to a 'user' under the law, ensuring the full duration allowed by statute—in this instance, 182 days—plus any fractional day remaining when the Notice of Intent (NOI) is filed. When the NOI was filed on December 26, 2013, 'day 182' was June 26, 2014. The law does not clarify how to treat a limitations period with only a fractional day left, but common law dictates that fractional days should be rounded according to societal norms. The Court of Appeals' ruling, which could leave plaintiffs in a 'deadlocked' position if they filed an NOI just before the limitations expired, was rejected.

A timely NOI preserves the day it is filed as a usable day once the notice period concludes. This applies to any NOI that triggers tolling under MCL 600.5856(c), regardless of when it is filed in relation to the limitations period. After the notice period, the time to file a claim resumes for the remaining whole days plus one additional day for the fractional day when the NOI was filed. Therefore, if an NOI is filed on the last day of the limitations period, the next business day after the notice period ends is available for filing a suit.

In this case, the plaintiffs filed their NOI on the last day of the limitations period, preserving that day for filing after the 182-day notice period concluded. As a result, they had one day left to file their complaint after the notice period expired. The plaintiffs were required to wait the full notice period before proceeding, which meant they could file their complaint on June 27, 2013, after the notice period ended on June 26, 2013. The complaint was deemed timely filed. The decision was reversed and remanded by the Michigan Supreme Court, affirming that the limitations period is tolled even when the NOI is filed on the final day of the limitations period.

Plaintiff Jeffrey Haksluoto's medical malpractice complaint was deemed timely, as it was filed on June 27, 2014, following the expiration of a 182-day notice period that began after he served a Notice of Intent (NOI) on December 26, 2013, the last day of the statute of limitations. The Court of Appeals had previously ruled that the NOI did not toll the statute of limitations, leading to the conclusion that the complaint was time-barred. However, this decision was reversed, affirming that serving the NOI on the final day of the limitations period was sufficient to allow for the subsequent filing of the complaint. The case highlights the complexities surrounding the calculation of time periods in medical malpractice claims, governed by both statutory limitations and required notice provisions. The court's review of motions for summary disposition is conducted de novo, focusing on statutory interpretation and legal doctrines. The relevant statute establishes a two-year limitations period for medical malpractice claims, alongside a mandatory 182-day notice requirement prior to initiating legal action.

Michigan's 'mailbox rule' mandates that proof of mailing a Notice of Intent (NOI) serves as prima facie evidence for compliance with the NOI requirement, as outlined in MCL 600.2912b(2). Under MCL 600.5856(c), mailing an NOI tolls the statute of limitations if the claim could be barred during the applicable notice period. The plaintiff mailed the NOI on December 26, 2013, the last day of the limitations period, arguing that the tolling commenced upon giving notice, thus allowing an additional day to file the complaint.

In contrast, the defendants and the Court of Appeals reference MCR 1.108(1), which states that the day of the act or event is not included in time computations. They argue that because December 26 is not counted, the notice period began on December 27, after the limitations period had expired, meaning there was nothing left to toll. The legal implications of the remaining time on December 26 are crucial since both parties assume their conclusions without addressing this point.

While it is established that the NOI was filed before the end of December 26 and December 27 marks the first day of the 182-day notice/tolling period, determining the legal effect of the unexpired portion of December 26 is complex. The Revised Judicature Act outlines comprehensive rules for limitations and tolling periods, asserting that any deviation from the two-year limitations for malpractice actions is only as specified in the statute.

The tolling provision under MCL 600.5856(c) indicates that tolling begins when notice is given, provided the limitations period is set to expire during the notice period. The court highlighted that if the NOI was filed on the last day, and if rounding down were applied, there would be no time left to toll, thus failing to trigger tolling. The determination of whether to round up or down is critical in establishing if time remained to toll, impacting the timeliness of the plaintiff's complaint.

The Legislature has the authority to change the common-law rule regarding fractions of a day; however, without a statute addressing this issue, judgments made on the same day are treated as simultaneous. MCL 500.5856(c) does not address fractions of a day, raising the question of whether a fractional day left in a statute of limitations period can trigger tolling under Driver. Specifically, it examines if a Notice of Intent (NOI) served on the last day of the limitations period can be tolled if only a fraction of a day remains. This issue is novel in Michigan law, as existing case law does not provide a definitive answer.

The parties reference previous cases to support their positions. The plaintiff cites Tyra v Organ Procurement Agency of Mich, where an NOI was deemed 'timely', yet this case did not address tolling directly and is considered nonbinding. The defendants refer to Dewan v Khoury, where the complaint was ruled untimely after an NOI was served on the last day of the limitations, but this denial of appeal does not set precedent.

The document also discusses the treatment of fractional days in legal contexts, indicating that while fractional days are generally disregarded, it remains unclear how this affects the plaintiff's ability to file after the NOI was submitted on December 26, 2013. The parties debate the relevance of MCR 1.108(1), which governs how fractional days are counted, with MCL 8.6 and MCR 1.108(1) providing overlapping guidelines on counting days for legal time periods.

The method of calculating time periods in Michigan courts, which excludes the first day and includes the last, has been a consistent practice since the state's inception. This approach is reflected in the current court rules, which are a restatement of earlier rules dating back to 1945. While not formally codified for statutory time periods until 1963, this method has been widely applied due to its alignment with common law principles. The rationale is to ensure that parties receive the full time allotted by law, as demonstrated in the case of Dousman v O’Malley, where the court ruled that only whole days are counted to prevent confusion regarding the time available for action. This principle is similarly applied in medical malpractice cases, where plaintiffs must wait the complete notice period before filing complaints. Defendants' arguments suggesting that the notice period begins the day after service misinterpret the established practice, as clarified in Dunlap v Sheffield, which indicates that the counting method does not equate the starting day with the first day of the period. The approach aims to provide parties the full measure of time intended by legal provisions, excluding only the fractional day of the initiating event.

Once the Notice of Intent (NOI) was filed on December 26, 2013, the 182-day notice period concluded on June 26, 2014. Under Michigan's mailbox rule, the notice period includes 182 full days, excluding the day the NOI was mailed but including the last day. This interpretation aligns with common-law principles of fairness, suggesting that defendants are entitled to 182 full days of notice. However, the impact of filing the NOI on the last day of the limitations period raises questions about whether it tolls that period, particularly when it was filed with less than a full day remaining. 

The law generally disregards fractions of a day, a principle rooted in common law and articulated in cases such as Warren and McGill. This means that the specific time of day the NOI was filed does not affect its legal standing; only the fact that it was filed on that day matters. The key legal question is whether to treat the filing as ineffective for tolling purposes due to a lack of remaining time, or as effective, preserving the filing date for future legal considerations. The system’s approach to fractions of a day results in parties potentially receiving slightly more or less time than if calculations considered exact hours and minutes.

Confusion exists regarding the treatment of 'edge' cases in relation to the computation of statutory time for bringing a suit. In certain instances, applying the rule can result in either granting a party an additional day or reducing their time by a day, potentially leaving them with no time if the statutory period is only one day. To address this, the practice of treating the day of the event as a mere point in time and excluding it from the calculation is justified. The decision in Warren favored providing parties with more time, aligning with the majority of American legal authority and ensuring clarity in legal actions.

The common law principle dictates that fractions of a day should be rounded in a manner consistent with societal norms. This was reaffirmed in People v Woolfolk, where it was determined that a person does not advance to the next age until their birthday, countering the traditional view that a day is over as soon as it begins. The current rule allows for the interpretation that a day is not considered over until it has fully elapsed, thus enabling a party to utilize the entire day within the notice period.

Moreover, the discussion emphasizes that disregarding fractional days does not preclude recognizing when a day is only partially exhausted. For instance, if a Notice of Intent (NOI) is submitted on the last day of a limitations period, it does not render the plaintiff 'deadlocked,' as established by the Court of Appeals. This conclusion contradicts the notion of common understanding and the legislative intent behind tolling provisions, aimed at preventing pitfalls for unwary plaintiffs.

A plaintiff filing a Notice of Intent (NOI) before the expiration of the limitations period cannot be left in a 'deadlock,' as this creates an unfair situation. It is determined that a timely filed NOI preserves the filing day as a usable day once the limitations period resumes after the notice period ends. This rule applies to any NOI triggering tolling under MCL 600.5856(c), regardless of whether it is filed on the last day or earlier. Once the notice period concludes, the time for the plaintiff to bring a claim resumes for the number of whole days left in the limitations period at the time the NOI was filed, plus one additional day for any fractional day when the NOI was submitted. There is no justification for treating the last day of the limitations period differently from other days, as the calculation remains consistent across all days. This principle has been previously endorsed in Michigan case law, specifically in Crockett v Fieger, wherein the court clarified that if an NOI is sent on the last day of the limitations period, the following business day is available to file a lawsuit. Furthermore, in Lancaster v Wease, the court incorrectly deemed a complaint untimely under the previous interpretation. The new ruling ensures that the day of filing the NOI is preserved as a valid day for filing after the notice period ends, aligning with similar interpretations in other jurisdictions, such as Maine.

A plaintiff who serves a notice of intent (NOI) to sue on the last day of the limitations period has one additional day after the ninety-day waiting period to file a complaint. In the case at hand, the plaintiff filed the NOI on December 26, 2013, before the day ended, preserving a fraction of that day. This allowed the plaintiff to file their complaint on December 27, 2013, which was deemed timely.

Defendants contended that the complaint was untimely, arguing it should have been filed by the last day of the 182-day notice period, rather than the following day. However, the relevant statute, MCL 600.2912b(1), requires a full 182 days after the NOI before a complaint can be filed. Previous case law, including Burton v. Reed City Hosp Corp and Tyra, reinforced that a complaint filed prematurely is insufficient. 

The court clarified that the entire 182-day waiting period must elapse before filing, emphasizing that the complaint filed by the plaintiff on December 27, 2013, was timely because it was filed after the completion of the waiting period and within the preserved time from the limitations period. The court concluded that the plaintiff's actions complied with statutory requirements and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, remanding the case for further proceedings.