Arora v. Buckhead Family Dentistry, Inc.

Citation: 263 F. Supp. 3d 121Docket: Civil Action No. 2016-1806

Court: District Court, District of Columbia; June 26, 2017; Federal District Court

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Dr. Sanjay Arora has initiated a diversity action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against Buckhead Family Dentistry, Inc., the manufacturer of a defective dental crown (Global Dental Solutions LLC), and his dental insurer (Cigna Health and Life Insurance Company). Each defendant has filed motions to dismiss the case. Arora has also requested an extension of time for service, permission to file a second amended complaint, and to amend his civil cover sheet.

The Court determined that it lacks personal jurisdiction over both the dentist and the crown manufacturer, and Arora has not demonstrated proper service of his insurer. An extension for service on the insurer is granted, while the motion for leave to amend is denied without prejudice, and there is no need to amend the civil docket sheet. The Court plans to issue an order for the parties to show cause regarding the potential transfer of the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.

In assessing the motions, the Court assumes the allegations in Arora’s complaints are true and notes that pro se pleadings are to be interpreted liberally. Arora's issues began in late 2013 when he received a crown from Dr. Travis Paige, which was supposed to be made of high-noble metal but was primarily nickel, causing him pain shortly after installation. After unsuccessful attempts to alleviate the irritation, he switched dentists in September 2014, discovering that Global Dental Solutions had billed Buckhead for a crown made of non-precious metals.

Arora relocated to the Washington, D.C. area in August 2014 and filed a lawsuit in September 2016 against Buckhead, Paige, Global, Brad Abramson (Global’s president), and Cigna. After Global and Abramson sought to dismiss the case, Arora amended his complaint as of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1), presenting ten counts: (1) fraud against Buckhead and Paige, (2) negligent misrepresentation against Buckhead and Paige, (3) unjust enrichment against Buckhead and Paige, (4) breach of fiduciary duty against Buckhead and Paige, (5) negligence against Buckhead and Paige, (6) breach of fiduciary duty against Cigna, (7) negligent misrepresentation against Cigna, (8) fraud against Global and Abramson, (9) unjust enrichment against Global and Abramson, and (10) conspiracy against Cigna, Paige, and Buckhead. Following this, Global and Abramson renewed their motion to dismiss, while Buckhead, Paige, and Cigna also moved to dismiss. After the motions were fully briefed, Arora requested leave to file a second amended complaint and sought extensions for service of process and to amend the civil cover sheet.

Regarding personal jurisdiction, the defendants moved to dismiss on the basis that the court lacks personal jurisdiction under the D.C. long-arm statute and the U.S. Constitution. The court determined that Arora failed to allege sufficient facts to establish personal jurisdiction over the defendants under the D.C. long-arm statute, making it unnecessary to address constitutional issues. As the plaintiff, Arora is required to demonstrate a prima facie case for jurisdiction. The court can decide the motion based on the facts as alleged without needing to resolve disputed factual issues. The D.C. long-arm statute allows for jurisdiction if a defendant causes tortious injury in D.C. through actions outside the jurisdiction and has established significant ties to D.C. through persistent business activities or substantial revenue from services or goods in the district. Thus, Arora must show that the tortious act resulted in injury in D.C. and that the defendants have significant ties to the area.

Arora's attempt to invoke personal jurisdiction under D.C. Code 13-423(a)(4) fails primarily because he has not established any 'tortious injury' occurring in the District of Columbia. His alleged injury, the damage to his gums from a low-quality crown, occurred in Georgia, with his only claim of harm in D.C. being ongoing pain related to that injury. By the time he moved to D.C., he had severed all ties with the relevant dental entities and his insurance provider. The court references the precedent set in Leaks v. Ex-Lax, where continuing suffering after an original injury did not suffice to establish jurisdiction in D.C. The court emphasized that only the original injury site is relevant for personal jurisdiction, thus confirming that Arora's injury is tied to Georgia, regardless of his subsequent travels. Additionally, Arora's argument for jurisdiction based on marketing emails from Buckhead is invalid, as these communications are unrelated to the alleged tortious conduct and do not meet the D.C. long-arm statute's requirements for establishing a claim arising from business transactions.

Emails sent by the defendants did not result in any injury within the District of Columbia, failing to meet the 'injury' requirement of the long-arm statute for tortious conduct. Arora referenced cases that supported personal jurisdiction based on directed communications, but those involved broader statutes or specific connections to the forum state not applicable here. The court determined that the D.C. long-arm statute does not grant personal jurisdiction over Global, Abramson, Buckhead, or Paige concerning medical malpractice or tortious actions occurring outside D.C. Arora's request to transfer the case to federal courts in Maryland or Virginia is deemed meritless, as there is no indication those courts would offer a more convenient forum or have personal jurisdiction over the defendants. However, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia may have both personal jurisdiction and venue, as the defendants are located in Atlanta and relevant events occurred there. Two statutes, 28 U.S.C. 1406(a) and 28 U.S.C. 1631, provide mechanisms for transferring cases brought in the wrong venue or lacking jurisdiction. The D.C. Circuit mandates transfer under Section 1631 when jurisdiction is lacking, applicable in both subject matter and personal jurisdiction cases. The court will allow the parties to address the potential transfer to the Northern District of Georgia before deciding on transferring or dismissing Arora’s claims for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Cigna filed a motion to dismiss Arora's complaint based on insufficient service of process under Rule 12(b)(5) and failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The Court determined that Arora did not adequately demonstrate proper service according to Rule 4(h), which hindered establishing personal jurisdiction over Cigna, thereby preventing consideration of the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The Court granted Arora a discretionary extension of forty-five days to complete service, warning that failure to provide adequate proof of service within this timeframe would lead to dismissal without prejudice under Rule 4(m).

Arora's complaint was filed on September 9, 2016, giving him until December 8, 2016, to serve. The Court issued an order on December 21, 2016, requiring proof of service by January 6, 2017. On January 4, 2017, Arora submitted evidence of mailing the summons and complaint to Cigna's registered agent via certified mail on December 7, 2016, with a return receipt signed on December 8, 2016. Additionally, he sought a forty-five-day extension citing "good cause," explaining that Cigna's registered agent, CT Corporation, indicated Cigna was not in their records and could not forward the documents. Subsequently, Arora sent the complaint to two other addresses for Cigna on December 23, 2016, and provided tracking reports showing delivery on December 28, 2016. He expressed concern over potential prejudice due to the statute of limitations and requested clarification on any improperly served defendants. Cigna's motion to dismiss followed about a month later, asserting insufficient service of process among other grounds.

Cigna presents two primary arguments regarding the adequacy of service by Arora. First, Cigna contends that service attempted through CT Corporation was ineffective, as CT Corporation is not the registered agent for Cigna Health and Life Insurance Company, the defendant in this case. The court agrees with Cigna's position, noting that Arora mistakenly believed CT Corporation was the registered agent, while evidence shows CT Corporation is the agent for a different entity, Cigna Healthcare Inc. Arora's assertion that CT Corporation acted as Cigna’s authorized agent is based on a theory of apparent authority, which the court finds unpersuasive. The court notes that CT Corporation notified Arora that it could not forward the summons and complaint because Cigna Health and Life Insurance Company was not in its records, undermining the notion of apparent authority. 

The second argument from Cigna addresses Arora's effort to serve Cigna by certified mail to its offices in Hartford and Philadelphia, which occurred after the 90-day period specified in Rule 4(m). Cigna argues that this delay lacks 'good cause' and that service was otherwise improper. While the court acknowledges the timing issue, it is not convinced that the mere delay warrants dismissal of the action. Overall, the court concludes that Arora has not properly served Cigna, primarily due to the ineffective service via CT Corporation, but remains open to the validity of the certified mailings despite the timing concerns.

Rule 4(m) requires a district court to extend the 90-day service period if the plaintiff demonstrates good cause for failure to timely serve. Good cause is defined as an external factor hindering service, not mere negligence. Even without good cause, the court has discretion to either dismiss the case without prejudice or allow additional time for service. The Advisory Committee notes that the court may extend the service period regardless of whether good cause is shown. It remains unclear if this discretion is limited by the need for "excusable neglect" under Rule 6(b)(2) or by equitable factors.

In evaluating whether an omission is excusable, the court considers several factors: the potential prejudice to the opposing party, the length of delay and its impact on judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay, and the good faith of the movant. The court found Arora’s delay in serving Cigna excusable, negating the need to determine if good cause was established. Despite Cigna’s claims about Arora's sophistication, he is pro se and faces challenges with legal procedures. Arora made multiple attempts to serve Cigna within the required timeframe, and his confusion between Cigna entities was understandable. The court noted that Arora acted diligently and in good faith, with no significant prejudicial effect on Cigna or the proceedings.

While Arora expressed concern that dismissal could time-bar his claims, Cigna countered that Arora did not specify which claims would be affected. The court acknowledged that some claims, such as those for fraud or negligent misrepresentation under Georgia law, have a four-year statute of limitations, allowing for refiling if the case is dismissed without prejudice. Overall, the court found sufficient grounds to extend the service period due to Arora's good faith efforts and the minimal impact of the delay.

Arora's claims against Cigna cannot be confidently determined to be governed by Georgia law or the applicable four-year statute of limitations, as other jurisdictions may have shorter statutes. The Court finds the delay in serving Cigna, from December 8 to December 23, 2016, excusable, but it cannot dismiss Cigna's motion based solely on this delay. Cigna asserts that Arora did not properly serve the complaint, lacking details on who received the documents and whether that individual was authorized to accept service. Arora's claim of service to the "Cigna Incoming Legal Department" and "Cigna Corporate Office" does not sufficiently establish compliance with service requirements under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(h). Consequently, Arora has not met his burden of proving effective service of process. As a result, the Court cannot address Cigna's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, since personal jurisdiction requires proper service, and without it, the Court lacks the authority to proceed.

Arora's motion for an extension of time to serve Cigna is granted, allowing an additional 45 days until August 10, 2017, to effect service. The Court determined that Arora has acted in good faith and with reasonable diligence, and that granting the extension would not unfairly prejudice Cigna. The risk of barring Arora's claims due to statute of limitations uncertainty influenced this decision. However, failure to serve within the extended period will result in dismissal of his claims against Cigna.

Regarding Arora's motion to amend his complaint, the Court noted that he may only amend with the Court's leave since he has already amended once and all defendants oppose further amendments. The Court found that any proposed amendments would be futile or premature, particularly concerning personal jurisdiction over several defendants and the merits of Cigna's motion to dismiss.

Arora's request to amend the civil cover sheet, correcting the case classification from "Medical Malpractice" to "Other Contracts," was also denied as unsupported and unnecessary, having no substantive impact on the Court's jurisdictional conclusions. Ultimately, the Court concluded it lacks personal jurisdiction over several defendants, Arora has not properly served Cigna, and both the motion for leave to amend and the request to amend the civil cover sheet are denied. A separate order will follow.