State v. Thomas L. Scott (077434) (Monmouth and Statewide)

Citation: Not availableDocket: A-86-15

Court: Supreme Court of New Jersey; June 28, 2017; New Jersey; State Supreme Court

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Defendant Thomas L. Scott appeals his conviction for third-degree possession of heroin, asserting that the sentence imposed was excessively harsh. The conviction stems from an incident on November 27, 2012, where, during a police encounter related to an unrelated matter, officers discovered 0.618 grams of heroin in Scott’s pants pocket. Scott's defense claimed he lacked intent to possess the heroin, alleging that his mother, Darlene Barbella, placed it in his pants without his knowledge. 

Although Scott did not testify, he presented testimony from a family friend, Lauren Halbersberg, and submitted a written statement from Barbella. Halbersberg testified that she, Scott, and his cousin were in their shared apartment when Barbella found the heroin on a table and allegedly placed it into a pair of jeans that Scott later wore. There were inconsistencies in Barbella's account, particularly regarding the timeline of events.

Prior to trial, the State sought to cross-examine Barbella regarding two prior instances where she allegedly lied to protect Scott, arguing these instances were relevant under New Jersey Rule of Evidence 404(b) to demonstrate her character as a witness. Defense counsel argued against the admissibility of this evidence, claiming it did not meet the criteria set for Rule 404(b). The trial court ultimately ruled on this evidentiary issue, which is a focal point of the appeal. The appellate court affirmed the conviction and the sentence.

Defense counsel argued that two past incidents of lying by witness Barbella were inadmissible for impeachment purposes under N.J.R.E. 609, as she had not been convicted of any related crimes. The trial court ruled that Rule 404(b), concerning prior bad acts, was not relevant since the matter at hand involved witness impeachment. Instead, the court referenced N.J.R.E. 608 as more applicable but chose not to enforce its prohibition against using specific instances of dishonesty to establish a witness's propensity for untruthfulness. Citing N.J.R.E. 104(a), the court exercised discretion to allow the admission of Barbella's previous lies to the police, which were deemed relevant for cross-examination and rebuttal if she testified. Consequently, defense counsel opted not to call Barbella as a witness, relying on another witness, Halbersberg's, testimony. The jury convicted the defendant on a possession charge, resulting in a five-year prison sentence with a two-and-a-half-year parole ineligibility period. On appeal, the defendant raised two points: the trial court's alleged improper admission of evidence for impeaching a witness not subject to conviction and the assertion that the sentence was excessively harsh. The appellate review emphasized the need for deference to the trial court's evidentiary decisions, suggesting that any potential error in admitting Barbella's past lying was harmless given the overall record. The court found that Rule 404(b) did not support the admission of Barbella's conduct, and while Rule 608 allows impeachment through character evidence, it does not permit proof through specific past acts of dishonesty.

The trial court incorrectly assumed it had the authority to "relax" evidence provisions under Rule 104(a), which is a procedural tool for ruling on evidential matters rather than a basis for admissibility. The Rules of Evidence intentionally exclude a general "relaxation rule," as noted in N.J.R.E. 101(a)(2). On appeal, the State argues that the trial court's evidentiary ruling can be upheld based on Barbella's history of lying to protect her son, indicating bias. The defendant objects to this argument since it was not presented at the trial level, but the appellate court finds it acceptable to consider this alternative argument now. It emphasizes that the focus of appellate review is on the judgment rather than the trial court's reasoning. If the trial court's order is valid, it can be affirmed despite an incorrect basis for its decision.

Regarding the admissibility of evidence related to bias impeachment, the court agrees with the State that Barbella's past actions, if proven, are admissible. Although neither federal nor New Jersey evidence rules explicitly provide for "bias impeachment," common law allows for undermining a witness's credibility based on bias. The Supreme Court case United States v. Abel supports this, allowing extrinsic acts as evidence of bias. Similarly, New Jersey case law recognizes the admissibility of such evidence, affirming that bias is a valid subject for cross-examination in criminal trials, though the trial court may limit this inquiry for various legitimate reasons.

The court upheld the admission of evidence regarding Barbella's past actions, which illustrated her bias in favor of her son, the defendant. This bias is presumed in a mother-son relationship, but the evidence demonstrated Barbella's willingness to lie to authorities, risking her own punishment to protect her son. The trial court's decision to allow this evidence for impeachment purposes was appropriate and not overly prejudicial under N.J.R.E. 403. Even if there had been an error in admitting this evidence, it was deemed a harmless error as Barbella's testimony was largely repetitive of another witness's and unlikely to sway the jury. The jury could have independently assessed her credibility due to their familial relationship.

Regarding the defendant's sentence, the court noted his extensive criminal history, including multiple convictions for drug offenses. The sentencing judge classified him as a "habitual offender," justifying the sentence. Although the judge failed to provide explicit reasons for rejecting certain mitigating factors, this omission was not sufficient to warrant a remand for resentencing due to the strong aggravating factors present. Ultimately, the sentence imposed was deemed reasonable given the circumstances, and the conviction was affirmed.