Hernandez v. Mesa

Citations: 2017 U.S. LEXIS 4059; 137 S. Ct. 2003; 198 L. Ed. 2d 625; 26 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 747; 85 U.S.L.W. 4495; 2017 WL 2722409Docket: 15-118

Court: Supreme Court of the United States; June 26, 2017; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court

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A United States Border Patrol agent, Jesus Mesa, Jr., shot and killed 15-year-old Mexican national Sergio Adrián Hernández Güereca during a cross-border incident. The shooting occurred while Hernández was on Mexican soil, standing near a pillar in a culvert that marks the U.S.-Mexico border. The case raises three legal questions: whether Hernández's parents can bring claims against Mesa under Bivens for alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment (unreasonable seizure) and Fifth Amendment (due process); and whether Mesa can claim qualified immunity. The incident unfolded as Hernández and friends were playing a game near the border when Mesa, on the U.S. side, fired shots across the boundary, striking and killing Hernández, who was reportedly unarmed. The Department of Justice investigated the shooting and concluded that Mesa acted within the guidelines of Customs and Border Patrol policies, finding insufficient evidence to support federal civil rights charges. Hernández's parents subsequently filed a lawsuit against Mesa, which the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas dismissed.

The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit issued a ruling affirming in part and reversing in part a previous decision regarding Hernández's constitutional rights. The panel determined that Hernández had no Fourth Amendment rights, as he was a Mexican citizen without a significant connection to the U.S. at the time of the shooting, which occurred on Mexican soil. However, they found that his Fifth Amendment rights were violated and extended Bivens to this context. Agent Mesa was ruled not entitled to qualified immunity because no reasonable officer could have believed his actions were lawful under the circumstances.

In a subsequent en banc review, the Court unanimously upheld the District Court's dismissal of the claims against Mesa, stating that the petitioners failed to assert a valid Fourth Amendment claim. The en banc court was divided on whether Mesa violated the Fifth Amendment but unanimously agreed that he was entitled to qualified immunity, citing a lack of existing case law that would have warned him about the applicability of excessive force standards in this scenario. The en banc court did not address the potential for a Bivens remedy.

The case was granted certiorari by the Supreme Court, which vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded for further proceedings. The Supreme Court chose to address the Bivens issue first, emphasizing that a remedy is not available where special factors suggest hesitation without congressional action. The Court noted that the Court of Appeals had not yet considered the implications of its recent decision in Ziglar v. Abbasi, which clarified what constitutes a special factor for such cases, and indicated that it is more suitable for the Court of Appeals to analyze this issue initially.

The en banc Court of Appeals ruled that Hernández had no Fourth Amendment rights in this case, making it unnecessary to address the Bivens question. This approach, which resolves constitutional questions without determining the availability of a Bivens remedy, has precedent in previous cases. However, the Court noted the sensitivity and potential implications of the Fourth Amendment issue, suggesting it might be imprudent to resolve it given recent guidance in Abbasi. Regarding the Fifth Amendment claim, the Court of Appeals concluded that Mesa was entitled to qualified immunity, reasoning that Hernández was an alien without significant ties to the U.S. However, this conclusion is problematic since Mesa was unaware of Hernández's nationality or ties at the time of the incident. Qualified immunity protects officials from liability unless their actions violate clearly established constitutional rights known to a reasonable person. The analysis focuses on facts known at the time of the conduct, disregarding post-incident information. Mesa's uncertainty about Hernández's status does not automatically grant immunity, and the Government's assertion that the claim is solely under the Fourth Amendment is not addressed by the Court. The Court vacated the Court of Appeals' judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, stating that the determination of damages and the applicability of claims should be made by the Court of Appeals. Justice Gorsuch did not participate in the decision, while Justice Thomas dissented, advocating for a direct resolution of the Bivens question instead of remanding. He expressed the belief that Bivens should be confined to its original context.

The case involves the constitutional tort action brought by the parents of Sergio Adrián Hernández Güereca against U.S. Border Patrol agent Jesus Mesa, Jr., who shot and killed Hernández on June 7, 2010. The incident occurred while Hernández was on the Mexican side of a culvert straddling the U.S.-Mexico border. The Court of Appeals ruled that Hernández lacked Fourth Amendment rights because he was not a U.S. citizen, was on Mexican soil at the time, and had no significant voluntary connection to the U.S. Justice Breyer, dissenting, argues against this ruling, asserting that the Fourth Amendment should apply despite Hernández's location and citizenship status. Breyer emphasizes that the context—specifically, the cross-border nature of the incident and the actions of a federal officer—is critical. He notes that the culvert does not have clear physical demarcations of sovereignty and has historically been treated as a border area. Breyer cites precedents indicating that constitutional protections extend beyond strict territorial boundaries, advocating that Hernández's rights were violated under the Fourth Amendment, which prohibits excessive force by law enforcement.

The river's flooding altered its course and sparked disputes over the U.S.-Mexico border in the Ciudad Juarez-El Paso area. In the 1960s, the two countries negotiated the Chamizal Convention to relocate the river channel, with both nations sharing costs and establishing a bilateral commission to oversee the project, which included the construction and maintenance of the new channel. President Johnson celebrated the completion of this effort, symbolizing cultural bridges between the nations. The United States contributed approximately $45 million to the project. Subsequent treaties ensured joint maintenance of the Rio Grande and Colorado River, with an International Boundary and Water Commission managing limitrophe areas. International law recognizes special obligations concerning these boundary areas, historically defined by natural features but increasingly marked by engineered lines. Modern boundaries have created regions governed by unique legal and cooperative frameworks, reflecting a regime of voisinage that promotes collaboration, shared resources, and infrastructure between neighboring countries.

Compensation is mandated for losses resulting from incorrect sovereign actions in hot pursuit, as outlined in Article 111(8) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Applying the Fourth Amendment to the culvert is essential to avoid significant anomalies, particularly highlighted by the Court of Appeals' arbitrary distinction based on an imaginary line. The behavior of a U.S. Border Patrol agent remains unchanged regardless of this line's position. Numerous daily crossings between El Paso and Ciudad Juarez complicate any legal distinction based on an invisible boundary. As such, the entire culvert should be considered under Fourth Amendment protections due to its significant connection to the U.S. The case should be remanded for further examination of Bivens and qualified immunity issues, as neither lower court addressed whether Bivens applies. The dissent emphasizes the importance of these considerations in reaching a conclusion that the Fourth Amendment is applicable.