Hupp v. Solera Oak Valley Greens Assn.

Citation: Not availableDocket: E065766

Court: California Court of Appeal; June 23, 2017; California; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Aristea Hupp appeals a judgment from the Superior Court of Riverside County, which granted the Solera Oak Valley Greens Association and City of Beaumont Animal Control Officer Jack Huntsman’s ex parte application to dismiss her first amended complaint (FAC) under the vexatious litigant statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 391.7. Aristea claims this dismissal violated her due process rights by denying her notice and an opportunity to be heard, and argues that Solera waived its vexatious litigant defense by not raising it in its initial responsive pleading. She also contends that under the Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act, she can seek damages for violations of Solera’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) on behalf of her son, Paul Hupp.

The court identifies "Solera" as encompassing both the Solera Oak Valley Greens Association and Huntsman. Prior to oral arguments, the court requested supplemental briefings on whether vexatious litigant statutes could apply to a party not declared as such, like Aristea. The court affirms the dismissal of claims in the FAC benefiting Paul, who is a declared vexatious litigant, but reverses the dismissal for claims personal to Aristea. The court directs that all allegations related to Paul be stricken from the FAC. Additionally, Paul Hupp, although a law school graduate, is not a practicing attorney and previously attempted to represent Aristea without proper standing. Aristea's request for judicial notice regarding a transcript from a hearing is granted.

On January 7, 2014, the Riverside County Superior Court declared Paul Hupp a vexatious litigant, requiring him to obtain a prefiling order for any future legal complaints as a self-represented plaintiff. In August 2015, Paul and his mother, Aristea Hupp, filed a complaint against the Solera Oak Valley Greens Association in federal court. The association manages a gated community in Beaumont, with five resident gates and one guest entry gate. The complaint arose from a new rule adopted in late 2014, mandating that pit bulls be muzzled in common areas. The Hupps objected to the muzzle rule, arguing it inaccurately labeled pit bulls as "the most dangerous breed" and lacked clarity on enforcement and identification of the breed.

Following a meeting in December 2014 concerning the rule's enforcement, the Hupps continued to walk their dogs without muzzles, leading to Solera imposing a $200 fine on Aristea in April 2015. The Hupps contested the fine and threatened legal action just before a disciplinary hearing. Subsequently, Solera deactivated the Hupps' remote access to the community, forcing them to enter through the guest gate, causing delays. The Hupps' federal complaint included allegations of civil rights violations, due process infringements, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. In October 2015, the federal court dismissed their complaint without leave to amend, citing a failure to state a federal claim and declining to exercise jurisdiction over state law claims.

Aristea filed a complaint in the Riverside County Superior Court shortly after a dismissal, representing herself throughout the trial and appeal. The allegations mirrored those of a previously dismissed federal complaint by the Hupps. Aristea claimed that in March 2014, a Solera neighbor installed surveillance cameras directed at the Hupps' home, violating Solera's CC&Rs, which were not enforced. Additional allegations included instances where Solera employees, Timothy Taylor and Samuel Rojas, filmed Paul Hupp on multiple occasions while he walked his dogs. The Hupps sought to review Solera’s contracts and financial information, but their request was denied.

The Complaint included claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, private nuisance, violation of the Davis-Stirling Act, invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and defamation. Although only Aristea was named in the caption, both Aristea and Paul were recognized as plaintiffs in the body of the Complaint. On November 24, 2015, Solera filed a motion to quash service of summons, arguing that service was improper because Paul served the Complaint despite being a party to the action. The trial court granted this motion on December 24, 2015, allowing the Hupps to amend their Complaint.

Aristea subsequently filed a first amended complaint (FAC) on January 12, 2016, which excluded references to Paul as a plaintiff in the caption, stating only Aristea was suing in propria persona. However, many allegations remained unchanged, and new claims concerning Davis-Stirling Act violations were added. The FAC retained references to Paul and included defamation and private nuisance claims involving him as the subject. On January 26, 2016, Solera filed a notice regarding a vexatious litigant order against Paul, asserting that the lawsuit violated California’s vexatious litigant statutes due to a prior ruling.

Paul Hupp has filed a Complaint and a First Amended Complaint (FAC) despite being previously declared a vexatious litigant under Code of Civil Procedure section 391.7(c), which automatically stays the litigation and requires dismissal unless the plaintiffs obtain a court order within ten days. A footnote clarifies that while Paul Hupp is referred to as a plaintiff within the body of the Complaint, he is not named in the Caption, which lists only Aristea Hupp. On February 9, 2016, Solera submitted an ex parte application to dismiss the FAC, arguing that it contained the same allegations as the previously dismissed Complaint and asserting that Paul was effectively a plaintiff in the FAC. Solera noted that the Hupps had not sought permission from the presiding judge to file the FAC. Solera's attorney, Theodore Dokko, provided a declaration stating that more than ten days had elapsed since the Hupps were notified of the vexatious litigant order without obtaining approval for their filing. Dokko communicated with Paul and Aristea via voicemail and email regarding the upcoming ex parte hearing set for February 10, 2016, to address the dismissal request. On that date, the court granted Solera's motion for dismissal as the Hupps did not attend or oppose the application. Subsequently, Aristea filed a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal order, scheduled for April 4, 2016.

Aristea's supporting declaration asserts she did not receive notice of the vexatious litigant order or the ex parte application to dismiss. She claims she was not declared a vexatious litigant and that she communicated her opposition to Solera’s application to the court clerk via voicemail on February 9 and February 10, 2016. Despite her efforts, the court dismissed her case on March 1, 2016, prior to hearing her motion for reconsideration, which was subsequently denied due to lack of jurisdiction and absence of new facts. Paul, appearing on his own behalf, was not allowed to represent Aristea due to his lack of legal credentials in California. Following the denial of her reconsideration motion, Aristea appealed the dismissal judgment, arguing that her due process rights were violated due to insufficient notice and opportunity for a hearing.

The appeal's standard of review for the ex parte dismissal order is for abuse of discretion, meaning the court's decision will be upheld unless it clearly exceeds reasonable bounds. Aristea contended that Solera waived its vexatious litigant defense by not raising it initially; however, the court found no merit in this claim. According to section 391.7(c), there is no requirement for the vexatious litigant notice to be filed at the defendant's first appearance, and thus no waiver occurred. Solera's initial appearance was considered special, and the vexatious litigant notice was filed appropriately after Aristea's amended complaint. Consequently, Solera did not forfeit its objection based on the procedural context.

Aristea's First Amended Complaint (FAC) was dismissed under section 391.7(c) due to its association with Paul, who was previously declared a vexatious litigant. The trial court determined that the FAC was an attempt by Paul to evade the restrictions imposed by the vexatious litigant statutes, which prevent him from filing complaints in propria persona. The vexatious litigant statutes aim to prevent misuse of the court system by individuals who repeatedly litigate the same issues, thereby wasting court resources and affecting other parties' access to the courts.

Section 391.7, enacted in 1990, allows courts to issue pre-filing orders restricting vexatious litigants from initiating new litigation without prior approval from the presiding judge. If a court clerk erroneously files a case from a vexatious litigant without the necessary order, any party can notify the court of the litigant's status, which will automatically stay the litigation. The vexatious litigant must then obtain permission to proceed within ten days, or the case is dismissed. A defendant does not need to prove the plaintiff's vexatious status again if it has already been established.

Aristea also argued that her due process rights were violated due to a lack of adequate notice regarding the ex parte application for dismissal. She claimed she was entitled to 16 court days of notice and access to the moving papers according to section 1005, subdivision (b). This section stipulates that moving papers should be served at least 16 court days before a hearing, with an extension of five calendar days if served by mail. The court has the discretion to shorten this notice period.

A plaintiff identified as a vexatious litigant, served with a notice of vexatious litigant order under section 391.7(c), faces automatic dismissal of litigation unless they obtain permission from the presiding judge within 10 days. While section 391.7 allows for dismissal without meeting section 1005 notice requirements, it does not deny access to the courts but aims to prevent the initiation of meritless lawsuits. In this case, Solera served the Hupps with a notice on January 25, 2016, highlighting that the trial court wrongly allowed the filing of the First Amended Complaint (FAC) despite an earlier order declaring Paul a vexatious litigant. Neither Paul nor Aristea secured the required permission to file the Complaint or FAC. Following the 10-day period, Solera properly filed to dismiss the FAC regarding Paul, who failed to obtain prefiling permission and did not respond to the notice or attend the dismissal hearing, forfeiting objections to the dismissal of his claims. Although Aristea claimed the right to assert Paul’s claims under the Davis-Stirling Act, she lacked standing, and Paul could not bypass the vexatious litigant statutes by having her file on his behalf. Consequently, the trial court's dismissal of all claims made by or for Paul in the FAC was justified. The authority to dismiss claims personal to Aristea under vexatious litigant statutes raises a novel legal question, with no direct case law addressing this specific issue. Existing cases have extended the vexatious litigant law to attorneys and entities related to vexatious litigants but do not resolve the current matter.

Aristea is acting pro se and has not been declared a vexatious litigant, nor is she an alter ego of a vexatious litigant corporation. Her claims are distinct from those of Paul, who initiated the litigation and may have drafted her pleadings, but there is no evidence of this in court. The legal precedent set in Shieh, where a plaintiff was declared a vexatious litigant due to a pattern of frivolous claims, does not apply to Aristea, as she has no history of such behavior and is not subject to a prefiling order. While Paul has been declared a vexatious litigant and cannot pursue claims without authorization, Aristea's individual claims cannot be dismissed under the vexatious litigant statutes simply because Paul may have influenced them. The court emphasizes that Aristea's situation differs significantly from Shieh's, as she has not been found to be acting as a mere conduit for Paul's claims. The mention of Say. Say, Inc. highlights a related case where a corporation was deemed a vexatious litigant, but this does not impact Aristea's standing or claims.

The trial court dismissed Shieh's case due to his failure to post security as a vexatious litigant, while Say. Say, Inc. remained in the case. Both parties appealed, but the appellate court found Shieh did not demonstrate merit, denied his appeal, and dismissed it. The appellate court then initiated an inquiry into whether Say. Say, Inc. was a vexatious litigant. It determined that, under section 391, subdivision (b), a vexatious litigant is typically an individual appearing in propria persona, but since Say. Say, Inc. is a corporation, it cannot do so without counsel. However, the court found that the principles of disregarding corporate fiction applied, concluding Say. Say, Inc. could be deemed a vexatious litigant due to its close association with Shieh's conduct. The court noted that Shieh and Say. Say, Inc. engaged in numerous litigation efforts to evade the vexatious litigant law, which led to the declaration of Say. Say, Inc. as a vexatious litigant.

In contrast, the situation involving Paul and Aristea differs. Although Paul appears to use Aristea to bypass the vexatious litigant law, the necessary declaration that Aristea is a vexatious litigant has not occurred. Unlike the intertwined relationship between Say. Say, Inc. and Shieh, Aristea and Paul are distinct individuals with potentially separate rights. Consequently, the court cannot dismiss Aristea's claims solely based on Paul’s vexatious litigant status. The court acknowledges its inherent authority to dismiss frivolous claims to prevent judicial abuse, but this is distinct from the ministerial powers granted under section 391.7, subdivision (c).

The dismissal of the First Amended Complaint (FAC) was grounded in vexatious litigant statutes, which permit automatic dismissal or expedited notice of dismissal only for claims initiated by a vexatious litigant. Dismissal for meritless actions requires adherence to section 1005, subdivision (b), which mandates proper notice—a requirement not met in this case regarding Aristea's claims. No existing case law directly addresses scenarios where a vexatious litigant, Paul, instigates litigation through another individual, Aristea, who is also pursuing her separate claims. Paul, not being a licensed attorney, is accused of drafting and filing pleadings for Aristea to further his agenda. 

The situation parallels *In re Kinney*, where attorney Charles Kinney, declared a vexatious litigant, attempted to circumvent restrictions by using Kimberly Jean Kempton as a proxy plaintiff. The court found Kinney was essentially using Kempton to continue his vexatious practices, benefitting from the litigation while failing to uphold ethical obligations. The court issued a prefiling order restricting Kinney from initiating new lawsuits without judicial approval.

In contrast, the current case differs significantly from *Kinney*. Although Aristea may be perceived as a conduit for Paul's litigation, he was not her attorney of record and was barred from representing her due to lack of licensure. Additionally, the case does not involve an order to show cause regarding the vexatious litigant status of either Paul or Aristea; it solely pertains to the dismissal of Aristea’s complaint linked to a vexatious litigant order against Paul.

The appellate court's order in Kinney specifically prohibited the attorney Kinney, identified as a vexatious litigant, from filing new litigation without a prefiling order, unlike the current case involving Aristea and her son Paul. Here, Aristea is not barred under section 391.7(c) from pursuing her own claims related to her property interests, whereas Paul is a vexatious litigant and cannot bring claims. The court noted that the First Amended Complaint (FAC) was filed with the court, which then dismissed it entirely at Solera’s ex parte application. The appellate court found that this dismissal of Aristea’s personal claims was erroneous and emphasized that valid claims from nonvexatious litigants should not be dismissed ex parte, even when included in a complaint with vexatious litigant claims. The court clarified that it was not adding language to section 391.7(c) but was applying it to the case's unique facts. Solera's argument for a broader interpretation of section 391.7(c) to require dismissal of nonvexatious litigants’ claims was rejected, as the statute only addresses litigation by vexatious litigants. The court criticized Paul for his continued disruptive behavior in the legal system, including filing documents on behalf of Aristea without a license, while affirming Aristea’s right to pursue her claims. The trial court is instructed to consider whether to declare Aristea a vexatious litigant due to her association with Paul and to impose restrictions on Paul’s ability to file litigation without the presiding judge's approval.

The judgment of dismissal is affirmed concerning any claims in the First Amended Complaint (FAC) that are brought by or benefit Paul. However, the judgment is reversed for claims that are solely personal to Aristea. The trial court is instructed to remove all allegations mentioning Paul and any claims seeking recovery on his behalf from the FAC. Each party is to bear its own costs on appeal. Additionally, Solera's request for judicial notice of two documents related to Paul's prior appeal and complaint is denied due to their irrelevance to the current appeal. Similarly, Aristea's request for judicial notice of two trial court documents concerning a separate vexatious litigant matter is denied for the same reason, as these documents were not presented during the trial court's ruling on the dismissal.