State v. Blair

Citations: 361 Or. 527; 396 P.3d 908; 2017 Ore. LEXIS 417Docket: S064262

Court: Oregon Supreme Court; June 15, 2017; Oregon; State Supreme Court

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The Supreme Court of Oregon reviewed the case of State of Oregon v. Danny Lee Blair, concerning a warrantless search of Blair's backpack that yielded drugs. Prior to his trial for possession of a controlled substance, Blair sought to suppress the evidence, arguing that the search violated Article I, section 9 of the Oregon Constitution. The trial court denied his motion, leading to his conviction. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that while Blair consented to the search of his backpack, this consent did not extend to untying and searching an opaque grocery bag inside the backpack where the drugs were located.

The State sought review, contending that Blair’s unqualified consent should imply permission to search any unlocked containers within the backpack. The Supreme Court disagreed, emphasizing that the key question was whether Blair intended to consent to the search of closed containers. The Court found that it was unclear if the trial court properly understood this inquiry, and noted that the evidence could support different inferences regarding Blair's intent. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, vacated the circuit court's judgment, and remanded the case for reconsideration under the appropriate legal standard.

The Court of Appeals' decision has been reversed, vacating the defendant's conviction and remanding the case to the circuit court to reevaluate its suppression ruling based on the proper legal standard. The relevant facts involve a response by the Tillamook County Sheriff’s Office to a report of a man being chased. The defendant, whom officers found agitated and disheveled, claimed to have lost belongings including a backpack. Officer Jackson accompanied the defendant to retrieve the backpack, during which Jackson suspected drug involvement and sought consent to search it. The defendant consented, leading to the discovery of psilocybin mushrooms in a knotted grocery bag within the backpack. The defendant was charged with unlawful possession of a controlled substance and later moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the search was unconstitutional. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that consent was voluntary and included the search of the grocery bag. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, emphasizing that the scope of consent depends on what a reasonable person would understand from the interaction between the officer and the suspect. The court rejected the state's presumption that general consent to search encompasses closed containers within the searched item unless the context indicates items may be hidden there.

The court found insufficient evidence to determine that a reasonable person would believe the defendant consented to the search of a knotted grocery bag in his backpack. Consequently, the warrantless search was deemed unlawful, leading to the suppression of the evidence obtained from it. The Court of Appeals reversed the defendant's conviction and remanded the case. 

On review, the primary issue is the scope of consent for warrantless searches under Article I, section 9. The Court of Appeals had established a test for these situations, which involves assessing what a reasonable person would understand from the interaction between the officer and the suspect, considering the totality of circumstances. The state, while not disputing this test, proposed a "default" rule for cases involving "nested" closed containers, arguing that unqualified consent to search a closed container should extend to all closed, unlocked containers within it unless specific circumstances suggest otherwise. The state contended that the term "search" implies a thorough inspection, which a reasonable person would interpret as including the contents of additional containers. It also argued that an officer's request to search would lead a reasonable person to believe the officer is seeking evidence of illegal activities, thereby extending the consent to inspect inside other containers.

In contrast, the defendant argued that the state's proposed rule contradicts the "totality of the circumstances" test by placing undue emphasis on the terms "search" and the officer's status, without adequately considering how these factors interact with the surrounding circumstances.

Defendant contends that the proposed rule by the state improperly shifts the burden of proving lack of consent onto the defendant instead of maintaining it with the state. Citing the 'totality of the circumstances' test, the defendant argues that he would not have understood his consent to encompass the search of any closed containers within his backpack. Consequently, he claims the trial court erred in ruling that the officer acted within the scope of his consent when searching a grocery bag found inside the backpack. 

The court must first assess whether the standard for determining the scope of consent, which the state’s proposed rule is based upon, aligns with Article I, section 9 of the Oregon Constitution. This standard was first established in State v. Arroyo-Sotelo, adopting an 'objective reasonableness' approach used in Fourth Amendment cases, focusing on how a typical reasonable person would interpret the exchange between the officer and the suspect. Oregon courts have traditionally evaluated the intent of consent objectively, considering the totality of circumstances. 

The court concludes that the 'objective reasonableness' standard from Florida v. Jimeno aligns with Article I, section 9. Under this standard, the understanding of a reasonable person during the interaction between the officer and the defendant is critical. Although the parties have attempted to apply this standard, the court acknowledges its independent duty to determine the correct standard for evaluating consent. Article I, section 9 guarantees the right against 'unreasonable' searches and seizures, with warrantless searches generally deemed unreasonable unless they fall within specific exceptions. The burden lies with the state to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that an exception to the warrant requirement is applicable.

The consent exception to the warrant requirement differs from other exceptions, as it operates on the premise that when an individual voluntarily grants permission for a governmental search, they forfeit their privacy interest, thus negating the need for justification of the intrusion. This concept is contingent on the actual intent of the individual giving consent. In Bonilla, the court clarified that a mistaken belief by police regarding a person's authority to consent does not satisfy the requirements of Article I, section 9. The scope of consent is defined from the perspective of the consenting individual, as highlighted in Weaver, which required evidence of intent for retroactive consent. This approach contrasts with the Fourth Amendment's treatment of consent, where decisions tend to emphasize an objective standard of reasonableness from the police's viewpoint, as seen in Illinois v. Rodriguez. Federal cases often disregard the subjective understanding of those consenting when evaluating voluntariness. The totality of circumstances test in federal courts does not necessarily reflect the actual understanding and intention of the consenting party, as established in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, which stated that a person's awareness of their right to refuse consent is not essential for determining the voluntariness of that consent.

The court emphasized the need to balance the government's legitimate interest in obtaining consent for searches with the requirement to ensure that such consent is not coerced. In the case of Schneckloth, the court determined that the voluntariness of consent is a factual question assessed through the totality of the circumstances, including objective police conduct and the defendant's subjective understanding. Oregon case law, specifically State v. Stevens, indicates that the defendant's actual understanding and intent are crucial in evaluating voluntariness. 

Regarding the scope of consent, the inquiry focuses on the individual's actual understanding and intent, despite the inherent challenges of subjective assessments in ensuring consistent application of the law. The court maintains that a person's expressed intent is a key indicator of their understanding, and trial courts must evaluate the totality of circumstances to ascertain the defendant's actual intentions. Findings of fact by the trial court are binding if supported by sufficient evidence. However, if the defendant's intent is clearly expressed, that manifestation will prevail, influencing how reasonable individuals interpret their interactions with police.

The state proposed a corollary rule asserting that when a police officer requests consent to "search" an item, it should be interpreted as permission to inspect any closed containers within that item. The state argued that consent given without qualifications should imply consent to search closed but unlocked containers. The court disagreed, stating that such a rule would overly restrict the constitutional inquiry to two factors: the requestor's identity as a police officer and the terminology used in the request.

Two factors are not sufficient to override other surrounding circumstances in determining the scope of a defendant's consent to a search. Specifically, while a police officer’s general request to search an outward container and the defendant’s affirmative response may suggest consent, these facts alone do not necessarily imply consent to inspect closed containers within. The general nature of the request could indicate a brief, casual inspection rather than an extensive search. Without additional evidence clarifying the scope of consent, the situation may be seen as evenly balanced, leading to a failure of the state to meet its burden of proof.

The court rejects the state’s proposed default rule, emphasizing the need to consider the totality of circumstances to discern the defendant's actual intent regarding consent. If a defendant’s intent regarding consent is clearly expressed, that expression will prevail.

In the case at hand, different interpretations arise from the officer’s vague request and the defendant’s response. Evidence suggests the defendant may have been under the influence of drugs at the time, potentially indicating a mutual understanding that consent extended to a search for drugs within any closed containers. Conversely, the officer's request, coupled with the friendly interaction and the context of responding to a possible crime against the defendant, might imply that the search was not for specific items. This ambiguity underscores the complexity of determining the true intent and understanding of consent in this scenario.

The inference that Jackson acted as an ally of the defendant does not provide a clear rationale for why he would search the defendant's property or what he was seeking, suggesting instead that Jackson was not looking for drugs or contraband. The circumstances of their encounter imply that Jackson's request could either be a standard safety procedure or, from the defendant's perspective, unexpected, leaving him unprepared to recognize the implications of the request. The state argues that the defendant’s consent to search the knotted grocery bag can be inferred from his lack of objection as Jackson began to open it. However, this assertion is flawed, as it assumes the defendant had the opportunity to object, which is not supported by evidence; he may not have been aware that Jackson was opening the bag until it occurred. Thus, the defendant's silence does not clearly indicate consent to search the closed containers within the backpack. The record does not clarify whether the trial court found that the defendant intended to consent to this search. Although typically, a trial court's factual findings are presumed to align with its decisions, it is uncertain here if the court recognized the appropriate scope of consent. Consequently, the case is remanded to allow the trial court to assess the scope of the defendant's consent under the correct legal standard. The Court of Appeals' decision is reversed, and the circuit court's judgment is vacated for further proceedings.