Christina J. Greenfield v. Ian D. Smith

Citations: 162 Idaho 246; 395 P.3d 1279; 2017 WL 2438759; 2017 Ida. LEXIS 165Docket: 43831

Court: Idaho Supreme Court; June 6, 2017; Idaho; State Supreme Court

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The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the district court's judgment in a legal malpractice case involving Christina J. Greenfield and her former attorney, Ian D. Smith. Greenfield had hired Smith for representation in a civil suit against her neighbors and later in a criminal matter, ultimately being acquitted of the criminal charges. After Smith withdrew from the civil case due to a breakdown in their attorney-client relationship, Greenfield represented herself at trial, resulting in a jury verdict against her and a significant damages award to the neighbors.

Greenfield filed a malpractice suit against Smith on December 1, 2014, alleging multiple failures in representation. Smith moved for summary judgment, claiming that Greenfield's claims were time-barred and that she could not establish the necessary elements of malpractice without expert testimony. Greenfield countered that her claims were timely and that expert testimony was not required.

The district court granted Smith's summary judgment motion, leading to Greenfield's appeal. The key issues on appeal included the statute of limitations for malpractice claims, the necessity of expert testimony in establishing malpractice, and Smith's entitlement to attorney’s fees on appeal. The Supreme Court upheld the lower court's decision, affirming that Greenfield's claims were indeed time-barred and that her lack of expert affidavits was detrimental to her case.

The standard of review for a district court's summary judgment decision requires the appellate court to apply the same standard as the trial court. Summary judgment is granted when there are no genuine issues of material fact, allowing the moving party to be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court reviews pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits, considering facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. To survive a summary judgment motion, the non-moving party must establish the existence of essential elements of their case for which they bear the burden of proof.

In the analysis section, it is determined that the district court erred in ruling that Greenfield's civil claims were time barred by the two-year statute of limitations for professional malpractice under Idaho law. Greenfield filed her complaint on December 1, 2014, including various claims such as negligence and fraud, some stemming from criminal representation and others from civil representation. The district court dismissed the fraud claim for lack of particularity and ruled that all other claims were subject to the two-year statute, concluding they were filed too late. Greenfield argues that her claims should instead be governed by a five-year statute of limitations for breach of written contract and that the court miscalculated the accrual date for the civil claims. The court agrees that the district court miscalculated the deadline for the civil claims while acknowledging that the two-year statute applies to professional malpractice claims, rejecting Greenfield's assertion that her case is purely a contract dispute.

Section 5-214 outlines the timeframes for initiating actions, with Section 5-219(4) establishing a two-year statute of limitations for professional malpractice claims. These claims arise from wrongful acts or omissions by licensed professionals in Idaho and include actions based on breach of implied warranties or covenants. In Lapham v. Stewart, the court clarified that professional malpractice encompasses claims traditionally considered contractual. The case involved a plaintiff alleging negligence, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty against an attorney, with all claims deemed subject to the two-year limitation. The court emphasized that the label of a cause of action does not exempt it from this statute. A contract basis for malpractice claims is recognized only when an attorney fails to meet an elevated standard of care explicitly stated in a written agreement. In Greenfield's situation, her claims against attorney Smith, which arose from his alleged inadequate representation, were treated as professional malpractice claims since no specific contractual breach was identified. The district court miscalculated the filing deadline for her claims, mistakenly interpreting the statute of limitations as expiring on November 30, 2014, without accounting for that date falling on a Sunday. Although the court correctly identified the date of damage as November 30, 2012, it failed to recognize that the complaint filed on December 1, 2014, was timely.

The district court's finding of "some damage" indicates that the statute of limitations for Greenfield's malpractice claim expired on November 30, 2014, two years after the adverse verdict, but since this date fell on a Sunday, it was excluded under Idaho Code § 73-109, making December 1, 2014, the final day to file the complaint. Consequently, Greenfield's complaint was timely, and the district court erred in ruling otherwise. However, this conclusion does not extend to criminal claims, which the district court correctly deemed untimely, as Greenfield did not contest the start of the limitations period from her acquittal on October 13, 2011.

Greenfield's failure to present expert affidavits concerning the attorney's standard of care and causation led to the district court granting Smith's summary judgment motion. Smith argued that without expert testimony, Greenfield could not demonstrate that his conduct fell below the requisite standard of care or that it caused her damages. Although Greenfield provided her affidavit outlining Smith's deficiencies, she claimed she should have been allowed to testify without expert evidence. To succeed in a legal malpractice claim, a plaintiff must establish the attorney-client relationship, the lawyer’s duty, a breach of that duty, and that the breach resulted in damages. Additionally, in civil malpractice cases, the plaintiff must show "some chance of success" in the original case. Typically, expert affidavits are required to prove the attorney's conduct fell below the standard of care, as jurors generally lack the expertise to assess legal standards. The only exception is when the malpractice is apparent to laypersons, such as allowing a statute of limitations to expire.

Smith filed a motion for summary judgment, accompanied by an affidavit and expert report asserting that he met and exceeded the standard of care in representing Ms. Greenfield. The expert analyzed Greenfield's alleged deficiencies and concluded they did not cause the jury’s negative verdict. Greenfield did not provide expert affidavits to counter Smith's claims and failed to disclose any expert witnesses during discovery. Instead, she submitted her own affidavit outlining perceived deficiencies in Smith's performance, such as not filing a motion to compel discovery and failing to prepare adequately for hearings. These claims involve complex legal decisions that required expert testimony to establish whether Smith's actions fell below the standard of care and caused her damages. Consequently, the court granted summary judgment in Smith's favor.

Greenfield, representing herself, argued the court should have informed her about the implications of a summary judgment motion. However, Idaho law states that pro se litigants are held to the same standards as those with legal representation, and there is no special consideration for self-representation. The record shows that Greenfield was aware of the summary judgment implications, as she actively defended against the motion with briefs and affidavits. Her loss was attributed to the lack of expert testimony rather than any misunderstanding of summary judgment's effects. The court found no merit in her claims regarding the district court’s duty to advise her.

Greenfield's additional arguments are not considered due to an inadequate record on appeal, placing the burden on the appellant to provide sufficient documentation to support claims. Greenfield contends that her case was prematurely dismissed before discovery concluded, but the Court will not assume error without an adequate record. The record lacks a motion for continuance under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f), even though such a motion was noted in the Register of Actions as filed two weeks post-hearing. Greenfield also claims late disclosure of the defense expert and improper supporting affidavits by Smith; however, there was no motion to strike filed during the summary judgment hearing, and a motion to strike filed later was also not included in the record. Therefore, these issues are not considered. Smith's request for attorney's fees under Idaho Code section 12-121 is denied, as Greenfield raised a valid legal issue regarding the statute of limitations, and her case's pursuit does not meet the criteria for frivolousness. The judgment in favor of Smith is affirmed, with costs awarded to Smith. Chief Justice Burdick and Justices Eismann, Jones, and Horton concur.