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Kevin Brott v. United States

Citations: 858 F.3d 425; 2017 FED App. 0115P; 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 9515; 2017 WL 2346989Docket: 16-1466

Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; May 31, 2017; Federal Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Twenty-three landowners in Michigan filed a lawsuit against the United States, seeking compensation over $10,000 for an alleged taking of their land for a public recreational trail. They contended that their claims should be heard in an Article III court with a jury trial. However, the court determined that Congress had constitutionally assigned exclusive jurisdiction over such compensation claims to the Court of Federal Claims, an Article I court, and eliminated the right to a jury trial in this context under the Little Tucker Act. The landowners asserted three claims: (1) a Fifth Amendment claim for just compensation under the Little Tucker Act, (2) a Fifth Amendment claim under 28 U.S.C. 1331, and (3) a request for a declaratory judgment regarding jurisdiction. The district court ruled that the statutory framework of the Tucker Act and the Little Tucker Act did not present any constitutional issues, despite restricting the landowners' ability to pursue claims over $10,000 in an Article III court and denying them a jury trial. As the landowners did not establish the unconstitutionality of these acts, the court dismissed their complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The case was subsequently appealed.

Subject-matter jurisdiction and statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. The burden of proof for subject matter jurisdiction lies with the party opposing dismissal. The landowners claim federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 for their Fifth Amendment claims. They also argue that the Tucker Act and Little Tucker Act, which grant exclusive jurisdiction to the Court of Federal Claims for just-compensation claims, are unconstitutional as they deny review in an Article III court and a jury trial, as the Court of Federal Claims does not provide jury trials. The jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims is exercised by a single judge, and actions under the Little Tucker Act are tried without a jury, except for a specific exception not relevant here. The landowners have appealed their Little Tucker Act claim to the Federal Circuit, which has stayed the appeal pending the Sixth Circuit's ruling on jurisdiction. Federal district courts lack jurisdiction for just-compensation claims against the United States exceeding $10,000, with the Tucker Act conferring jurisdiction over such claims to the Court of Federal Claims. The Little Tucker Act allows federal district courts concurrent jurisdiction for claims under $10,000. Together, these Acts delineate the jurisdictional boundaries for non-tort claims for damages against the United States.

The Tucker Act grants the Court of Federal Claims exclusive jurisdiction over claims against the United States for money damages exceeding $10,000 based on the Constitution, federal statutes, executive regulations, or contracts, as clarified in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998). A takings claim for monetary compensation must be filed in this court, while a declaratory judgment action regarding government takings can be filed in federal district court. The Court of Federal Claims has exclusive jurisdiction unless Congress specifies otherwise. Claims founded on the Constitution, including Fifth Amendment takings, are within the Court of Claims' jurisdiction. The general federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331 does not apply when Congress has designated a specific forum, as seen in related case law. 28 U.S.C. 1346(a)(2) limits district court jurisdiction for claims against the government to those not exceeding $10,000, reinforcing the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims for larger claims. Hence, the district court correctly ruled that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331 for the landowners' compensation claims, affirming that the Court of Federal Claims is the proper forum.

Landowners contend that the Tucker Act and Little Tucker Act's exclusive jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims for claims exceeding $10,000 is unconstitutional. They argue this violates their Fifth Amendment rights to an Article III forum and Seventh Amendment rights to a jury trial. However, they are not entitled to have these constitutional claims considered by an Article III court or jury, as any lawsuits against the United States rely on a waiver of sovereign immunity, which requires the government’s consent. The United States cannot be sued without its consent, and this waiver must be unequivocal and strictly interpreted. Jurisdiction over suits against the U.S. is granted by Congress, which can condition, restrict, or withdraw it at any time. The Tucker Act serves as a limited waiver of sovereign immunity, allowing claims for money damages against the U.S. but does not create substantive rights; it merely provides jurisdictional guidelines for claims based on other laws.

Congress has established that any lawsuits seeking monetary damages against the United States must adhere to the procedures outlined in the Tucker Act and the Little Tucker Act. Specifically, claims for just compensation exceeding $10,000 must be filed in the Court of Federal Claims. The landowners contend that a waiver of sovereign immunity is unnecessary when enforcing rights based on the Constitution, arguing that sovereign immunity does not distinguish between congressionally created entitlements and constitutional rights. However, case law indicates that the nature of the cause of action is irrelevant to the existence of sovereign immunity, which applies regardless of whether the claims arise under statute or constitutional provisions.

The landowners also assert that the Fifth Amendment's right to just compensation is "self-executing," thereby implying an inherent waiver of sovereign immunity. While the Supreme Court has characterized the Fifth Amendment right as self-executing, it does not equate this characterization to a waiver of sovereign immunity allowing for lawsuits against the government. Instead, it is Congress that has the authority to determine whether claims can be brought against the United States and in which courts. The landowners fail to cite any precedent allowing for claims based solely on the Fifth Amendment to be litigated in federal district court. Furthermore, the United States argues that a waiver of sovereign immunity requires both a defined right and a judicial remedy, with the Fifth Amendment providing a right to compensation but lacking a mechanism for enforcement. Therefore, courts must refer to statutes such as the Tucker Act and the Little Tucker Act to enforce the right to compensation.

Significant historical context undermines the landowners’ argument regarding just compensation under the Fifth Amendment. Prior to the establishment of the Court of Claims in 1855, there was no legal mechanism enabling litigants to sue the United States for monetary damages; claimants could only petition Congress for appropriations. The creation of the Court of Claims allowed for the hearing of claims based on federal law, but ambiguity persisted regarding litigants' ability to seek compensation for takings. In Langford v. United States, the Supreme Court dismissed a landowner's claim, asserting that the Court lacked jurisdiction over tort claims related to property seizures, highlighting Congress's failure to provide a general law for compensating just compensation for takings.

The Tucker Act of 1887 further defined the Court of Claims' jurisdiction, allowing claims based on Congressional law and constitutional claims, while also enabling district courts to hear certain claims below $1,000. This Act provided a necessary waiver of sovereign immunity for actions against the United States regarding monetary obligations. The landowners also argue against Congress's authority to condition claims, positing that they are entitled to review by an Article III court. However, their claims are classified as 'public rights' claims, which Congress can assign to non-Article III courts, as articulated in the public rights doctrine.

Matters involving public rights can be judicially determined, but Congress has discretion over whether these matters fall under the jurisdiction of U.S. courts. Judicial authority may be removed from Article III courts and delegated to legislative courts or administrative agencies. The public rights doctrine was historically limited to disputes between the government and individuals under its authority; however, this limitation has been rejected by the Supreme Court, which clarified that cases requiring a waiver of sovereign immunity involve public rights. Public rights are defined as those integral to federal government action, while private rights typically cannot be assigned to legislative courts. Private rights pertain to individual liability under law and are core to judicial power, encompassing common law, equity, and admiralty cases. The landowners’ compensation claims are categorized as public-right claims, linked to government functions regarding treasury payments. Congress can delegate these claims to the Court of Federal Claims. Although the landowners contend their claims are judicially inherent and require Article III court resolution, their reliance on Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States is misplaced, as it dealt with a specific historical context not applicable here.

The 1888 Act designated the circuit court of the United States for the western district of Pennsylvania as the jurisdiction for condemnation proceedings, allowing for appeals to the Supreme Court. Unlike the current situation, the Act specifically assigned jurisdiction to an Article III court for the Monongahela litigants' claims. Several courts of appeals have interpreted that the judicial determination of just compensation is satisfied when there is judicial review available in an Article III court. For instance, in Gulf Power Co. v. United States, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the Pole Attachment Act, finding that while the FCC initially determines compensation, the utility has the right to appeal to a federal appeals court, thus ensuring that the judicial branch ultimately decides just compensation. The Fifth Amendment does not mandate a judicial determination of just compensation at every instance of property taking, allowing administrative agencies to address claims initially, provided there is meaningful judicial review. The Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from the Court of Federal Claims, ensuring landowners receive judicial review in an Article III court. The separation of powers doctrine does not prevent Congress from restricting landowners from pursuing claims in an Article III forum, justifying the district court's dismissal of their declaratory judgment claim. Additionally, Congress's waiver of sovereign immunity for money damages claims requires trials in the Court of Federal Claims without a jury, which does not violate the Seventh Amendment, as this right does not apply to actions against the Federal Government.

Suits for money damages against the United States are not classified as common law suits and are not governed by the Seventh Amendment. The government can only be sued with its consent, which includes specifying the court, the forms of pleading, and the rules for such suits. Claimants must accept the conditions set by the government, including the possibility of facing counterclaims without a jury trial. In this context, landowners suing the United States must adhere to these conditions as they invoke the government’s waiver of sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court has ruled that in cases involving public rights, Congress can assign fact-finding to administrative bodies, which means the Seventh Amendment does not guarantee a jury trial for public-right claims against the government. Consequently, the district court correctly dismissed the landowners’ claims due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The Tucker Act and the Little Tucker Act grant the Court of Federal Claims exclusive jurisdiction over just-compensation claims exceeding $10,000 against the United States, and these acts are constitutional. Although the landowners wish for their claims to be heard in an Article III court with a jury, Congress can impose conditions on its waiver of sovereign immunity, requiring that such claims be heard in the Court of Federal Claims without a jury. The district court's order is therefore affirmed.