Edward J. Zakrzewski, II v. Julie L. Jones, etc.

Citations: 221 So. 3d 1159; 42 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 615; 2017 WL 2290077; 2017 Fla. LEXIS 1158Docket: SC16-729

Court: Supreme Court of Florida; May 25, 2017; Florida; State Supreme Court

Original Court Document: View Document

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Edward J. Zakrzewski, II filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his death sentences are unconstitutional based on the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Hurst v. Florida and Hurst v. State. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed Zakrzewski's three death sentences for the 1994 murders of his wife and two children. Although the jury recommended death for two murders with a 7-5 vote and life imprisonment for the third, the trial court sentenced him to death for all, citing aggravating factors. Zakrzewski's appeal for postconviction relief based on earlier Supreme Court rulings was denied, and he now claims entitlement to relief under Florida's chapter 2016-13. However, based on the precedent established in Asay v. State, the court ruled that the Hurst decisions do not apply retroactively to death sentences finalized before the Ring decision in 2002. Since Zakrzewski's sentences became final in 1999, the court denied his petition for habeas corpus. Justice Pariente concurred, noting the horrific nature of the murders but reaffirming the binding precedent that limited retroactive application of Hurst. The ruling is not final until the time to file a rehearing motion expires.

Judicial override of a death sentence, when the jury recommends life, is identified as an injustice that requires correction. In this context, the Petitioner’s counsel raised arguments similar to those in the precedential cases of Ring and Hurst, asserting that Florida's capital sentencing scheme violates the Sixth Amendment and the Florida Constitution by allowing a death sentence with only a bare majority jury vote. Dissenting justices have criticized the majority for not adhering to established legal standards, specifically the Tedder standard, which mandates that a trial judge can only override a jury’s life recommendation if the evidence overwhelmingly supports a death sentence. Citing past cases, such as Esty v. State and Strausser v. State, it is noted that a reasonable basis must exist in the record to support the jury’s recommendation, highlighting mitigating factors like the defendant's age, lack of criminal history, potential for rehabilitation, and emotional state. The majority's failure to consider these factors or the close nature of the jury's vote (seven to five) undermines the legitimacy of the override, which is deemed improper given the significant mitigation evidence available. The argument emphasizes the necessity of honoring jury recommendations and adhering to the Tedder standard in capital cases.

The majority has improperly replaced the opinions of sworn jurors, who expressed reasonable and differing views on the appropriateness of a death sentence, with their own subjective analysis. The jury had substantial evidence to support a life recommendation for the defendant, Anna, and the trial court acknowledged significant mitigation factors, including the defendant's lack of significant prior criminal history and the influence of extreme emotional disturbance. The trial judge considered fourteen nonstatutory mitigators, indicating the jury's recommendation was reasonable. The excerpt argues against the majority's use of judicial override to counteract the jury's recommendation, suggesting it undermines the purpose of the law intended to check emotional jury decisions. The decision calls for a reconsideration of case law on judicial overrides in light of the Supreme Court's ruling in Hurst v. Florida, which emphasizes the importance of jury recommendations in capital sentencing. The discussion highlights that since Zakrzewski's case, there has been no affirmation of a judicial override on direct appeal, and underscores the need to grant Hurst relief to Zakrzewski due to the unconstitutional nature of the judicial override in his case, while also recognizing its implications for other similarly situated defendants.

Edward J. Zakrzewski, II’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus was reviewed by the Court, claiming relief based on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in *Hurst v. Florida* and subsequent remand in *Hurst v. State*. The Court affirmed Zakrzewski's three death sentences stemming from the 1994 murders of his wife and two children, despite a jury recommending life imprisonment for his daughter. The trial court overrode the jury’s recommendation for life, citing aggravating factors, and the death sentences were upheld on direct appeal. 

Zakrzewski argued that his sentences were unconstitutional under *Hurst* and sought relief under Florida law. However, the Court referenced its ruling in *Asay v. State*, which determined that *Hurst* does not apply retroactively to death sentences finalized before *Ring v. Arizona*. Since Zakrzewski's sentences became final in 1999, he was found ineligible for *Hurst* relief, leading to the denial of his habeas corpus petition. The majority opinion was supported by various justices, while Justice Pariente concurred in result, acknowledging the brutal nature of the crimes but emphasizing adherence to precedent. The ruling is not final until the time for rehearing motions has expired.

Hurst v. State established that its findings do not apply retroactively to death sentences finalized prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Ring v. Arizona, and there is no exception for sentences resulting from judicial overrides. Both Asay and Chief Justice Labarga acknowledged the injustice of judicial overrides when a jury recommends life. The petitioner contended that their counsel raised arguments akin to those in Ring and Hurst, asserting the unconstitutionality of Florida's capital sentencing scheme for requiring a bare majority for death sentences. The dissenting opinion highlighted previous cases where the judiciary failed to honor the Tedder standard, which mandates that a judge can only override a jury’s life recommendation if the evidence overwhelmingly supports a death sentence. Specific cases, including Esty v. State and Strausser v. State, reinforced that significant mitigating factors can support a jury's life recommendation and that the majority’s decision did not consider the jury's recommendation favorably. The jury's narrow 7-5 vote against life for the appellant was emphasized as being just one vote away from a life sentence, underscoring the need to recognize the reasonable basis for the jury's decision.

The majority has disregarded the jury's views and substituted its own subjective analysis regarding the appropriateness of a death sentence, despite jurors expressing differing opinions and having reasonable grounds for their recommendations. The trial court acknowledged significant mitigation factors, including the defendant's lack of significant prior criminal history and extreme emotional disturbance, along with numerous nonstatutory mitigators. Given this extensive evidence, it is inappropriate to conclude that there is no reasonable basis for the jury’s recommendation for life. The text argues against the misuse of judicial discretion intended to check emotional jury decisions, suggesting that judicial overrides should be reconsidered in light of the Hurst decision, which has invalidated previous cases supporting jury overrides. There are currently only three defendants sentenced to death due to judicial overrides, and the distinction between life and death recommendations by juries has been emphasized by the court following Hurst. Therefore, the author advocates for granting relief to Zakrzewski due to his death sentence resulting from a judicial override, which would also benefit other defendants in similar situations arising from unconstitutional overrides.