Crowell v. Massachusetts Parole Board

Citations: 477 Mass. 106; 74 N.E.3d 618Docket: SJC 12203

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court; May 15, 2017; Massachusetts; State Supreme Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by official reports. Errors can be reported to the Supreme Judicial Court's Reporter of Decisions. In the case of Richard Crowell vs. Massachusetts Parole Board, the Supreme Judicial Court reviewed a civil action initiated by Crowell in the Superior Court on April 2, 2014, claiming that the Parole Board violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and related state laws by denying his parole petition. The Superior Court allowed the board's motion to dismiss and denied Crowell's request for reconsideration. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed this decision and remanded the case for further record development, affirming that Crowell's commuted life sentence qualifies as a "life sentence" under regulations. 

Crowell, convicted of second-degree murder in 1962, was sentenced to life imprisonment with parole eligibility. His sentence was commuted in 1974, and he was paroled in 1975, but was returned to custody multiple times for parole violations linked to alcohol issues and assaultive behavior. A traumatic brain injury (TBI) sustained in 1987 led to cognitive and emotional deficits, which Crowell argues contributed to his parole challenges. Following several parole denials, he was paroled in 2003 but had his parole revoked within a month due to noncompliance with rehabilitation requirements. In a 2012 hearing, a board member acknowledged the chronic impact of Crowell's TBI on his behavior and cooperation, suggesting he would require ongoing management in a suitable environment.

Concerns were raised regarding the plaintiff's eligibility for voluntary rehabilitation programs that required full cooperation. The board denied the plaintiff parole, citing his inability to present a viable release plan, a history of defiance, and a lack of rehabilitation necessary for safe community living. Additionally, the board noted the plaintiff's combative attitude and perceived entitlement to parole. Following this decision, the plaintiff filed a certiorari complaint on April 2, 2014, claiming violations of his rights under the ADA and related state provisions. He contested the board's practice of granting parole review hearings every five years instead of annually and sought immediate release or a hearing that would not consider his disability as a barrier to parole. The court dismissed the complaint, stating the board did not discriminate against the plaintiff, as his disability was only one factor in their decision. The plaintiff appealed but faced a brief stay to pursue an unsuccessful motion for reconsideration regarding the nature of his sentence. The case was subsequently transferred from the Appeals Court for further review. The judge's dismissal was contested as the plaintiff argued the board failed to file the required administrative record, violating Superior Court Standing Order 1-96(2). The board claimed compliance with the standing order and procedural rules. The judge's approval of the dismissal was deemed erroneous as the plaintiff had presented a valid claim suggesting the board's decision was arbitrary or unsupported by substantial evidence, indicating the court should have reviewed the administrative record instead.

Certiorari serves as a narrow mechanism to correct significant legal errors evident in the record from judicial or quasi-judicial bodies. The requirement for a defendant agency to submit the administrative record implicitly acknowledges this purpose. Consequently, the dismissal of the case is vacated and remanded for additional proceedings. 

The plaintiff's complaint in the Superior Court challenged the board's denial of his parole petition, claiming it was unlawful as it relied on his disability and criticized him for not securing a proper release plan. He argued this violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), as well as state constitutional and statutory provisions. The Appeals Court previously reached a similar conclusion in Doucette v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., noting the importance of conducting certiorari review under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12(c) rather than 12(b)(6). 

Title II of the ADA prohibits discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities in public services, and the court observed that the board's decision seemingly did not adequately consider the ADA's applicability or other relevant laws. The plaintiff's alleged disabilities, attributed to traumatic brain injury (TBI), and his claim of being denied a fair hearing and parole review process, suggest potential violations of the ADA, which applies to state agencies and prisoners alike. The crux of the inquiry is whether the board discriminated against the plaintiff in denying parole due to his disability. Statutory provisions limit the board's ability to grant parole, requiring a risk assessment that ensures the prisoner can live lawfully in the community while maintaining societal welfare.

Prisoners are not guaranteed parole, and the board's decisions regarding parole are given significant deference, though this deference has limits. Notably, the board cannot exclude prisoners based solely on disability and must take steps to accommodate those with disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Massachusetts parole statutes. If a prisoner has a mental disability that may hinder their ability to prepare a release plan, the board should implement reasonable modifications, such as providing expert assistance for post-release programming. While the board must consider risk reduction programs for mentally disabled prisoners, it is not required to make modifications that would fundamentally change the nature of parole. The board must also assess whether a prisoner's disability might increase their risk of reoffending. In the case at hand, the board recognized the plaintiff's disability and its potential impact on his behavior but did not adequately explore reasonable accommodations that could enable his qualification for parole. The board also failed to consider how the plaintiff's disability influenced his performance during the parole hearing and his ability to identify suitable parole programs. Consequently, while the board evaluated various factors, it did not sufficiently account for the plaintiff's limitations or how they might be addressed, leaving uncertainty regarding how much weight the disability was given in the overall decision. Further examination of the administrative record will provide clarity on these claims.

Parole eligibility for prisoners serving life sentences is governed by General Laws c. 127, 133A, which mandates an initial hearing after fifteen years and rehearings every five years if parole is denied. In contrast, other prisoners denied parole have annual rehearings. The plaintiff contends that his commutation from a life sentence to a thirty-six years to life sentence qualifies him for annual reviews. However, the court disagrees, referencing a precedent that defines the nature of a sentence based on its maximum term, which determines overall imprisonment duration, while the minimum term sets the parole eligibility date. The plaintiff's reliance on California case law is dismissed as those cases involve different circumstances regarding juvenile offenders. The court concludes that adopting the plaintiff's interpretation would undermine the relevance of 133A, effectively limiting 'life sentences' to those without parole eligibility. Consequently, the board maintains that 133A applies to all sentences with 'life' as the maximum term. The court reverses the dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint and remands for further proceedings.