Com. v. Gonzales, J.

Citation: Not availableDocket: Com. v. Gonzales, J. No. 363 EDA 2015

Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania; May 11, 2017; Pennsylvania; State Appellate Court

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The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals the dismissal of charges against Jose Gonzales by the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, which was based on Pa.R.Crim.P. 600. The trial court had determined that a 208-day continuance was excludable from the time calculations under Rule 600, a decision the Commonwealth contests. Gonzales faced serious charges, including attempted murder, stemming from a shooting incident on August 31, 2010. Witnesses identified him as the shooter, and the victim survived after surgery.

Gonzales was arrested on December 11, 2010, and after a preliminary hearing on March 2, 2011, 81 days of delay were attributed to the Commonwealth. A subsequent delay of 341 days until February 6, 2012, was primarily due to defense requests. A continuance was granted on February 6, 2012, extending the trial date to July 9, 2012. Delays continued due to joint or defense requests, including a one-day continuance on October 9, 2012, and further issues regarding DNA evidence.

During a pretrial hearing on October 10, 2012, the Commonwealth indicated readiness to proceed but asked for an extension to obtain DNA samples from Gonzales, to which defense counsel consented. The Commonwealth later noted a lack of the hearing transcript in the certified record when filing a petition in April 2016, leading to a request to supplement the record. It appears that the trial court ruled on the Rule 600 issue without the benefit of the transcript from the October 10 hearing. The decision is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

The Commonwealth's late attempts to provide a complete record were disapproved. The necessity of an additional DNA swab for Appellee remains unclear. The court noted the extendable nature of time, with Judge Hill continuing the case until May 13, 2013. A docket entry from October 10, 2012, indicated that DNA results were not complete, yet the defense was ready, with time ruled extendable. On May 6, 2013, the Commonwealth requested a continuance due to outstanding DNA results, leading to multiple continuances until DNA and fingerprint discovery was completed on December 3, 2013, over twenty months after the initial DNA sample request. The case faced further continuances into 2014, with a 334-day delay from January 8 to December 8, 2014, attributed to the defense. 

On December 8, 2014, Appellee filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 600, claiming the Commonwealth's lack of diligence violated his speedy trial rights. The trial court, presided by Judge Covington, granted the motion, finding that the prior ruling by Judge Hill on the October 10, 2012, continuance was erroneous due to insufficient evidence of Appellee's agreement. The court determined that the 208-day delay from October 10, 2012, to March 6, 2013, counted against the Commonwealth, adjusting the Rule 600 deadline to July 19, 2013, and identifying a violation on May 6, 2013.

The Commonwealth filed a motion for reconsideration on December 17, 2014, contesting that the 208-day delay should not be charged against it. An evidentiary hearing was set for January 8, 2015, during which ADA Jill Fertel testified about her communication with defense counsel regarding proceeding without DNA evidence, which defense counsel deemed unwise. The trial court also attributed a one-day continuance on October 9, 2012, to the Commonwealth due to a 'DNA issue.'

The parties agreed that the time would be extendable, and it was noted that the DNA evidence was incomplete. Both parties expressed readiness to proceed. During cross-examination, defense counsel, who had previously spoken with ADA Fertel on October 10, 2012, claimed not to recall that listing. The Commonwealth contended that the trial court should adhere to the prior judge’s ruling concerning the extendable time frame, while Appellee argued that the earlier decision was clearly erroneous and warranted reconsideration. The court reinstated Appellee's Rule 600 motion, stating that the record did not explicitly indicate an agreement to extend the time. It dismissed ADA Fertel’s testimony regarding defense counsel's agreement as insufficient due to the lapse of time since the conversation. This led to a timely appeal, with the Commonwealth alleging that the lower court misapplied the 'manifest injustice' exception to revisit the issue of the joint continuance that had been previously ruled extendable. The appeal questions whether the trial court's decision was appropriate under the coordinate jurisdiction rule, which generally prohibits a judge from altering a legal determination made by a prior judge of the same level. The standard of review involves assessing whether there was an abuse of discretion, considering the facts in favor of the party winning the Rule 600 motion, with the appellant bearing the burden of proof. Rule 600 mandates that trials commence within 365 days of filing a complaint, with specific provisions for calculating delay periods.

Departure from the coordinate jurisdiction rule is allowed only under exceptional circumstances, which include a change in controlling law, substantial changes in facts or evidence, or a clearly erroneous order that could result in manifest injustice if followed. In this case, the trial court overturned the prior judge's finding that the time from October 10, 2012, to May 6, 2013, was extendable, labeling the earlier ruling as clearly erroneous due to a lack of evidence that the Appellee waived the time under Rule 600. The court also found ADA Fertel's testimony regarding an agreement not credible, despite the availability of a transcript from the October 10, 2012 hearing that seems to support her claim of an agreement. If such an agreement is established, the trial court's conclusions regarding the prior ruling's erroneous nature and a Rule 600 violation would be undermined. The trial court adjusted the Rule 600 run date to July 19, 2013, but including the disputed 208 days would push the run date to February 12, 2014. Furthermore, since the defense acknowledged that 334 days from January 8, 2014, to December 8, 2014, were attributable to them, the adjusted run date would be at least January 12, 2015, indicating no Rule 600 violation during the December 8, 2014 hearing on the Appellee’s motion. Consequently, the order granting the Appellee’s Rule 600 motion is vacated, and the case is remanded for further consideration based on the complete record. The court refrains from commenting on additional conclusions regarding manifest injustice or prejudice under Rule 600 due to the Commonwealth's lack of due diligence.