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Kathleen S. McCreary David Drabkin, Ann F. Cawley, Angelina J. Messenger, Edward R. Napolitano, Charles E. Butler, John D. Hawkins, Nancy G. Steger, Richard Cacciato, Carol Ann Pascal, Marty T. Thompson and Gregory De Sousa v. Jean Stone, Elisabeth M. Brown, Edward Falkenberg, Beatrice K. Underweiser, the Board of Trustees of the Village of Scarsdale, and the Village of Scarsdale, the Scarsdale Creche Committee, Patricia Curran, Cynthia Barsuhn, Grace Fellows, Doris Adler, Mary Tully, Joan Mann and Maria Pedulla, Plaintiffs v. The Village of Scarsdale and the Board of Trustees of the Village of Scarsdale

Citation: 739 F.2d 716Docket: 1071

Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; October 15, 1984; Federal Appellate Court

Narrative Opinion Summary

This case concerns the denial by a local government of applications submitted by resident groups and a committee of local churches to display a creche in a public park during the Christmas season. The district court upheld the denials, reasoning they were necessary to avoid violating the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, finding the restrictions content-based as they targeted the religious nature of the proposed display. The appellate court, however, reversed, holding that the park constituted a traditional public forum and that the Village’s actions impermissibly discriminated against religious expression. Applying Supreme Court precedents, notably Lynch v. Donnelly and Widmar v. Vincent, the appellate court determined that permitting the creche display would not violate the Establishment Clause, provided there was no government sponsorship, financial support, or excessive entanglement with religion. The court endorsed the use of disclaimers to clarify the private nature of the display and remanded for determination of appropriate disclaimer measures. The judgment was reversed with instructions to issue an injunction preventing the Village from using the Establishment Clause as a basis for prohibiting the creche, while reaffirming the Village’s authority to impose reasonable, content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions. The outcome restores the applicants’ right to access the public forum for religious expression under the same conditions as other users.

Legal Issues Addressed

Application of the Lemon Test in Establishment Clause Analysis

Application: The Lemon test was applied to determine whether allowing the creche display had a secular purpose, a primary effect of advancing religion, or resulted in excessive entanglement; the court upheld that an open-forum policy with equal access, as in this case, satisfied these requirements.

Reasoning: Specifically, it agreed with Judge Stewart's finding that allowing the creche served a secular purpose in promoting an open-forum policy, allowing equal access for religious and nonreligious speech, as supported by the precedent set in Widmar.

Authority to Impose Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions

Application: The Village retains the authority to enforce reasonable, content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions on the use of public property, provided such regulations are compatible with normal activities and allow alternative channels for communication.

Reasoning: The Village retains the authority to impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on public property usage. The key consideration is whether the method of expression is compatible with the normal activities at the location and time. If it is compatible, the state can enforce content-neutral regulations that serve significant governmental interests while allowing ample alternative communication channels.

Compelling State Interest and the Establishment Clause

Application: The central issue was whether content-based denials were necessary to serve the compelling interest of adhering to the Establishment Clause; the appellate court found that such denials were not justified under recent Supreme Court precedents.

Reasoning: The central issue on appeal is whether the Village's content-based denials of applications to display a creche during Christmas at Boniface Circle, a traditional public forum, were necessary to uphold the compelling state interest of adhering to the establishment clause of the First Amendment. The district court found the denials justified but did not consider the implications of Lynch v. Donnelly, a relevant Supreme Court decision. The appellate court disagreed with the district court's analysis in light of Lynch and reversed its decision, remanding the case for further consideration.

Content-Based Versus Content-Neutral Restrictions

Application: The denial of applications to display the creche was found to be content-based, as the Village's motivation stemmed from the religious nature of the proposed display.

Reasoning: According to the district court, the denials were content-based, supported by evidence that the reason for denial stemmed from concerns about the religious nature of the symbols involved. Additionally, it noted that other applicants seeking access were redirected to different Village-owned properties, reinforcing the content-based nature of the denials.

Establishment Clause Evaluations Are Fact-Specific

Application: The court emphasized that establishment clause analyses must consider the specific circumstances of each case and rejected analogies to cases involving direct government sponsorship or funding of religious displays.

Reasoning: The Court concluded that establishment-clause evaluations must consider the specific facts of each case.

Incidental Benefits to Religion and Government Action

Application: The court reiterated that indirect or incidental benefits to religion resulting from government action do not violate the Establishment Clause, especially in a public forum context.

Reasoning: The Court affirmed that including a creche in a public display did not constitute excessive aid to religion compared to other established Supreme Court precedents. It acknowledged that while the display may advance religion indirectly, not all government actions benefiting religion are unconstitutional.

Permissibility of Religious Displays in Public Forums under Supreme Court Precedent

Application: Relying on Lynch v. Donnelly and Widmar v. Vincent, the court concluded that permitting the creche display in a public forum for a limited time during the holiday season did not violate the Establishment Clause.

Reasoning: The ruling confirms that the Village may permit a creche display at Boniface Circle, a traditional public forum, for approximately two weeks during the Christmas holiday season without violating the Establishment Clause. It highlights that the prohibition was problematic due to its content-based nature.

Traditional Public Forum Status of Parks

Application: The court recognized Boniface Circle as a traditional public forum, emphasizing its historical use for public purposes and the absence of regulations restricting its use for First Amendment activities.

Reasoning: The district court found that Boniface Circle constituted a traditional public forum, a conclusion uncontested by the parties. This determination was based on the lack of any legal designation of Boniface Circle as other than a park dedicated to First Amendment activities and the Village's inconsistent pattern in granting access to the area.

Use of Disclaimers to Avoid Perceptions of Government Endorsement

Application: The court supported the use of disclaimer signs to clarify that the creche display was privately maintained, instructing the district court to address the disclaimer's size, visibility, and content to mitigate any appearance of government sponsorship.

Reasoning: The current situation suggests that a proper disclaimer, along with a valid secular purpose and the Village’s practices regarding public property access, would prevent reasonable inferences of Village support for any religion related to the creche display. The court instructs the district court on remand to address the size, visibility, and content of the disclaimer signs, noting that the previously displayed sign was inadequately sized and not easily readable from surrounding areas.