Mandable v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n of Westport

Citations: 163 A.3d 69; 173 Conn. App. 256; 2017 WL 1907853; 2017 Conn. App. LEXIS 197Docket: AC38369

Court: Connecticut Appellate Court; May 16, 2017; Connecticut; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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In the case of J. Burke Mandable et al. v. Planning and Zoning Commission of the Town of Westport (AC 38369), the critical issue is whether two lot line adjustment maps were improperly recorded by the Kramers, qualifying as resubdivisions under General Statutes § 8-18, which would necessitate approval from the Planning and Zoning Commission. The plaintiffs, owners of 11 Wakeman Road, appealed the trial court's decision that denied their request for declaratory relief, asserting the Kramers should have obtained commission approval. The trial court affirmed that the Kramers were not required to seek such approval since their maps were not considered resubdivisions. Key facts include that a 1929 map was previously filed in the Westport Land Records, and in 2010, a map submitted by the Kramers was signed by the planning and zoning director, stating it was not a subdivision or resubdivision, thus allowing it to be recorded without commission approval.

In 2013, the Kramers submitted a map to Bradley to divide 10 Wakeman Road into two lots, which Bradley signed and recorded in May 2013. In January 2014, the plaintiffs filed a 'Petition for Determination of Re-Subdivision' regarding the property, but the commission declined to consider it, citing the expiration of the plaintiffs' appeal opportunity and lack of authority to review the petition. The plaintiffs then filed a two-count amended complaint: the first appealing the commission's refusal and the second seeking a declaratory judgment that the Kramers' maps constituted resubdivisions under General Statutes 8-18, necessitating commission approval. The trial court ruled against the plaintiffs, stating that 'resubdivision' requires a prior 'subdivision,' and the Kramers' maps did not modify a subdivision since they altered a map filed before subdivision regulations existed. Consequently, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' appeal and denied their request for declaratory relief. The plaintiffs argued that 8-18 includes changes to recorded maps not qualifying as subdivisions, while the defendants contended that a map must modify a subdivision to be a resubdivision. The court agreed with the defendants, emphasizing that statutory construction aims to reflect legislative intent, and noted that the statute's language must be clear before considering extratextual evidence for interpretation. The court determines ambiguity based on whether the statute allows for multiple reasonable interpretations when viewed in context.

The legislature is presumed to enact provisions with intent and meaning, necessitating that statutes be interpreted such that no part is rendered superfluous. General Statutes § 8-25(a) states that a subdivision plan filed without commission approval is void. § 8-18 defines "subdivision" as the division of land into three or more lots following the adoption of subdivision regulations, including the concept of resubdivision. Resubdivision involves changes to maps of approved or recorded subdivisions, specifically affecting street layouts, reserved public areas, or lot sizes that create additional building lots if previously conveyed.

The interpretation of § 8-18 emphasizes that "resubdivision" cannot occur without a prior "subdivision," which must have taken place post-adoption of regulations. The consistent use of terms within the statute indicates that "approved" and "recorded" subdivisions must have occurred after these regulations for resubdivision to apply. The plaintiffs' argument that "resubdivision" could include maps recorded before the regulations disregards the significance of the term "subdivision," contradicting the principle that statutes should not contain superfluous language. Overall, the interpretation must align with the broader statutory framework to maintain coherence, reinforcing that only subdivisions established after the regulations are recognized for resubdivision purposes.

Plaintiffs are unable to prevail in their claims regarding the Kramers’ maps, as these maps do not modify a subdivision under General Statutes 8-18. The Kramers’ maps attempted to alter a 1929 map recorded prior to the town's subdivision regulations, meaning that any land division occurring before these regulations is not considered a subdivision. The first division after the adoption of the regulations is classified as a "free cut," which is exempt from approval requirements. Consequently, the Kramers’ maps are not classified as resubdivisions and do not require commission approval, leading to the court's dismissal of the plaintiffs’ appeal and denial of declaratory relief.

The plaintiffs also contended that the commission improperly delegated authority to Bradley regarding the classification of the maps. However, they conceded that if the Kramers’ maps are not resubdivisions, this issue need not be addressed. The court determined that the Kramers’ maps were not resubdivisions, thus not pursuing the delegation claim. The trial court found no merit in the plaintiffs’ arguments, pointing out that their claims involved pure questions of law based on undisputed facts, making remand unnecessary. The court declined to consider the legislative history of the statute, affirming its unambiguous text. The judgment was affirmed with concurring opinions from other judges.