State v. Stanifer

Citation: 2017 Ohio 2721Docket: 2016-G-0085

Court: Ohio Court of Appeals; May 8, 2017; Ohio; State Appellate Court

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Mindie Mock Stanifer appealed the judgment of the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas, which sentenced her to 18 years in prison for involuntary manslaughter, kidnapping, and obstruction of justice after she pleaded guilty. The case originated from a 2006 incident where Chad South broke into the home of victims Daniel Ott and Mary Anne Ricker, bound them, and subsequently shot Ott, who later died. South, later arrested for another crime, indicated he was hired by Joseph Rosebrook to kill Ott but mistakenly killed the wrong person. Stanifer was found in Florida in 2014 and initially denied involvement but later confessed to being in the getaway car during the murder. She claimed her involvement was influenced by drug use. In December 2015, she was indicted on nine counts, including conspiracy and aggravated murder, but ultimately pleaded guilty to reduced charges on May 9, 2016. The trial court accepted her plea and dismissed the remaining charges. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment, finding no error in the sentencing.

On July 11, 2016, the trial court sentenced the appellant to a total of 18 years in prison for multiple offenses: eight years for involuntary manslaughter (first-degree felony), six years for kidnapping (second-degree felony), and two concurrent terms of 18 months and 30 months for two counts of obstruction of justice (third-degree felonies). Each sentence included a specified period of post-release control. The sentences are to be served consecutively, with the appellant receiving 322 days of credit for time served. 

The appellant filed a timely appeal, asserting two assignments of error: first, that the trial court's findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), R.C. 2929.11, and R.C. 2929.12 were not clearly and convincingly supported by the record, rendering the sentences contrary to law; and second, that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences for allied offenses of similar import. The appeal is governed by R.C. 2953.08(G), which allows the appellate court to review the record and modify or vacate the sentence if it finds that the sentencing court's findings are not supported by the record or that the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.

R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) outlines the criteria for imposing consecutive sentences, requiring the court to find that consecutive service is necessary to protect the public or punish the offender and that the sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the conduct or the danger posed by the offender. The court must also make specific findings related to the offender's conduct and history to justify consecutive sentences.

In State v. Bonnell, the Ohio Supreme Court clarified that for consecutive sentences to be imposed, a trial court must make the findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) during the sentencing hearing and record these findings in the sentencing entry; however, there is no requirement to provide reasons or to use specific statutory language, as long as the findings are evident in the record. Failure to meet these requirements results in a sentence being deemed contrary to law. In the case at hand, the trial court properly made the necessary findings and included them in the sentencing entry. During the hearing, the appellant expressed remorse and received support from multiple individuals, including a counselor and a jail minister, who attested to her efforts in rehabilitation and character. The defense requested a minimum sentence, but the court noted significant factors in determining the sentence, including the seriousness of the offense, which involved Involuntary Manslaughter linked to a second-degree felony of Kidnapping. The court emphasized that the crime was not impulsive but rather a premeditated act involving collaboration with others, distinguishing the appellant's role while acknowledging the gravity of the offenses committed.

Chad South's actions are characterized as deliberate and scripted, indicating a higher level of culpability compared to impulsive crimes of passion. The obstruction of justice significantly prolonged the suffering of victims, with initial charges dating back to December 2014 and subsequent opportunities to disclose the truth in December 2015 that were not taken. Despite the gravity of the crime, South failed to come clean, necessitating extensive law enforcement efforts to uncover the truth.

Since the homicide of Dan Ott in May 2006, South has a documented history of criminal behavior, including charges of reckless operation of a vehicle, theft, domestic assault, public intoxication, DUI, and drug-related offenses. His criminal activities spanned from 2007 to May of the previous year and included repeated violations of probation and outstanding warrants. Although defense counsel argued that many of these offenses stemmed from drug addiction, the court emphasized the importance of accountability and the extensive nature of South's criminal record, which includes prior offenses and a juvenile record.

The court acknowledged the support from individuals advocating for South's rehabilitation but stressed the need to consider the broader context of his choices and numerous rehabilitation opportunities, such as various treatment programs. Ultimately, the impact of South's actions on the victims' families and their ongoing distress was highlighted, underscoring a pattern of poor decisions throughout his life, despite any claimed good intentions.

An 18-year sentence has been imposed, with consecutive sentences deemed necessary to protect the public and punish the offender. The court found that the offender's conduct was serious enough to warrant consecutive sentences, as the harm from multiple offenses was significant and could not be adequately addressed by a single term. The offender’s history of criminal behavior supports the necessity of consecutive sentences to prevent future crimes. The trial court referenced R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), confirming the need for consecutive sentences based on the seriousness of the offenses and the danger posed to the public.

The appellant raised concerns regarding R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, which guide sentencing purposes and factors. R.C. 2929.11 emphasizes protecting the public and punishing offenders while minimizing burdens on government resources. Sentencing must consider the need for incapacitation, deterrence, rehabilitation, and victim restitution, ensuring that penalties reflect the seriousness of the conduct and are consistent with similar cases. R.C. 2929.12 outlines factors for assessing whether an offender is unlikely to commit future crimes, including prior behavior, criminal history, and signs of remorse.

The trial court thoroughly considered relevant statutory factors in sentencing the appellant, adhering to the felony sentencing guidelines under R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12. The appellant received an eight-year sentence for involuntary manslaughter, six years for kidnapping, and 18 and 30 months for obstruction of justice, all within the statutory ranges specified in R.C. 2929.14(A). The court also properly informed the appellant about post-release control, confirming that the sentence complied with legal standards and was not clearly contrary to law, rendering the first assignment of error meritless.

In the second assignment of error, the appellant argued that the trial court improperly imposed consecutive sentences for allied offenses, asserting that the sentences for involuntary manslaughter and kidnapping should merge. The analysis of allied offenses is performed de novo, guided by R.C. 2941.25, which protects against multiple punishments for the same offense under the Double Jeopardy Clause. The statute allows for conviction of only one allied offense when the same conduct constitutes multiple offenses of similar import. However, if offenses are dissimilar in import, committed separately, or with distinct motivations, multiple convictions are permissible. The Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Ruff established that dissimilar offenses involve separate identifiable harm, separate victims, or distinct motivations, allowing for multiple convictions under R.C. 2941.25(B).

Failure to merge allied offenses constitutes plain error, necessitating appellate court reversal of the conviction and remand for a new sentencing hearing where the state must choose which allied offense to pursue. The case examines whether involuntary manslaughter and kidnapping are allied offenses for sentencing purposes. Involuntary manslaughter, as defined by R.C. 2903.04(A), involves causing another's death during the commission of a felony, while kidnapping under R.C. 2905.01(A)(2) involves forcibly removing or restraining a person to facilitate a felony. The court has previously ruled that involuntary manslaughter and kidnapping are dissimilar offenses.

In this case, Chad South broke into the home of victims Daniel Ott and Mary Anne Ricker, bound them, and subsequently shot Ott, leading to his death. South later indicated to detectives that he had been hired to kill "Dan Ott" but claimed he had killed the wrong person. Appellant, who was waiting in a getaway car with South, initially denied involvement but later confessed to being present during the murder. She admitted to accompanying South under the pretense of a burglary to support her drug habit. 

Under accomplice liability, defined by R.C. 2923.03, anyone aiding or abetting a crime is subject to the same penalties as the principal offender. The court noted that multiple offenses committed against different victims in the same conduct are not allied and can be separately punished. Appellant contends on appeal that the trial court should have determined if involuntary manslaughter and kidnapping were allied offenses before sentencing, emphasizing that she pleaded guilty to only one kidnapping count related to Ott.

During the plea hearing, the court confirmed that Ms. Stanifer understood the charges to which she was pleading guilty. These included a stipulated lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter (first-degree felony) and the merged charges of kidnapping (second-degree felony) involving two victims, alongside two charges of obstructing justice (third-degree felonies). The court's amendment of the indictment regarding counts four and five, and the acknowledgment of both victims, was noted. The legal precedent indicates that involuntary manslaughter and kidnapping are dissimilar offenses, allowing for multiple convictions under Ohio law when offenses involve separate victims or identifiable harms. Thus, the trial court's decision to impose separate sentences was justified. The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas, stating that the appellant's assignments of error lacked merit.