State of Iowa v. Ngor Makuey

Citation: Not availableDocket: 16-0162

Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa; May 3, 2017; Iowa; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Ngor Makuey was convicted of first-degree murder, first-degree robbery, and assault with intent to commit serious injury following a bench trial. The incident occurred on July 2, 2014, when Makuey forcibly entered the home of 97-year-old Ruppert and 92-year-old Harriet Anderson, striking both with a metal spatula. Ruppert later died from blunt force trauma, while Harriet was injured but survived. Evidence included video footage capturing Makuey near the crime scene, along with a blood-stained spatula and clothing found at his residence, which matched Harriet's blood type. 

During the trial, Makuey presented an insanity defense, supported by expert testimony claiming he was unable to distinguish right from wrong due to a psychotic disorder. Contrarily, the State's witnesses argued he had the capacity to understand his actions. Ultimately, the court rejected the insanity defense, convicting Makuey of the charges, including a lesser-included offense for attempted murder, concluding he did not intend to kill. The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences.

Makuey was convicted of first-degree murder under the felony-murder rule and sentenced to life in prison, along with concurrent sentences of two years for assault with intent to commit serious injury, and twenty-five years each for first-degree robbery and second-degree burglary. The assault sentence is to run consecutively. Makuey is appealing, arguing that his sentences violate the Eighth Amendment and Iowa's constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 

The appeal raises the issue of issue preservation, asserting that an illegal sentence can be contested at any time, and that unconstitutional sentences qualify as illegal. The State suggests that challenges to a sentence's constitutionality should first be raised at the trial level. While the State's viewpoint has merit regarding the necessity of a record for review, the Iowa Supreme Court allows for remanding cases when additional records are needed. The court has previously established that unconstitutional sentences are illegal, making usual error preservation rules inapplicable.

The review of alleged unconstitutional sentences is conducted de novo. Makuey cites both the U.S. and Iowa Constitutions in his claim of cruel and unusual punishment, arguing that the felony-murder rule is unjust as applied to him, particularly as the trial court found he did not intend to kill anyone. The background details reveal Makuey's troubled upbringing, including living in an Ethiopian refugee camp marked by violence, moving to the U.S. in 2000, and a history of instability and limited education. These circumstances, along with the court's findings regarding intent, are significant factors in Makuey's appeal.

Defendants can challenge their sentences under the cruel and unusual punishment clause of both state and federal constitutions, specifically through an as-applied analysis based on the individual facts of their cases. The initial step in this analysis is to assess whether the sentence indicates gross disproportionality to the crime committed, with significant deference given to legislative definitions of crimes. A sentence is rarely deemed grossly disproportionate enough to warrant further inquiry. Unique factors, such as the nature of the crime, can heighten the risk of disproportionality. 

In this case, Makuey’s youth was noted, as the court previously ruled that mandatory minimum sentences for youthful offenders are unconstitutional. However, this ruling applies only to offenders under eighteen. The crime of first-degree murder, particularly under the felony-murder rule, is classified broadly and is subject to the most severe penalties under Iowa law. The court emphasized that participation in inherently dangerous crimes can imply intent to kill, thus justifying severe penalties like life imprisonment. 

Makuey argued that his lack of intent to commit murder, while involved in a forcible felony, should lessen his culpability. However, the court found that the conditions surrounding his actions and the felony-murder rule implied intent, concluding that Makuey did not demonstrate gross disproportionality necessary to challenge the constitutionality of his sentence. The court referenced Bruegger, clarifying that an evidentiary hearing is not required in all cases for such challenges, as enough relevant factors were present to affirm the sentence. Ultimately, Makuey’s convictions and sentence were affirmed.