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Joseph Prystash v. Lorie Davis, Director
Citations: 854 F.3d 830; 2017 WL 1487229; 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 7365Docket: 16-70014
Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; April 26, 2017; Federal Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Joseph Andrew Prystash, sentenced to death for his role as a middleman in a murder-for-hire case, is seeking a certificate of appealability from the Fifth Circuit Court to contest the district court's denial of his habeas corpus petition. He poses five specific questions for certification: 1. Whether there was justifiable cause for the procedural default of his Batson claim (related to jury selection). 2. Whether the state's failure to disclose evidence regarding the involuntariness of a co-defendant's confession constituted a Brady violation (withholding exculpatory evidence). 3. Whether the trial court infringed on his rights by restricting expert testimony during sentencing, which limited his ability to present mitigation evidence. 4. Whether the introduction of evidence concerning unadjudicated offenses during sentencing breached the Eighth Amendment. 5. Whether the state court's application of the invited error doctrine effectively barred his claim of being unconstitutionally sentenced to death without a jury instruction on anti-parties. The case stems from the 1994 murder of Farah Fratta, with suspicion falling on her husband, Robert Fratta, amidst a contentious divorce. Evidence indicated that Robert hired Prystash to orchestrate the murder, with Prystash later confessing to his involvement after initially denying knowledge. His confession was obtained following a series of questionable police tactics, including misleading a co-defendant, Howard Guidry, about attorney permissions, which led to Guidry’s confession and ultimately, Prystash's arrest. B. Prystash's trial commenced in summer 1996, during which the State exercised peremptory strikes to eliminate all five black jurors from the venire. Prystash's counsel objected, highlighting the exclusion of juror Ms. Merchant, prompting a Batson inquiry. The court accepted the prosecutor's race-neutral justification for the Merchant strike, but defense counsel did not seek similar scrutiny for the other four black jurors, stating there was nothing more to address. During the trial, the prosecution presented Prystash's written confession and testimony from Billingsley, who relayed incriminating statements made by Prystash. Witness Gipp testified to discussions between Prystash and Robert Fratta regarding plans to kill Farah, including details about a gun given to Prystash and their actions on the night of the murder. Prystash returned home after the crime, disclosed the murder to Gipp, and subsequently met Fratta. Prystash’s counsel introduced evidence related to his arrest to argue procedural irregularities. However, the jury also heard Guidry's confession implicating Prystash, leading to his conviction for capital murder. During sentencing, the State presented evidence of Prystash's criminal history and character flaws, supported by testimonies from ex-wives. The defense countered with testimonies about Prystash's difficult upbringing and character assessments from religious leaders, along with psychologist Walter Quijano's assertion that Prystash would not pose a threat in prison. The court barred Quijano from discussing speculative classifications of inmates. The jury sentenced Prystash to death. He appealed to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, contending that the trial court mistakenly failed to submit a statutory special issue regarding his culpability as a party to the crime rather than the shooter. Although Prystash initially requested that the instruction not be given, the Court of Criminal Appeals noted that the doctrine of invited error could not excuse the omission of a similar instruction. The court in Prystash's case rejected a challenge to a prior ruling using the invited error doctrine. Following an unsuccessful direct appeal, Prystash sought postconviction relief in Texas, which also failed, leading him to file a federal petition. The district court noted that some claims were not presented in state court and stayed the federal proceedings to allow Prystash to file a new state habeas petition. Only one claim, related to a Brady violation concerning the suppression of evidence about the legality of Guidry’s confession, was permitted to proceed but was ultimately rejected on its merits. After returning to federal court, Prystash's amended petition was denied, and the district court analyzed twelve claims but did not issue a certificate of appealability (COA) for any. Prystash now seeks a COA on five specific questions. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, a COA is necessary for a habeas petitioner to appeal a district court's denial of a writ, requiring a substantial showing of a constitutional right's denial. A COA may be granted if reasonable jurists would find the district court's conclusions debatable or incorrect. The district court's procedural ruling will also be examined under this standard. In death penalty cases, any uncertainty regarding a COA issuance is resolved in favor of the petitioner. The federal court must defer to state courts and can only grant habeas relief if state remedies have been exhausted, or if the state court's decision is contrary to or an unreasonable application of established federal law. Prystash claimed that the prosecution discriminated against black jurors, a challenge he could raise despite not being black. However, the district court found this claim procedurally barred since it was raised in a successive state petition and rejected for not being timely presented. Prystash must demonstrate cause to excuse his procedural default in state court, as established in Coleman v. Thompson. He attempted to apply the precedents set by Martinez v. Ryan and Trevino v. Thaler to justify this default. In Martinez, the Supreme Court allowed a petitioner to claim ineffective assistance of trial counsel, which had been previously barred due to procedural issues in state habeas petitions. The Court ruled that a showing of ineffective assistance by initial state habeas counsel could excuse the default, particularly since Arizona law restricts such claims until postconviction. Trevino extended this rationale to Texas, where ineffective assistance claims can technically be raised on direct appeal, but are often only meaningfully reviewed in collateral proceedings. The Supreme Court has noted this exception is narrow and specifically pertains to claims of ineffective assistance at trial. Currently, the Court is deliberating whether this exception applies to claims of ineffective assistance of habeas counsel, as seen in Davila v. Davis. However, even if the Court rules in favor of extending Martinez/Trevino, it would not aid Prystash in his Certificate of Appealability (COA) application, as he did not pursue a COA regarding ineffective assistance claims in his appeal. Prystash's new argument in his COA application—asserting that his Batson claim should be excused due to his inability to obtain juror questionnaires during prior proceedings—was not presented in the district court. The court can only consider the merits of issues raised in the initial appeal, and Prystash's speculation about potential futility in obtaining records lacks the record necessary for proper factfinding. Without evidence of when the jury cards were destroyed, it is unclear if Prystash could have obtained them during his direct appeal or initial state habeas petition. Prystash's claims for cause are dismissed as either unraised in the district court or lacking authority to extend Martinez/Trevino beyond ineffective assistance claims. A Certificate of Appealability (COA) will not be issued for the procedural default ruling. Prystash alleges a due process violation due to the State's failure to disclose that Guidry's confession, as recounted by Billingsley, was involuntary, invoking Brady v. Maryland. To succeed on a Brady claim, a defendant must prove that the prosecution suppressed favorable evidence material to guilt or punishment that was not discoverable with due diligence. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals allowed this claim in Prystash's second habeas attempt but later upheld the district court's finding that the confession information was immaterial given overwhelming evidence of guilt. The district court deferred to the Texas court's application of federal law and assessed whether the state court's materiality finding was an unreasonable application of federal law. Prystash argues the district court applied the wrong materiality standard, asserting he needed to show a reasonable likelihood of a different outcome, not a 'more likely than not' standard. While he correctly identifies the applicable standard as 'reasonable probability,' the district court actually applied this standard, concluding that Guidry's confession would not have altered the trial's outcome due to substantial evidence against Prystash, including his own confession and corroborating testimony from his girlfriend, Gipp. The jury that convicted Guidry did not hear Prystash's confession, which was inadmissible hearsay for Guidry's case. The evidence against Prystash was deemed strong, leading to only a brief mention of the Guidry confession during his trial, which prosecutors did not emphasize. The district court upheld the state court's finding that the manner in which Guidry's confession was obtained did not undermine the verdict's reliability. Prystash claimed his due process rights were violated due to false testimony regarding the voluntariness of Guidry’s confession, which was obtained through police deception. The district court reiterated the state court's view that the testimony regarding the confession was minimal and that the confession was largely cumulative to other incriminating statements made by Prystash. Prystash shifted his Brady argument, asserting that the misconduct regarding Guidry’s confession could have been used to challenge the credibility of his own confession. However, the district court found that the officers involved in taking Prystash’s confession were not linked to the misconduct associated with Guidry's confession, and corroborating evidence from Gipp further diminished the impeachment value of the Guidry confession. Prystash failed to meet the Certificate of Appealability (COA) standard concerning the disclosure of the circumstances of Guidry's confession. Additionally, Prystash contended that he was denied the right to present mitigating evidence regarding his potential classification in the prison system when the State barred Quijano from testifying. The trial court ruled this testimony as speculative, and the district court determined that Prystash did not demonstrate a fundamental fairness violation necessary to overturn the evidentiary ruling. Prystash's arguments centered on perceived inconsistencies in the treatment of evidence in other cases, neglecting to address the established limitations on presenting mitigating evidence according to state rules. The district court's decision on this matter was upheld. Prystash contends that the trial court erred by allowing the prosecution to present evidence of his prior unadjudicated offenses, including an arrest for attempted murder, during the sentencing phase for the death penalty. He claims this violates the Eighth Amendment by introducing unreliability, causing undue prejudice, and diminishing procedural safeguards. However, established legal precedent forecloses this argument, as supported by cases such as Vega v. Johnson and Harris v. Johnson, affirming the district court's decision. Additionally, Prystash raises a concern regarding his sentence given that he did not directly cause the murder, arguing that capital punishment should align with personal responsibility and moral guilt, as outlined in Enmund v. Florida. Texas law includes an anti-parties instruction during sentencing to ensure the jury focuses on the defendant's individual culpability. Prystash, convicted of capital murder as a party, initially requested the exclusion of this instruction on constitutional grounds but later reversed his position on appeal, claiming its absence was erroneous. The Court of Criminal Appeals ruled he had invited the error and denied relief. The district court identified this ruling as a procedural bar to his federal habeas relief. Prystash argues that the invited error doctrine was not firmly established at the time of his appeal due to prior overrulings by the Court of Criminal Appeals. Although the district court's application of this procedural bar may be debatable, it also determined that the claim concerning the special issue lacked merit, referencing past decisions indicating that jurors may consider a defendant's non-triggerman status in their deliberations. Prystash's application for a Certificate of Appealability (COA) does not include the district court’s merits ruling as an issue for appeal, which is required under 28 U.S.C. 2253(c)(3). His briefing fails to adequately challenge the grounds on which the district court rejected his claim, rendering his procedural question moot. Circuit case law indicates that granting a COA would result in an advisory opinion since the absence of a COA challenging the merits ruling prevents relief. The district court's merits ruling is supported by circuit law, stating that a jury needs only one fair opportunity to consider mitigating evidence. Although Prystash's counsel argued that the jury instructions differed from those in a precedent case (Nichols), the critical issue of future dangerousness was similarly addressed in both trials. Consequently, the application for a COA is denied.