Ignelzi, P. v. Ogg, Cordes, Murphy and Ignelzi

Citations: 160 A.3d 805; 2017 Pa. Super. 111; 2017 WL 1398880; 2017 Pa. Super. LEXIS 264Docket: Ignelzi, P. v. Ogg, Cordes, Murphy and Ignelzi No. 971 WDA 2016

Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania; April 19, 2017; Pennsylvania; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Philip A. Ignelzi, along with his wife Marianne Ignelzi, is involved in a legal dispute against former partners and the law firm Ogg, Murphy, and Perkosky, LLP (OMP) concerning the dissolution of their former law firm, Ogg, Cordes, Murphy, and Ignelzi, LLP (OCMI). Ignelzi, who became a judge in November 2009, could no longer remain a partner at OCMI, leading to its dissolution. A new firm was established by some former partners, while others formed separate entities. Following unsuccessful settlement negotiations regarding Ignelzi's partnership share, he filed a lawsuit on October 31, 2011, alleging breach of contract and violations of the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA) related to his entitlement to contingent fee cases concluded post-dissolution.

The Superior Court of Pennsylvania reviewed an appeal from Gary J. Ogg, Michael A. Murphy, Rebecca Murphy, John D. Perkosky, and OMP concerning a discovery order issued on May 20, 2016. This order partially granted and partially denied their motion for a protective order against Ignelzi’s discovery requests, which included client lists, ledgers, and financial summaries from OCMI as of December 31, 2009. The appellants contended that Ignelzi was not entitled to this information based on previous court rulings that established the parameters for determining partnership shares upon a partner's departure. The trial court determined that no express agreement existed regarding the distribution of shares for contingent fee cases post-dissolution, thereby limiting Ignelzi's claims primarily to those under the UPA. The court ultimately quashed the appeal, and the specific requests for document production were not included in the certified record on appeal.

The appellant bears the responsibility for ensuring that the appeal record is complete, as established in Commonwealth v. Preston, 904 A.2d 1, 7 (Pa. Super. 2006). The appellants contended that the value of Judge Ignelzi's work was not ascertainable at the relevant time and that the discovery requests were overly broad, burdensome, and potentially violative of ethical rules, particularly due to the risk of exposing confidential client information. The trial court partially granted and partially denied the appellants' motion for a protective order, requiring the production of certain documents while also limiting the scope of others. Specifically, documents requested in paragraph 2 were denied without prejudice, allowing for future, more narrowly tailored discovery. The court mandated that any documents shared must be redacted to protect confidentiality, assigning numbers to clients instead of using their names, and restricting disclosure to specified parties only. The court acknowledged the order's significance as it presented a controlling legal question, allowing for immediate appeal to facilitate resolution. Appellants filed a notice of appeal on June 22, 2016, which raised concerns regarding its timeliness; the appeal was due within 30 days of the order's entry. The Supreme Court's ruling clarifies that an order is not appealable until properly docketed with notice of entry. As there was no such notation, the appeal period did not commence, rendering the appeal timely.

Ignelzi has questioned the appealability of the trial court's order regarding multiple claims and parties, noting that a final order can only be appealed if it facilitates the resolution of the entire case and is expressly determined as such. The order in question, which partially granted and denied a protective order, does not dismiss any claims or parties, thus lacking the characteristics of a final order as defined under Rule 341(c). Therefore, the court lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal under this rule. 

The potential for jurisdiction under Rule 313, which pertains to collateral orders, is also examined. A collateral order must be separable from the main action and involve a significant right that would be irreparably lost if not reviewed immediately. The Appellants argue that the trial court's decision regarding access to confidential legal files could lead to Ignelzi obtaining sensitive information about clients he has no involvement with. They assert that the underlying issue of whether Ignelzi is entitled to recover from unresolved contingent fee cases is central to the appeal. 

The Appellants also claim that public policy should preclude a former law firm partner who becomes a judge from collecting fees from unresolved matters. The resolution of these issues could determine whether Ignelzi is entitled to a share of contingent fees post-dissolution of OCMI. If it is found that these cases had no value at the time of dissolution or that a judge cannot collect from a former firm, Ignelzi would not receive any compensation, effectively concluding the case.

Appellants' appeal from a discovery order is deemed not to meet the separability requirement of the collateral order doctrine, resulting in a lack of jurisdiction for the court to hear the appeal. Appellants argue that Ignelzi should not receive certain information, citing several Rules of Professional Conduct regarding fee sharing and confidentiality. However, the Supreme Court has clarified that these rules do not constitute substantive law but are applicable in disciplinary contexts. Even if the order were separable, the matter remains unripe for review.

The court references T.M. v. Elwyn, where the requirements for asserting attorney-client privilege in withholding discovery were established. In that case, a school objected to document requests on privilege grounds but failed to provide a privilege log or identify specific protected documents. Consequently, the court ruled it could not determine any privilege applicability without such information. Similarly, the Appellants must assert facts proving the relevance of attorney-client privilege and create a privilege log for the trial court's review. Since the Appellants have not fulfilled these obligations, the court concludes they do not meet the jurisdictional criteria for appeal under the collateral order doctrine, leading to the quashing of the appeal. Judgment entered on 4/19/2017.