Christopher White v. Troy Steele

Citations: 853 F.3d 486; 2017 WL 1279289; 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 5958Docket: 16-2349

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; April 6, 2017; Federal Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Christopher White appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, armed criminal action, and first-degree assault, following a jury trial in Missouri. He filed a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, contending that the prosecution failed to disclose a deal made with a key witness, Jeffrey Shockley, in exchange for his testimony. The district court denied White’s petition, which was subsequently affirmed by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.

The case originated from a shooting incident on June 21, 2002, where three armed men killed Freddie Chew. Shockley, a friend of Chew, identified White as one of the shooters during the trial in January 2004. Shockley had pending felony charges at the time and denied receiving any deal for his testimony. The jury convicted White, sentencing him to life without parole. 

On appeal, White argued violations of his right to a speedy trial, errors related to jury instructions, and limitations on cross-examination of Shockley. The Missouri Court of Appeals upheld the conviction. White later sought post-conviction relief citing ineffective assistance of counsel, which was also denied.

In February 2008, White filed a federal habeas petition reasserting his claims, later amending it after discovering a conflict-of-interest form that suggested Shockley had negotiated a deal to testify. White asserted that the State violated Brady v. Maryland by failing to disclose this agreement and Napue v. Illinois by not correcting Shockley’s false testimony about receiving a deal. He maintained some original claims while abandoning others.

White asserted in an affidavit that he received a conflict-of-interest form in January 2009. The district court determined that his Brady and Napue claims were not time-barred under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) because they were filed within one year of this date, which was considered the point at which the claims could have been discovered through due diligence. Despite this, the court denied White's amended petition on the merits. White later moved to alter or amend the judgment, arguing that he had not completed discovery on his Brady claim, leading the court to grant an evidentiary hearing.

During the hearing, both White and Smallwood indicated that the form was provided to White in 2007 or 2008. Testimony from Shockley’s former defense counsel, Robert Taaffe, clarified that he never secured a plea deal for Shockley and noted that a state offer was declined by Shockley due to a requirement to testify against his brother. Taaffe also mentioned a suggestion from the prosecutor about a potential dismissal of the charges, which the prosecutor denied. 

Post-hearing, the State revealed expense records showing financial support provided to Shockley, but the district court still denied White’s motion to alter or amend the judgment, reaffirming that his claims were meritless while issuing a certificate of appealability on them. On appeal, White contended that the district court erred in denying his claims, while the State argued they were time-barred, procedurally defaulted, and without merit. The appeal court reviews factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo.

The State claimed that White's Brady and Napue claims were barred by AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations, which starts from when the factual basis of the claim could have been discovered. White's claims were timely as per the district court, based on his January 2009 discovery of the form. The State contested this finding, citing the evidentiary hearing where White and Smallwood suggested earlier dates for receiving the form. However, the court found no clear error in its original finding, noting inconsistencies in Smallwood's testimony and White’s clarification that he received the form after filing his original habeas petition on February 29, 2008, thus making a 2007 receipt impossible.

The timing of White's receipt of the form remains uncertain. However, despite doubts regarding compliance with the statute of limitations, the court opts to address the merits of Shelton's habeas corpus petition rather than remanding for further development of the limitations defense. Under established precedents, including Brady v. Maryland, the prosecution's suppression of favorable evidence violates due process if the evidence is material to guilt or punishment, regardless of the prosecution's intent. Materiality is assessed based on whether the undisclosed evidence would likely have altered the trial's outcome, and this obligation extends to any agreements between the government and witnesses for leniency in exchange for testimony.

The district court concluded, after reviewing evidence and witness demeanor during the habeas hearing, that no formal or implicit agreement existed between the state and witness Shockley. This finding was not clearly erroneous. While defense counsel noted a potential negotiation for a plea agreement, Shockley ultimately rejected any offer. The prosecution's obligation to disclose only arises from an actual agreement, not mere negotiations. Testimony indicated no secret deals were made, with the prosecutor denying any such hints. Importantly, the prosecution did not dismiss charges against Shockley after his testimony, and at sentencing, it was emphasized that no agreement or quid pro quo existed for his testimony against White. Although White suggested that Shockley had a separate agreement to testify against his brother, Shockley denied that this was in exchange for any consideration. Overall, the district court's finding that no deal or agreement existed regarding Shockley's testimony against White or his brother was upheld.

Without an existing agreement, the State could not have suppressed evidence or knowingly used false testimony, as Shockley's statement regarding not receiving a deal was not false. The absence of a deal meant the State could not have known about any expectation Shockley might have had. The district court assumed that financial assistance given to Shockley—specifically a hotel stay and relocation support—was Brady material that should have been disclosed. However, even if this assumption is valid, the failure to disclose this assistance did not violate Brady, as it did not undermine confidence in the verdict. During the evidentiary hearing, Shockley indicated the police moved him for safety reasons due to threats and stated he was unaware of who funded his hotel or food vouchers, asserting he received neither cash nor valuable items. At sentencing, it was mentioned that Shockley was relocated to protect him from threats. Unlike the precedent set in United States v. Librach, where cash payments incentivized testimony, there is no evidence that Shockley received any incentive to testify based on the assistance he received, which occurred in 2002, well before White’s trial in January 2004. Shockley also expressed a desire for 'revenge' for his friend's death as his motivation to testify. The district court concluded that disclosing this assistance could have negatively impacted White’s defense by inviting speculation about potential intimidation. Therefore, the nondisclosure did not undermine the verdict's confidence, leading to the affirmation of the denial of White's habeas corpus petition.