State of Iowa v. Christopher Jepsen

Citation: Not availableDocket: 16-0203

Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa; April 5, 2017; Iowa; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Christopher Jepsen, convicted of two counts of third-degree sexual abuse, was initially sentenced to probation, which was later deemed illegally lenient. In 2016, the State moved to correct this sentence, resulting in a prison term of up to ten years. Jepsen appealed, arguing that the correction violated his double jeopardy rights and contended he should receive credit for the time served on probation. The Court of Appeals noted that the determination of double jeopardy issues hinges on legislative intent and Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.24(5)(b), which allows for credit for time spent in custody in certain facilities but not for supervised probation. The court found the record insufficient to fully assess Jepsen’s claim and conditionally affirmed the corrected sentence, remanding the case for the district court to clarify whether Jepsen spent any of his probationary period in a residential treatment or alternative jail facility. The original sentencing error arose because Jepsen’s conviction for count II was a forcible felony, making him ineligible for a suspended sentence.

The court held a resentencing hearing, utilizing all available sentencing options, and referenced an updated PSI report along with materials from the State related to a potential probation revocation. On January 29, 2016, the court issued a corrected judgment, voiding conflicting parts of the original sentence and imposing concurrent ten-year terms of incarceration for each count. While Jepsen received credit for time served in county jail, his request for credit for time served on probation was denied, as the court classified the resentencing as a new sentence rather than a probation revocation scenario. Consequently, the State’s application for probation revocation was dismissed as moot. Jepsen is now appealing, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to argue that the Double Jeopardy Clause entitles him to credit for the time spent on probation under the illegal sentence. 

The court will review this double-jeopardy claim de novo, acknowledging that Jepsen's constitutional challenge to the corrected sentence can be directly reviewed, despite his characterization of the issue as ineffective assistance of counsel. Jepsen does not contest the illegality of the original sentence or assert that he discharged it, which would preclude a corrected sentence. Under Iowa rules, he is entitled to credit for time spent in custody prior to correction, but he claims entitlement to credit for probation time as well. The Double Jeopardy Clause protects against multiple punishments for the same offense, requiring that any punishment already served must be credited when imposing a new sentence. The case references relevant precedents affirming these principles.

Pearce asserts that any punishment previously served should be subtracted from a new sentence. This principle has been upheld in cases such as United States v. Martin and United States v. McMillen. The State acknowledges that if Jepsen served time in incarceration, he would receive credit against his new sentence, but disputes whether he should receive credit for time served on probation. Both Jepsen and the State agree that probation constitutes a form of punishment, as noted in Korematsu v. United States. However, the State argues against credit for probation time, referencing Trecker v. State, which ruled that no statute allows credit for probation time after its revocation.

Jepsen contends, citing Martin, that probation must be credited against his new prison sentence since it represents "punishment already exacted." Martin establishes that while probation and imprisonment differ, both restrict liberty, allowing for credit determination based on the conditions of probation. Jepsen argues for a one-to-one credit ratio for probation days to incarceration days, while the State opposes this, suggesting that creating a formula for such credit is arbitrary. The State prefers the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in People v. Whitfield, which held that probation is not equivalent to imprisonment for double jeopardy purposes and that credit for probation time is discretionary.

The conflicting positions present two outcomes: either remand for the court to grant Jepsen credit for over four years of probation against his ten-year prison sentence, or affirm no credit, leaving Jepsen with zero days despite having completed nearly five years of probation.

The document addresses the complexities of sentencing and credit for time served in the context of double jeopardy and legislative intent. It critiques two sentencing options: the first undermines the intended severity of the punishment for sexual abuse against a minor, while the second overlooks the principle of full credit established in Pearce v. Alabama. To reconcile these positions, it references Iowa case law and the Double Jeopardy Clause, emphasizing that the total punishment must align with legislative intent. 

Rule 2.24(5)(b) is highlighted as crucial for determining the credit owed to a defendant after correcting an illegal sentence, specifically providing for full credit for time spent in institutional custody prior to correction. The court has defined "custody" as time spent in jail or a detention facility. The discussion includes relevant statutes, particularly Iowa Code 907.3(3), which was amended to clarify credit for time served during probation revocation, allowing credit only for time spent in specific residential facilities.

The document concludes that Jepsen is entitled to sentencing credit for time spent in alternative jail facilities but not for time spent on supervised probation outside these facilities. Due to incomplete records regarding Jepsen's probation conditions, the sentence is conditionally affirmed, with a remand for a hearing to provide the missing information. The district court is instructed to credit Jepsen for time spent in qualifying facilities against his corrected prison sentence, and the court does not retain jurisdiction.