CMJ Management Co. v. Wilkerson

Citation: Not availableDocket: AC 16-P-426

Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court; March 31, 2017; Massachusetts; State Appellate Court

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All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. Errors can be reported to the Reporter of Decisions at the Supreme Judicial Court in Boston, MA. 

In the case CMJ Management Company vs. Patricia Wilkerson (No. 16-P-426), heard in the Suffolk Housing Court, Wilkerson appeals a judgment that granted CMJ possession of her apartment due to alleged lease violations. The court found that Wilkerson's juvenile grandson engaged in criminal activity by firing a BB gun, which injured two other children in the complex. Following this incident, Wilkerson received a notice to quit her lease.

Wilkerson argues that the judge incorrectly interpreted the lease's provisions regarding criminal activity as applicable to juveniles and disputes the characterization of her grandson's actions as criminal. Furthermore, she contends that the judge erred in denying her request for a jury trial after she failed to submit a required pretrial memorandum.

Wilkerson resides in Harbor Point Apartments, a mixed-income housing development with both market-rate and subsidized units under the Section 8 Housing Assistance Program. Her lease, a HUD "model lease," prohibits unlawful activities and allows termination for material noncompliance, which includes criminal acts committed by tenants or their household members. The court's ruling hinges on the interpretation of these lease terms and the nature of the juvenile's conduct.

The lease provision clearly indicates Congress's intent to include juvenile conduct as "criminal activity" under the Section 8 program. Despite the absence of criminal charges against the juvenile, the act of firing a BB gun and injuring residents is classified as criminal activity, constituting a material breach of Wilkerson's lease. The lease permits termination if there is criminal activity by any household member, aligning with federal statutes and HUD regulations aimed at ensuring safe housing. Wilkerson’s argument that violations of G. L. c. 269. 12B, which is punishable by a fine, should not be considered criminal activity is rejected; criminal acts, even if punishable by fines, fall under the definition of criminal activity in the lease. The lease does not stipulate that criminal activity must lead to arrest or conviction, and the conduct in question posed a threat to resident safety, justifying eviction. The authority to terminate tenancy is exercised at the owner’s discretion, considering all relevant circumstances. The judge’s conclusion that the juvenile's actions breached the lease was upheld, affirming that the lease applies equally to juveniles and adults. Wilkerson also claims she was denied her right to a jury trial under Massachusetts law.

Article 15 affirms the right to a jury trial in property disputes and suits between parties, unless previously established practices dictate otherwise. However, General Laws c. 185C. 21 mandates that cases in the housing court department be heard by a judge without a jury, except where constitutional rights necessitate a jury trial and the defendant has not waived this right. Wilkerson requested a jury trial referencing relevant legal statutes and rules, including Part I, Article XV of the Massachusetts Constitution and USPR 8, which permits jury trials in summary process actions in Housing Court and Superior Court.

Wilkerson's jury demand was dismissed after she failed to comply with a pretrial conference order, despite having timely requested a jury trial in her answer to the complaint. Under Mass. R. Civ. P. 16, parties must discuss potential settlements and submit pretrial memoranda. CMJ submitted a memorandum with proposed jury instructions, while Wilkerson, unrepresented by counsel, did not file a memorandum or respond to CMJ's settlement letter. The pretrial order warned of potential sanctions for non-compliance, including the striking of jury demands. During the pretrial conference, when questioned about the lack of a memorandum, Wilkerson explained her understanding of the process, but the judge insisted that proceeding to a jury trial without a memorandum was not permissible.

While a timely jury demand can be made, failure to comply with procedural requirements may lead to its waiver. Waiver of a constitutional right requires intentional relinquishment, and demands for jury trials cannot be withdrawn without mutual consent. Housing Court judges have broad discretion to manage summary process hearings, particularly for self-represented litigants, acknowledging their challenges and allowing for flexibility with late motions and rescheduling as deemed appropriate. The Housing Court's standing orders recognize the prevalence of pro se litigants and encourage fair application of rules to accommodate their needs.

Presiding over cases with self-represented litigants poses challenges, especially when one party has legal counsel. Judges are required to apply the law impartially, irrespective of a litigant's representation status, while ensuring that self-represented parties have a fair opportunity to present their claims and defenses. The judge's responsibility is to manage the proceedings and assist self-represented individuals in articulating their cases without bias.

In the case referenced, Wilkerson initiated a summary process action in September 2014, demanding a jury trial set for September 2015. She was later informed of a pretrial conference scheduled for September 11, 2015. At the conference, the judge struck her jury demand due to her failure to submit a required pretrial conference memorandum and scheduled a bench trial shortly thereafter. Wilkerson did not object to the jury demand being stricken and proceeded with the bench trial.

Generally, when a party requests a jury trial but then participates in a non-jury trial without objection, they are considered to have waived their right to a jury. This right is protected under Article 15 of the Massachusetts Constitution, which preserves the right to a jury trial for actions recognized at the time of the Constitution's adoption in 1780, including eviction cases.

The judge's authority to impose sanctions must align with due process principles, which consider factors such as the party's culpability, actual prejudice to the opposing party, potential for lesser sanctions, and the deterrent effect of the sanction. Wilkerson made efforts to understand court requirements and indicated she was advised to appear for the pretrial conference. The record does not demonstrate that the opposing party suffered actual prejudice, nor that the judge considered lesser sanctions before striking the jury demand.

Due to the circumstances, it was determined that Wilkerson's jury demand should not have been struck without considering less severe alternatives. Consequently, the judgment awarding possession and costs to the plaintiff was vacated, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.